Philipp II. and the Army Reforms

in the Mediterranean in the – 4th Century

“spiras legionibus nexunt”

Ennius Fr. 498

by Jakob Büchel, Vienna/Austria, 2024

Arrian, Diodor, Livy and Polybios are discussed, the “Iphicratean peltast”, the “speira”, the “Asthetairoi” and the “phalanx” in two parts explained. Have fun!

„ἔστι δἑ συμπάντα τᾶυτα τἁ συγγράμματα ἐκείνη μάλιστα οὑκ ὠφέλιμα, ὁτι – All of these works are bad and useless, because“¹

This one has not been added so far! Astonishing how many nerds found time and spirit to write about ancient warfare. I am fond of it too, so let these lines be attached to the shelves already filled with greetings to all my elder colleagues, starting off with Xenophon.

1. Philipp II. of Macedonia, Chronology

I have nothing new to say about king Philipp. The following lines give some suggestions concerning chronology and emphasize some points frequently neglected:

-382: Philipp was born as the third son of Eurydike and Amyntas II.² This king then had „reigned“ for eleven years. He was, however, expelled at least once and possibly twice from his realm. In between Argaios II. was recognized as another Macedonian king. The principal menace was the Olynthian league which actually „liberated“ Pella and other Macedonian cities of his rule and proceeded to install democracy instead. In this Olynth was allied to the Illyrian coalition of Bardylis which questioned the very existence of Macedonia. The king was rescued by Spartan intervention and managed to return. Still Olynth and the Illyrians maintained their direct trade through his country and stood ready for intervention. Sparta seized the Cadmeia.

-379: After intense fighting Sparta „dissolved“ the Olynthian league.

-377: Athens formed its second Attic league, Thebai freed the Cadmeia, established democracy and reformed the Boiotian league. Both declared war on Sparta.

-375: Amyntas II. concluded treaties with Thessaly and Athens as Olynth again established its league. An army of Triballians presumably via the Strymon valley entered the southern plain and plundered in the vicinity of Abdera.

-374: In Thessaly a struggle between a democratic faction in the only harbor Pherai and the conservative hinterland kept the country occupied for much of the century. In a first phase the tyranny of Pherai with Jason generated sympathies throughout Thessaly, he was recognized as „Tagos“ of all Thessalians and accumulated large followings in the Hestiaiotis, Pelasgiotis and Thessaliotis while Phtiotis and the Magnetai became his vassals.

-371: Sparta was defeated at Leuktra. Its hegemony crumbled.

-370: Jason of Pherai was murdered and Amyntas II. of Macedonia died of old age. He had six sons: Alexander, Perdiccas, Philipp and a daughter Eurynoë were born by Eurydike; and Archelaos, Arrhidaios and Menelaos by Gygaia. Alexander II. became king. Yet why Eurydike’s sons preceded Gygaia’s is unsure as Eurydike was a Lyncestian (then foreign) princess while the name Gygaia is known in Macedonian history before. Anyway Alexander rallied his army and payed his tribute to the Illyrians.

-369: In Thessaly Jason’s killer was murdered, that killer in turn murdered by Jason’s nephew Alexander who, being a classical example of a mad dictator and mentally ill, squandered the sympathies for democracy in Thessalia by such measures as massacring former allies. The Thessalians called for help against him and were answered by Alexander II. of Macedonia and the Theban/Boiotian league simultaneously. Alexander II. invaded Thessaly, expelled the Aleuadae from Larisa and Crannon and established Macedonian garrisons in these cities. He seems to have had some successful engagement with the Pheraians too.³ He then during his absence lost his kingship to a rivaling faction at home represented by his brother in law, Ptolemy the Alorite. The Aleuadae then regretted their policy and voted for the Boiotian intervention instead.

-368: Pelopidas, the commander from Thebai, together with a coalition of Thessalians managed to defeat Alexander of Pherai in the field and to restrict him to his county. He was not strong enough, however, to lay siege to Pherai and instead drove the Macedonians from the country. Alexander II. meanwhile was murdered by Ptolemy. Another faction headed by Pausanias and backed up by the Olynthians claimed the throne while still another faction with Argaios II. stood apart. Eurydike and her remaining sons are told to have been guarded by Iphicrates,⁴ yet eventually Pelopidas mediated the compromise. Ptolemy became the „guardian“ for Perdiccas while the factions remained unaltered. Pelopidas then reformed the Thessalian koinon⁵ and withdrew home as Thebai had no resources for a permanent presence even in Thessaly. Philipp was taken as a hostage to Thebai and lived there in the house of Pammenes.⁶ He traveled in Greece, learned much and met one of his future wives at a festival. The Pheraian dictator, now backed up by an alliance with Athens, immediately continued his aggressive policies and soon afterwards Thebai again had to respond to Thessalian complaints. Pelopidas sent as mere ambassador got caught by the dictator.

– 367: Again released he received in Susa approval for the Boiotian version of a “koine eirene”, whence both Sparta and Athens since then were in opposition to the great king.

– 366: Athens allied to Ariobarzanes, the revolting governor of Phrygia Minor, and started a proxy war against the Carian dynast, took Samos from him and in the next year resettled it with 2 000 cleruchs. In turn Thebai succeeded to gain Oropos from Athens.

-365: Perdiccas III. in Macedonia came to age, managed to kill Ptolemy first and succeeded to the Macedonian throne.⁷ Athens resented an Olynthian intervention in Amphipolis and declared war on the league. This in – fight of democracy for the first time in decades opened a chance for the Macedonian kingdom to recover. Philipp returned to Macedonia and probably became the king’s „epitropos“ in the Amphaxitis.⁸

-364: Athens took Torone and Potidaia from the Olynthian league, yet failed to take Amphipolis. In its defense Olynth and the Thracians mutually supported each other while Macedonia still claimed to support Athens, albeit achieved nothing of any consequence. In Thessaly another battle was fought between Pheraians and Thebans where Pelopidas fell. While the victorious intervention army again was unable to terminate the tyranny of the Tagos in Pherai, at least Magnesia and Phtiotis were taken from him and joined the koinon.⁹

-362: Olynth rallied at home and the Amphipolitans next asked Perdiccas III. for help who sent a Macedonian force there. Athens consequently declared war on Perdiccas¹⁰ and took Methone and Pydna from him. Thebai vanquished Sparta at the battle of Mantineia, yet Epaminondas died and Theban “hegemony” crumbled.

-361: Alexander of Pherai fell on his former ally Athens which led to a treaty between Athens and the Thessalian “koinon”.¹¹ This treaty names the “koinon’s” officials and the knights as partners and omits the “archon’s” name. Nothing certain is known concerning decision-making in this structure, yet apparently the conservative oligarchic families, principally the Aleuadae from Larisa, were not happy with their position in it.

-360: Perdiccas III. nevertheless opened a second front against Illyria, refused to pay the tribute, marched out for battle and was conquered and slain by Bardylis and his Dassarethians.¹² Aegypt again revolted from the Persians and Nectanebos II. became pharaoh.

-359: Philipp II. claimed the throne of Macedonia,¹³ he sought and received peace with the Dassarethians and alliance with Derdas of Elimiotis, marrying Bardylis’ granddaughter Audata and the latter’s sister Phila too. He bribed the old king Agis of the Paionians to delay on his intended incursion of Macedonia. He also succeeded to bribe King Cotys¹⁴ of Thrace into terminating his support for Pausanias’ claim to the throne of Macedonia.¹⁵ Cotys then captured Sestos from the Athenians and subsequently was murdered, his kingdom passing to his son Kersebleptes while considerable parts of it broke away with the kings Amadokos II. and Berisades.¹⁶ Further the rival Argaios II.¹⁷ was killed by Philipp and his 3 000 hoplites captured in Pieria and, finally, an agreement was reached with the Athenians, ending the war Philipp had inherited from Perdiccas III.¹⁸ Meanwhile the infantry from Lower Macedonia was doubled to 3 000 and renamed „Hypaspistes“. The Macedonian archers, the Xenikon, the Pierian, the Amphaxitic and the Elimiotid “taxeis” were instituted.

-358: Alexander of Pherai finally was murdered by his wife. Still their relatives followed in the position of Tagos and the Pheraian tyranny did not dissolve. Philipp mobilized 10 000 infantry with 600 riders and raided his newly acquired father in law. First a campaign into Paionia was conducted, a battle fought and the Paionian king forced to ally himself to Macedonia.¹⁹ While the Olynthian league in vain tried to end its conflict with Athens²⁰ a decisive victory in Lyncestis ended Dassarethian hegemony, Bardylis was killed.²¹ Orestis and Lyncestis were annexed by Macedonia. They formed a new district²² around the new founded city Herakleia in Lynkestis. When this news had spread Philipp received an invitation to intervene in Thessaly by the Aleuadae²³ and married Philinna of Larisa.

-357: Philipp also sought an alliance with Arybbas from Epiros and married Olympias while the Olynthian league in turn made alliance with king Grabos of Illyria. Relations with the Aleuadae were not without friction,²⁴ yet Philipp showed no intent to establish garrisons²⁵ and presented himself „very friendly towards the Thessalians“.²⁶ This first intervention in Thessaly is only occasionally mentioned²⁷ while most publications omit it altogether. Tisiphonos and his brothers in Pherai had ended the meaningless conflict with Athens and again made a try to gain in Thessaly. So king Philipp in this year came to Thessaly via Elimaia straight from Dassarethia.²⁸ He advanced against the Pheraian forces and again restricted them to their home country. He also helped the Aleuadae in dominating the “koinon” again, reminding the knights that their social standing was incompatible with democratic procedures and the alliance with Thebai or Athens against their vital interests.

Furthermore his army stood ready to intervene in local affairs. The opponents of the Aleuadae had dependents too and these Philipp supported in their claims against their superiors. By this their faction in the “koinon” became split up and rendered powerless. Polyaen mentions a conflict between Pharsalos and Phelinna and implies there were others. Anyway armed intervention is mentioned only in the case of Pharcedon.²⁹ Finally Philipp made friends among the knights where ever possible and likely invested his booty from Dassarethia into feasts³⁰ and presents for those who cooperated. It seems likely that the Macedonian army from then on was followed by a number of volunteering Thessalian knights.

When Philipp left Thessaly it was again in the hands of the Aleuadae and a stable ally to Macedonia. He besides some new friends had gained nothing in particular for himself, yet Macedonian reputation among the knights had greatly improved and he was recognized as fair arbitrator in Thessalian affairs and a reliable partner and neighbour throughout the country. This PR-tour was a prerequisite for the next invitation to invade Pherai in -353 and ended when king Philipp perceived that the Athenian allies would mutiny. He then straightly headed for Amphipolis. Philinna of Larisa gave birth to Philipp Arhidaios, Audata to Cynane.

Athens intervened on Euboia, driving off a Theban force³¹ and started a war against its former allies Chios, Kos, Rhodos, Byzanz and Perinth (Social war). Philipp left Parmenio with half the army in Macedonia to besiege Pydna and himself laid siege to Amphipolis³² with the claim of doing so on behalf of the Athenians³³, thereby for months delaying an Athenian reaction³⁴ while he sought the alliance with the Olyntian league. Chares the Athenian general went off for the Chersonesos.³⁵

-356: Athens finally declared war on Philipp and allied itself with king Grabos of Illyria, king Lyppeios of Paionia (Agis presumably having died that year) and king Ketriporis (son of Berisades) of western Thrace,³⁶ as Philipp already was allied with the Olynthian league³⁷ and Kersebleptes, who declared war to his rivaling kings in Thrace³⁸ and tried to gain the Chersones from Athens in a conflicting approach: whenever an Athenian force was near, he cooperated. Once it left, he again started hostilities.³⁹ Artabazos the Persian satrap of Phrygia Minor revolted against his overlord with Athenian help as Chares chose to take side with the satrap.⁴⁰ Amphipolis and Pydna⁴¹ fell to Philipp and Potidaia came under siege too. The division of the Macedonian army under Parmenio invaded Dassarethia and Taulantia and vanquished king Grabos of Illyria in a battle.

This came so fast that Lyppeios was unable to join forces, let alone Ketriporis. Lyppeios is not recorded to have achieved anything of consequence in this year and Ketriporis in mortal fear of Kersebleptes could not risk to leave his capital at all. He had joined the league in the bare hope that his allies would relieve him of the Macedonian pressure. In Illyria the Macedonians seem to have occupied no new territory in this year, restricting themselves to guard the passes at Ochrid and Pelium. It cannot be ruled out, on the other hand, that part of the Illyrian population there⁴² was then caught as prisoners of war and sent to Macedonia. This victory guaranteed no lasting peace given the polycentric power structures in Illyria, yet a champion was defeated, his alliance shattered and his warriors were dead. Macedonia could expect some quiet years in this theater.

Paionia, roughly in the borders of present „Northern Macedonia“, covers 25 000 square kilometers and then had a population of approx. 270 000. So theoretically 5 500 men could be sent for campaigning abroad and up to 13 000 mobilized to defend the country. Social practice did not reflect these numbers, however: In -358 Paionia had been defeated in a battle. How many it then fielded is unknown, yet the Macedonians with their „10 000“ men seem to have been at a comfortable advantage. I therefore imply that Paionian forces like those of the Thracian tribes were grouped round a warrior chaste („satren“ = „kschatria“) that consisted of only one knight in thousand. These „aristocrats“ had their followings and certainly Paionia could field several hundreds of riders and thousands of light-armed infantry. Yet close order infantry either was missing or else represented in a royal guard unit only. So an army of 5 to 6 000 seem to be a reasonable estimate for the country.

This army in -356 did nothing. While Parmenio was in Illyria still Philipp guarded the Axios entry to the southern plain. The Paionians resolved to sit it out and promptly were attacked by Parmenio in the following year. Alexander III. was born and the king’s horses won at Olympia. When Potidaia had surrendered⁴³ Philipp gave it to Olynth⁴⁴ and next occupied Krenides⁴⁵ in the south of Ketriporis kingdom and resettled it with the prisoners of war from Potidaia.⁴⁶ Ketriporis was unable to defend his vassals, surrounded by enemies as he stood.⁴⁷ The Thebans together with some Thessalians started the „Third Sacred“ war, declared upon the Phocians, yet effectively including Athens, Sparta and others.

-355: Parmenio now invaded Paionia. The Erigon valley by then was a marshy primeval forest. Settlement restricted itself to the heights or else to pile dwellings in the lakes. The communication system too kept itself to the heights and was inaccessible to carriages driven by oxen. While this seriously hindered the march of a large army nevertheless being infiltrated by bands from the cluttered country could never be ruled out. The Macedonian king here had to colonize what he believed to be remote wilderness. According to Strabo⁴⁸ three cities were founded there. One was Alkomenai,⁴⁹ another Styberra.⁵⁰ These settlements were in the valleys, their „chora“ drained and the waters channeled until tilling the soil became possible. Further the places were connected by a new road which followed the valleys utilizing (wooden) bridges⁵¹ to minimize inclination and being suitable to carriages. It ultimately connected Herakleia Lyncestis and Bylazora.

Populating new cities as essential feature of king Philipp’s reign here has to be discussed. The king in war caught a number of his enemies as prisoners. He had to buy them from his army for a trifling sum, yet then legally could address himself owner of these persons with the right to purchase them if he pleased. Next he offered to those who where willing to learn to be addressed in Greek language their freedom and settlement in one of the king’s cities with the prospect of becoming citizen there in return for future military service. The king in this indeed acted as a true bandit „making offers one cannot refuse“. He, his son as well as numerous other military colonizers in history probably saw no wrong in this: They with agriculture brought the gifts of civilization and in return asked for fiscal responsibility.

Prisoners were only a fraction of a new cities population. King Philipp presumably had a deal with his barons that he may claim any man without property in their followings for himself provided he replaced the lost worker with a foreigner. So part of the prisoners were absorbed by Macedonia proper while colonists too poor to become part of the war-effort by themselves became equipped by the king and were installed as settlers in the new cities. Furthermore Greek exiles willing to quit their claims against their city were welcome to become Macedonian citizens instead. Finally the native population in the cities „chora“, once the exponents of political resistance had been killed in battle and their land given to the new-comers, was free to join in the city and to attain citizenship trough military service. King Philipp never stopped amalgamating „his“ population and produced an exemplary lesson in people- building, worthy of comparison to the Assyrian kings.

Many ancient as well as contemporary works take the greatest pains to discuss the origins of the Macedonians. For this king Philipp and his companions could not have cared less. Being „Macedonian“ from the start included the idea of integrating people of Thracian, Phrygian and Illyrian background. „Lower“ Macedonia was former Bottian soil. The Argeads had centuries of experience with stealing Thracian lands and were accustomed to handle these people. The Macedonians themselves had learned civilization from the Greeks and now knew how to keep their books, yet had not forgotten what life had been like without it. There was sympathy, mutual understanding and secret consent between these nations and it is quite inaccurate to compare the Macedonian occupation to the appalling slaughters of the later Roman conquest.

At the start of the century democracy had had the chance to do what had to be done and to bring civilization to the region. Olynth failed in this hampered both by Sparta and Athens. It was only natural that king Philipp inherited the claim. Democracy would have installed cities with citizens. This the king and conservative imitated as far as possible. His settlers were „στραδιότες πολιτίκοι“⁵² and through this „Macedonians“, regardless of their ethnicity. Ranking was by duration of membership. The core of settlers from „Lower“ Macedonia (who were able to express themselves in a way a Greek could understand) headed by some of the „aristocracy“ in each city made the leading group and assimilated the others, assisted by eventual native Greeks in teaching and soliciting.

Greek language had become standard in the king’s administration presumably since Archelaos III. and from there spread into communal use.⁵³ Macedonian cities differed in civic institutions from Greek cities. The “peliganes” formed a body comparable to a Roman senate or a Spartan gerousia.⁵⁴ Executive officials were “tagoi” or else “dikastai”.⁵⁵ Finally the people met to form a public will.⁵⁶ Macedonian kings reigned “οὺ βὶᾳ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ – not trough force but by law”⁵⁷ and never developed a large central bureaucracy, so practically Macedonian cities were „autonomous“. Lukian a bit carried away formulates Macedones then had been ἐλέυθεροι ἄνδρες.⁵⁸ The new settlements in the Erigon valley together with Stenae and Stobi in the Axios valley built a new district of Macedonia named „Deuriopis“.⁵⁹

On the other side of the Axios a similar process was set in motion and the Strumitza and the Bregalnica valleys were annexed and dotted with Macedonian cities (Berovo= Beroia, Stip= Astibos, Strumitza= Astraion, Veles= Bylazora, Negotino= Antigoneia⁶⁰, Delcevo= Doberos⁶¹) and likewise connected by roads. This „Macedonian Paionia“⁶² perhaps was named Geugela (=Leugea) after a regional center Gevgelija (= Γευγελή) in the south of the country. The Paionian North (Tetovo valley, a section of the Vardar around Skopije and the area around Kumanovo) remained as Macedonian vassal kingdom under its king Lyppeios and played its role as buffer state to Dardania.

No proof for this division of the country in -355 neither in literature nor in archaeology survived. It is most likely to have happened, tough, as the kingdom of Paionia in -334 sent only one „ila“ of riders and an unknown number of „akontists“ for the expedition, hardly a sufficient contribution for a total of 270 000 Paionians. If, on the other hand, two Macedonian “taxeis” with further two „ilai“ of Macedonian knights were added the contribution would rise to 5 300 men, about 2% of the total.

While Parmenio was thus engaged in Illyria in -356 and in Paionia -355 king Philipp with the other half of the army was free to act against king Ketriporis of Thrace. The Thracian king was in no position to oppose the Macedonians with an army and single Thracian tribes were small in numbers, approx. only 30 000 to 35 000 humans per tribe and consequently comprising some 30 knights. The capture of Amphipolis denied Athenian access, Olynth was neutralized in alliance and the Paionians were defeated. Philipp first adhered to a call from Krenides and sent his prisoners from Potidaia there. Then the resident Odomanthi and Bisaltians were integrated into the Macedonian state and as nothing concerning any organized violence is reported one may assume that their knights simply passed into the king’s service.

In -355 the Edonian plain further had to be secured against the neighbouring Maidoi who inhabited the Nestos valley and who had come to the rescue of the Odomanthi. Philipp restricted them to their valley which he did not intend to invade and made a separate treaty with them.⁶³ Furthermore the harbour of Kavala (Neapolis) came under siege⁶⁴ and during that siege Pammenes with 5 000 Theban mercenaries came by on his way to Asia Minor, traveling by ship. King Philipp had no own navy then and decided to accompany the Thebans to Maroneia, a Greek city in the lands of Amadokos II.

This king held the position between Ketriporis and Kersebleptes. King Philipp in Maroneia met Apollonides, an ambassador from Kersebleptes. A plan for concentric attack against Ketriporis, Amadokos and Athens was developed and Demosthenes explains: „The country belonged to Amadokos and had he not forbidden Philipp to set foot there, we were at war with Cardia and Kersebleptes.“⁶⁵ Philipp presumably took ship for Kavala. This alliance with Kersebleptes showed no significant impact on the Macedonian enemies in -354. Kersebleptes may have campaigned against Amadokos II. but given his own weak position (he still had to guard from factions at home) this probably was more of a show. King Philipp, on the other hand, attacked Ketriporis’ lands most fiercely, in a way that revealed a design to conquer the whole Thracian kingdom.

This plan was well thought out. The Thracian tribes had no confidence in their rivaling overlords and would not gather into an army. Further the civil war in Thrace was a matter of the Odrysian knights alone, not the Thracian peoples. The „Dii“, the priest-chaste of the country and the „Bessoi“, the lower classes above the slaves,⁶⁶ never were involved in the resistance against Philipp. He prudently introduced himself to the Thracians as participant in the knightly civil war. Furthermore it was Ketriporis who had declared war on Philipp, because of the Macedonian capture of Amphipolis. King Cotys could have acted that way as sole representative of the Thracian state. Few Thracians saw Ketriporis as the man to handle this claim. Foreigners in Amphipolis had been a constant nuisance for centuries and no Thracian, not even the great Cotys, in hundred years had succeeded to expel them. At present a Thracian king predominantly had to settle his differences with his colleagues in the interest of national security rather than to provoke dangerous foreign opponents. So possibly Ketriporis had only weak support from his own vassals and King Philipp’s offensive met only few resistance. Parmenio laid siege to Methone late in the year.⁶⁷ Phocians and Thebans met with mixed success.

-354: Philipp after integrating the Odomanthi, capturing Neapolis and restricting the Maidoi to the Nestos valley now invaded the Orbelicon, the Strymon valley beyond the Rouby gorge and there fought the Sinti and the Dentheletai. The latter lived north of the Kresna gorge, in the vicinity of Skaptopara, Pautalia and Doupla. Four cities were founded (Kallipolis, Herakleia Sintike= „Orthopolis“, Philippopolis and Gareskos?),⁶⁸ at least one of them was situated north of the Kresna gorge and when Strabo and others declare that the Strymon was Macedon’s border to Thracia this was true since and because of King Philipp’s activities in the region. These again included building a road from Amphipolis up the valley trough the Kresna gorge to the land of the Agrianians. The new roads from Paionia in the Strumica and Bregalnica valleys were connected to this one and only by that measure it became possible to lead a large army along the river up to the Serdican plain.

King Langaros of Agriania was impressed by Philipp’s doings, left Ketriporis’ vassalage and became a Macedonian ally instead. The Agrianians inhabited the sources of the Strymon and bordered Paionia and in a like manner built the buffer state against the Morava valley. To make this work the Dentheletai, however, must have been defeated and must have been made vassals of Macedonia. If only one city was founded in their territory⁶⁹ maybe Pautalia was to become Langaros’ capital and Doupla a mere garrison.

Again we know nothing certain about this war. There is Polyaen’s stratagem narrating that Philipp searched with bloodhounds for hidden villagers⁷⁰ and this occasionally caused strong sentiments among the commentators. On the other hand Philipp, as we already know, kidnapped people all the time without intending to kill but to reallocate them according to his ambitions. If Thracian knights resisted they were of course killed in battle as their lands were to be given to the new settlers. Yet the Sinti and Dentheletai lived on in their districts well into the -first century, so Philipp did not destroy the tribal structure but restricted himself to colonize the centers of communication and to organize agricultural work there. This he did without economical prospect. Grain and hay produced in the upper Strymon valley could never be a match to cheap crops from Aegypt or Scythia while the locals principally relied on their flocks and only reluctantly accepted ploughing as a necessity.⁷¹ He did it for strategic reasons only, in order to feed his army in the region.

Anyway nothing concerning any battles is related and presumably at the end of this year Ketriporis had lost half his realm while the Maidoi had an arrangement with the enemy. At that the enemies army stood ready to invade his home country which had been unthinkable at the start of the war three years earlier. Either then or else in early -353 he concluded a peace with his conqueror, becoming a vassal king and ceding Agriania, Edonia, Sintike and Dentheletis to Philipp, while the Maidoi were to become „free Thracians“. These three years of campaigning and colonization by Diodor are referred to with only one sentence:⁷² and forced them (including Ketriporis) to join forces with him.“ By this Mygdonia and Edonia joined as new Macedonian districts whereas the „Sarisophoroi“ might have come from the above mentioned conquered tribes. Methone too was conquered⁷³ and Kleopatra, Alexander III.’ sister, was born.

-353: The Aleuads in Larisa, Thessaly, again called for help, this time to terminate the tyranny of Pherai. Pherai meanwhile was in alliance with the Phocians and accepting the offer involved Macedonia in the „Sacred“ war. This king Philipp during the last three years had constantly declined as his matters in the north-east still were undecided. Only after this did he accept. In Thessaly a Macedonian army augmented by some of the Thessalians first was successful against a Phocian/Pheraian force under Phaillos. Onomarchos, then the Phocian commander, consequently quit his operations against Thebai and the Boiotians, gathered his forces to Pherai and met the Macedonian army. In this battle Philipp was defeated, had to retreat from Thessaly and was able to do so only because Onomarchos chose not to pursue and returned to his sieges in Boiotia. Kersebleptes changed his attitude and sought the alliance with Athens.

-352: Philipp replenished his forces and returned to Thessaly. The Thessalian „koinon“ chose him as „archon“ and consequently Macedonia was able to field 20 000 infantry and 3 000 riders. In this campaign Philipp seemingly achieved to separate his enemies and fell on Onomarchos while the Pheraian knights were bottled up in Pherai. Yet Onomarchos was caught in the open (the „Krokus Fields“) with only 500 riders while an also present Athenian fleet in the gulf of Pherai failed to achieve anything of consequence.⁷⁴

The Phocian force was destroyed, Onomarchos was killed. Pherai and Pagasai then were conquered and garrisoned by Philipp. Its tyrants had to leave the country. At Pagasai Philipp inherited their naval project. From then on a small Macedonian fleet (20 triremes with some smaller vessels) became part of the war effort.⁷⁵ Perrhibaea and Magnesia seem to have come under Philipp’s control and the passes to the west of Thessalia were secured with two new-founded cities (Gomphi, Phalorea). Philipp was elected „archon“ of the Thessalian “koinon” for lifetime.⁷⁶ The „Sacred“ war was not ended as Athens and Sparta blocked the entrance to Phokis. The Macedonian army split. From then on Parmenio commanded the forces in Thessaly. Philipp after having married Nikesipolis of Pherai with the main force in autumn left for Thrace which led to additional armaments in Athens where the Chersonesos was believed to be endangered.⁷⁷ Philipp, however, marched up in the lands of the Agrianians and nothing further happened in that year. Artabazos rebellion ended, the 5 000 Theban infantry seem to have passed to the great king. Artabazos fled to Macedonia. The Olynthian league ended its war with Athens.⁷⁸

-351: Philipp got a call for arbitration from Ketripori’s brothers who after his death asked Philipp to decide who should follow as king. Philipp showed up with his army⁷⁹ using the new built road and decided to take their kingdom for himself. The land of the Treres, the Serdi with the capital Serdica, the Laiai and the Tilateians was occupied by Philipp. Presumably some new settlements were established there. A “strategos” from now on had the task to defend Macedonian Thrace against the Triballians, the Getai and the free Thracians in the Rhodope mountains. A treaty of alliance was concluded with Amadokos II. (who soon was succeeded by his son Teres III.) and Kersebleptes was compelled to agree to this development. Philipp despite falling ill in the process came down the Hebros and besieged Heraion Teichos.⁸⁰ Artaxerxes failed in an attempt to invade Aegypt. Nikesipolis of Pherai died in childbirth, a daughter Thessalonike survived.

-350: Philipp now intervened in Epiros, compelling Arrybas to give Tymphaia, Paraurea and Atintania to him. The future king Alexander I was brought to Pella. A campaign was conducted in Illyria and a border in Taulantia fixed and secured by some cities.⁸¹ Tymphaia became a Macedonian district.

-349: Philipp declared war on the Olynthian league, first taking smaller places, then fighting battles against their and the Athenian forces and, finally, laying siege to Olynth. Simultaneously he instigated civil war on Euboia to distract Athens.⁸² Teres III. now left the Macedonian alliance, allied himself to Kersebleptes and both seem to have declared war on Philipp.⁸³

-348: Olynth was taken and razed to the ground. Anthemus, Bottiaia and Apollonia were established as new Macedonian districts.

-347: Philipp sent Antipater along the Aegean coast together with the fleet to invade Teres III.’ territory.⁸⁴ Only now the Macedonian army had become large enough to operate in three divisions and only now Philipp dared to invade this land between two inaccessible enemies: The free Thracians in the Rhodope mountains and the Athenian fleet. Abdera and Maroneia gave in and became Macedonian allies.⁸⁵ The Athenian general Chares seems to have had a minor success against one of Antipater’s commanders, one Addaios named “the cock”.⁸⁶ Thebai called for aid and Philipp responded by sending a detachment. Too few to end the war, yet enough to make the Thebans holding out.⁸⁷

-346: Philipp via Serdica invaded the northern part of Teres’ realm and made him a vassal king. He further marched against Kersebleptes and again laid siege to Heraion Teichos. While negotiating a peace with the Athenians he still took some places from them that they had taken from Teres for themselves.⁸⁸ The peace was concluded with Athens while the war against Kersebleptes was still undecided. Kersebleptes ultimately too became a vassal king and gave his son Sitalces as a hostage to Pella.⁸⁹

The „Sacred“ war also ended. Phocis surrendered and Halos was stormed by Parmenio. Philipp mediated a peace that included a penalty for the temple-robbers without giving way to bloodthirsty requests for revenge. He was to preside over the Pythian games and gained two Amphictionic votes. Indeed trough his subordinates he controlled even more and soon started to make politics by it. Macedonia was at peace with its neighbours, subject to no tribute and indeed receiving it from all of them.

-345: After more than twelve years of campaigning the Macedonian army was allowed to return home. From -353 to -346 the army constantly had had to conduct strategic shifts from one end of the realm to the other with increasing distances. A rest no doubt was much desired. The King started another round of amalgamation of the population as now after the capture of the Olynthian league many new Greek cities had to be integrated. Demosthenes claims that Philipp destroyed them all. This is a gross exaggeration: Olynth, Stageira and Potidaia actually were razed to the ground. Some minor ports like Galepsos or Methone were dissolved as they had no place in the room concept of the land power. The others were not. They also retained their set of institutions and their autonomy. Albeit a royal „epistates“ in future was to supervise this and probably most cities had to accept some Macedonians as co-citizens. On the other hand Greek prisoners of war were transferred to the so far founded cities in Illyria, Paionia and Thracia.⁹⁰

Athens during the war had blockaded the Macedonian coast. Their fleet had occupied Thasos and Preparethos and intercepted Macedonian and neutral ships.⁹¹ The Macedonian fleet and some privateers harassed their opponent,⁹² yet could do little about it. Via the Olynthian league trade was possible from -352 to -349 and then again ran dry. Only with the peace piracy could be fought effectively again⁹³ and economy got a chance to flourish. Trade was taxed mainly in the ports. While entry duty and rent for landing a ship normally were paid to the city, customs of goods were paid to the king. We cannot be certain about exactly when Kallicrates reformed the Macedonian system of custom duties,⁹⁴ yet probably before -357 and consequently for the ports Pella and Therma only.

If we then assume 20 “talents” for a mayor port after the reform this compares well to D. 23. 110, where King Kersebleptes income from “his” Greek harbors is estimated at 200 “talents”. These were about ten in number from Ainos at the delta of the Hebros to Histros in the delta of the Danube, excluding the Chersones. Philipp now held Pagasai, Pydna, Pella, Therma, Mekyberna, Torone, Akanthos, Argilos, Amphipolis, Kavala, Abdera and Maroneia; so perhaps this income for the king too amounted to something in the vicinity of 200 “talents”. Obviously this is a most crude calculation even in the premises as the revenue shifted with the market development, with the efficiency of the collection and with success in the fight against smuggling and piracy. Further other numbers related for Delos and Rhodos⁹⁵ do not compare well to these.⁹⁶ Finally Argilos or Pydna were much smaller ports than Pella or Therma, the sum hardly was distributed evenly; yet it gives a clue about this part of the king’s revenue.

The larger part of this income, however, was generated in a system of public leasing.⁹⁷ Barons and commoners alike invested themselves in enterprises on the king’s land. This in the first place concerned mining. Further the king had a monopoly in acquisition, transport and trade of timber⁹⁸ and had his share in the trade of salt to the interior.⁹⁹ Presumably arms and construction industry, transportation, horse and mule breeding were organized in it and even farmers on leased land cannot be ruled out. The only number related are the “1 000 talents” Philipp is supposed to have gained by the acquisition of the mines in Edonia.¹⁰⁰ Success in mining besides technique¹⁰¹ needed lots of workforce. According to Polybios the silver mines in Spain later produced “25 000 drachmas” per day with 40 000 workers in the process.¹⁰² The Macedonian mines then would have employed 27 000 men to generate the 1 000 talents per year. This certainly implies that the volume of the revenue out of public leasing was impressive, multiple the sum of the custom duties.¹⁰³

In Amphipolis the gold was coined to pieces of the Persian weight and the silver in the Attic standard.¹⁰⁴ Finally the cities taxed themselves and were able to produce regular payments in money to the crown. New- founded cities certainly did contribute to remind them of the principal obligation. Yet their main effort was military service and the new districts besides this presumably produced only small revenue. When Macedonia was conquered by the Romans it was to pay 100 “talents” as tribute which was considered “less than half” of what they formerly had given to their kings.¹⁰⁵ So a number between 201 and 240 “talents” seem to be an appropriate guess for the tax revenue of the 70 regional centers of the country, for an average of three “talents” per city and year.

Besides this the king claimed part of the produce of the land directly in kind (which was stored to royal granaries) and presumably became obligated to pay for it only if the consumption exceeded 10% of the yearly produce. The cities on their local level bore the brunt of tax collection. Anyway it must be emphasized that taxes, duties and rents at all levels were not collected by a bureaucracy but sold to be farmed, principally to the “peliganes” of the city. King Seuthes of Thracia is reported to have had an annual income of 400 “talents” in money per year, partly from tributes and partly from custom duties, and gifts besides, some decades earlier.¹⁰⁶ King Philipp even during the war seems to have had a regular income twice this sum, out of taxes and leasing rents alone. Now with the peace the revenue increased significantly.¹⁰⁷

The royal administration in this year presumably abandoned whatever measures to meet the crisis had been introduced since -359, and found a new mode of normality. Once the military settlers lived on their estates the standing army comprised only 1. 5 % of the population (see chap. 7) and the king apparently was able to feed and pay these out of his incomes.¹⁰⁸ He now had time to attend to judicial matters, is reported to have judged in single cases and by this met common expectations. During the war presumably Antipater had done most work in what should have been appellations to the king after a judgment in a city.¹⁰⁹ Finally the monarch now was in a position to repay what was credited: The public leasing companies during the war presumably had extended payment, deferred debts, quit their claims for interest and possibly also subscribed bonds. The “aristocracy” certainly had contributed in the latter manner, especially those who formerly had belonged to rivaling factions or else to the Lyncestai. The king readily rewarded his friends and hetairoi, yet just as readily asked for their support.¹¹⁰ Whatever he had asked from his barons during the war could now be paid back with interest. All of their families received land in some newly acquired city. Anyway even this year was not without military engagement: Pleuratos king of the Ardiaians made a try on the new Macedonian border in Illyria and was repelled, albeit the king was wounded.

-344: Philipp reorganized Thessaly into four „tetrarchies“. Again the details of this reform are unknown, yet principally Philipp would have terminated what Pelopidas instituted in -369. He retained the title „archon“, the „tagos“ is never heard of again. The „quarters“, however, were those of the previous structure including Pherai. Again personal dependencies¹¹¹ overshadowed the legal procedures of the cities and the magistrates were no longer chosen for a period but for lifetime. Despite democratic criticism this obviously was only to be expected and King Philipp here acted true to his agenda.

-343: Artaxerxes conquered Aegypt, Nectanebos II. fled. Macedonia made a treaty with the great king and Artabazos was allowed to return home. Python from Byzanz as Philipp’s ambassador in Athens negotiated for a common peace while the conservative faction on Euboia, in Megara and Elis again unleashed civil strife. Philipp concluded a treaty with the Aetolians and promised them Naupactos.¹¹²

-342: After three years of peace and regeneration Philipp again started campaigning and first intervened in Epiros. Arrybas was dethroned¹¹³ and replaced with his son Alexander I. Athens hindered Philipp to march into Akarnania. Philipp allied himself with Hermeias of Atarneus and started a final campaign into Thrace.¹¹⁴

-341: Teres III. was dethroned.¹¹⁵ The campaign lasted, the Macedonians suffered severe losses¹¹⁶ and the king had to winter in Thrace.¹¹⁷ King Kothelas of the Getai then made alliance with Philipp and married his daughter Meda to him.¹¹⁸

-340: Kersebleptes was dethroned and the last Thracian kingdom was vanquished by Philipp: „κὰι τὴν Θρᾀκην κατεστρέψατο π͠ασαν- he took the whole of Thrace, says Demosthenes.¹¹⁹ As the Maidoi and a couple of other tribes in the Rhodope mountains remained independent this is not entirely correct, whence Arrian uses the phrase: „κὰι τῆς Θρᾀκης τὰ πολλὰ προσέθηκεν – he took most of Thrace“.¹²⁰ Anyway this included the realms of all the three Thracian kings who held Thrace in -359: Ketriporis, Amadokos and Kersebleptes. The „strategos“ in Thrace now held the position Cotys had had as king of all Thracians.¹²¹ The Thracians annually paid a „tithe“ to their overlord but nothing indicates that this in character differed from the gifts Thracian kings in the yearly travel through their lands were accustomed to collect.

The whole of the Rhodope mountains was surrounded by a chain of Macedonian settlements: I count 4 cities in the Strymon valley, already mentioned above for -354 and estimate 4 further settlements in Western Thrace. Serdica, Helike (= Ichtiman) or Pisteiros (=Vetren) are likely candidates. I further estimate 6 cities in the former realm of Teres III: Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and Beroia (Stara Zagora) are acknowledged. Two should have been in the south, one Alexandropolis¹²² to restrict the Maidoi in the vicinity of Xanthi and a city near present Komotini to guard the Nymphae pass to the Arda valley in the area of the free Thracians. Further two cities along the Hebros south of Beroia must be totally conjectured (Burdipta?), yet would have served the same purpose in the north. Finally I estimate 6 cities along the Tundscha and the lower Hebros rivers in the former lands of Kersebleptes. Demosthenes names three of them: Kabyle (at Jambol), Drongilon, Masteira and implies that there were more.¹²³ Uscudama (Edirne), Topeiron and Cypsela are the most likely candidates. So together with the cities in Macedonia, Illyria and Thessaly¹²⁴ this adds up to 39 cities founded by Philipp II. The new settlements primarily saw to regular agricultural work in their „chora“ which Thracian tribes by themselves had been reluctant to do. The coastal Greek cities concluded alliances with Macedonia,¹²⁵ that is, inasmuch as they did not join the new Athenian anti- Macedonian alliance. Byzantion and Perinthos chose the latter and in return were besieged by Philipp. Meanwhile the Athenian strategos Diopheithes attacked Cardia and Irregulars seem to have raided Magnesia. After an Athenian grain fleet got plundered Athens declared war.¹²⁶ Philipp then decided to cancel the sieges and to leave Byzantion and Perinthos as he now had a more formidable enemy.

-339: Philipp meanwhile declared war on Atheas, the king of the Scythians in the Danube delta. This he did to protect his new Greek allies from their raids. While the Scythians were still wondering what the king could possibly want from them he had them conquered and seized their horses and themselves in order to fill up the number of the inhabitants in his new settlements. This plan did not work out. On the way home the army was intercepted by the Triballians who not only wounded the king but also took away his booty. Philipp was invited to punish Amphissa by the Amphictionics.

-338: Philipp’s army entered Phokis and occupied Elateia. Thebai, Athens and some Peloponesians gathered in alliance. Philipp fought one „winter“battle,¹²⁷ took Naupactos for the Aetolians, destroyed Amphissa after dispersing the mercenaries of the opponent and finally vanquished the allied forces at Chaironea. Immediately after this battle Alexander III. seems to have been sent to Illyria to campaign there.¹²⁸ The Boiotian and Athenian leagues were dissolved, in Boiotia democracy was abolished, Thespiai, Orchomenos and Platai were rebuilt, some dissidents banished from Thebai, Oropos given to Athens and the Cadmeia garrisoned. Nicae in Phocis, Ambracia, Chalcis and Korinth also were garrisoned by Philipp. Athens lost its position in the Chersones but was left otherwise unharmed. Byzantion and Perinthos again made peace and alliance. Philipp further invaded Lacedaimon as far as Gytheion,¹²⁹ took away the Kynuria for Argos, the Sciritai for Megalopolis and the Dentheliatis for the Messenians, yet left Laconia unharmed. Artaxerxes III., the great king, was murdered and succeeded by Arses.

-337: Philipp became „strategos autocrator“ of the “koinon” of the common peace in Greece. He married Kleopatra, a niece of his general Attalos, apparently having fallen in love. Olympias and Alexander III. detested this choice and left Pella for Epiros and Illyria.

-336: They both returned after negotiating. Parmenion and Attalos were sent to Asia with „10 000 men“. Some more negotiations with Pixodarus, the actual lord of Caria, concerning an alliance led nowhere¹³⁰ while Kleopatra gave birth to a daughter Europa. Alexander I. of Epiros came to Macedonia to marry. Then king Philipp was murdered by Pausanias s. o. Kerastos from Orestia, very likely instigated by Alexander III. and Olympias. Likewise Arses, the great king, was murdered and succeeded by Dareios III.

Never before Europe had produced such a man, judges Theopomp¹³¹ about Philipp II. and I like to compare him to Otto v. Bismark, another conservative political genius. From the start Philipp had a clear idea of his ultimate alliance with Athens despite fighting them for more than a decade during his reign. He took from them what they were unable to hold, yet without giving himself away to any passion: Even when he had lost one eye to a sniper in Methone the Athenians nevertheless were allowed to leave without ransom. From the start he had a clear idea of ultimately destroying Olynth despite being in alliance with them for seven years. Utilizing Athenian aggression to break up its alliance with the Illyrians was Philipp’s main political success.

Unlike his son who preferred to be feared King Philipp wanted to be loved.¹³² This disposition perhaps is not the most gratifying in life, yet it is a good one for a king. Philipp was charming, witty, a good speaker, persuasive and a well educated philhellenic. Sanguine in temperament he understood the disadvantage of being known as a murderer and took the killing not easy. He certainly killed Argaios II. in battle and Archelaos, Gygaia’s eldest, later too. Yet is unknown when and for what reasons.¹³³ Arrhidaios and Menelaos certainly enough afterwards had to flee to Olynth. Yet this did not impede Macedonian relationship with the league until -352. When Olynth had fallen the brothers were executed. Yet they certainly in the war had posed as claimants to the throne and left Philipp not much choice. Pausanias certainly was deposed of his position in Mygdonia by Philipp. Yet no one, not even Justin, claims that he was murdered by him. Finally Philipp did not kill his nephew, whose ward he technically was, as so many others had done. By renouncing the principles of vendetta and collective guilt he made himself acceptable to his barons, his people and to the Greeks who despised such behavior as “barbaric”.

Philipp made an effort and succeeded to win the Macedonian’s hearts so that even his bodyguards were fellow Macedonians. Shock and despair after the defeat of Perdiccas III. gave the background and Philipp II. with his men in the Amphaxitis and the garrison at Amphipolis next to him were Macedonia’s only remaining troops. When Argaios with his 3 000 mercenaries arrived at Aigai Philipp had been there already: consoling his subjects for their losses, conjuring them to take revenge and to accept a course of consequent militarism with himself as king. He indeed won a sort of beauty-contest among his Macedonians by promising them planned hardships and convinced them that now was the opportunity to answer violence with even more violence.

While this is sad by itself it should be remembered that the states in the region throughout Philipp’s live desintegrated in meaningless conflict of oligarchs and democrats which to fence in a mighty force was indispensable. At that the rivaling powers each were caught off balance: Thrace -359 sank into civil war. The great king had lost almost all of his provinces west of the Euphrates and had to conduct a difficult war against remote Aegypt. In Greece Sparta and Athens were unpopular, Thebai and the Thessalians too weak to overcome even their local civil strife, while Thebai’s, Olynth’s and Athen’s contest for democracy contradicted their own cause. In the west the Dassarethian threat was substantial, relations to the North with Paionia, Dardania, the Triballians and their enemies, the Celts, were bad to non existent; yet this most effectively was to be dealt with by arming to the teeth.

The seven bodyguards, secretaries and court officials, the “Basilike Ile” as institution probably existed before Philipp’s reign and former kings too had entertained prominent Greeks at their court. Yet only King Philipp united all factions and integrated all dissidents to this court, including the young to his “Paides Basilikoi”,¹³⁴ chose with stunning insight the best servants (Parmenio from Lyncestis, Eumenes from Cardia, Polyeidos from Thessaly), made everybody and even foreign princesses learn Greek letters¹³⁵ and himself a factor in the Greek discourse of his time. He conversed with Speusippos and Aristotheles but also customarily payed for the latest jokes from Athens.¹³⁶

He also was reasonable concerning his contemporaries needs and instantly perceived where to get hold on somebody. Be it power, wealth, fame or sex: Philipp provided for those who served him well and maintained a constant flow of gifts as his first royal responsibility. Further this policy was by no means restricted to his Macedonians but included virtually anybody useful, especially formal enemies. Bribing an opponent as a stratagem was not unknown to his contemporaries, yet Philipp II. surprised by the scale, the persistence and the patience involved in these activities. He built a conservative faction throughout Greece over decades.

There is much complaining in our surviving Greek sources concerning Philipp’s alleged disloyalty. Indeed he fulfilled the promises we know of and the wars he engaged in prior to -342 were declared on him. That information policy during a military engagement included lying about it is a matter of course and cannot have surprised anybody. Actually it seems the more special treatment the Athenians experienced by the king, the touchier they became about it. Demosthenes too insinuates that king Philipp generally did ill to his friends once their role was played. His example, the traitors of Olynth, is a poor choice however: accepting the king’s money by itself made no one his friend and Philipp was right to avoid people that likely at the next opportunity would betray him;¹³⁷ yet this certainly is no sufficient evidence of his begrudging malice. Indeed all Macedonian barons and many people throughout Greece made a fortune in assisting him while the king himself massed no wealth.¹³⁸ When Alexander III. took over the financial situation was uneasy despite the „koine eirene“.

As military commander Philipp combined audacity with caution. He always was on the watch for the unforeseeable opportunity and quick to exploit it, yet readily delayed before uncertain and dangerous moves. The battle of Chaironea was only fought after all possibilities of diplomacy were exhausted, after the army had fully assembled and had come to know its enemy, after all allies were sworn in and, finally, when no more time for waiting was left. For his conduct in a defeat we have his own word: he likens his army to a ram retreating, only to strike harder. While the sentence is of course propaganda it can be stated that Philipp also in his setbacks remained reasonable and, as Caesar put it: If luck fails you help yourself by own work, revealed persistence in dire circumstances.

Most remarkable, however, is King Philipp as a strategist. He developed his power from the center into all directions, secured his back by alliances and succeeded to be stronger as the enemy at the moment of decision by strict concentration of his forces to the field army. He was aware that alliances do not hold if the balance of power changes and managed to be ready when this happened. Macedonia intervened in Illyria -358, -356, -350, -345, -342, -338. In Thrace -356 to -353, -351, -347-346, -342- 340. In Greece -357, -353-352, -349-348, -343-342, -339-338. In all of these campaigns Philipp never fought in two theaters at the same time!

Each conflict was ended by treaty or conquest before the next was initiated. Each campaign had a condition of victory and was not extended after this had been achieved. For example in -351 Philipp had his army in Thrace and it must have been tempting to try an occupation of the country in this year. Philipp, however, concluded treaties and withdrew back to Serdica. This he did because in the following year a campaign in Illyria could no longer be postponed.

While Philipp prided himself on his diplomacy as his personal achievement obviously the reformed army was the main instrument of his political success. The king was the first to march, to toil and to fight. The army was accustomed to follow the king’s example: They were „ashamed“ when he personally initiated some work and assembled to take it off him. The king exposing himself in battle was a mighty factor in his men’s minds. They were constantly at the rescue for him, in seven watches every day. If he was endangered or even wounded this happened to the „shame“ of the army. Thus by „shame“, by comparing wounds, by rewards and presents and by demonstrative, extensive care for the men’s needs in the field the king produced a unique relationship with his army.

2. Introduction: The Army at the Start of the Century

Since the -seventh century armies in the Mediterranean had significantly changed in character by the introduction of riding as new combat technique and by the concept of citizenship which considerably enlarged the percentage of the population engaged in war. In a knightly army, even if it was very strong in totals, only a fraction counted as full-proof warriors and all the others were their servants. Those did have their functions in warfare, even in battle. Yet decisive were the lords alone and if they gave way the day at any rate was lost. Politics and consequently war being restricted to an “aristocracy” their family affairs set the frame. This is vividly narrated in Homer and again became standard when the citizenship became universal with the “Constitutio Antoniniana” in the year 212 and from then on men’s ambitions started to be transferred from their earthly cities to the city in heaven. During the period, however, citizens swelled the armies ranks with close-order infantry and changed the conditions of war.

The city itself was a military revolution. Without any weapons of destruction at hand ancient armies were weak in the offensive. A well constructed and guarded wall could not be overcome even by large armies. In order to permanently guard a wall, the landowners of a region concentrated to a spot, built their walls there and became “autonomous”, that is they could no longer be forced to contribute to any institution outside without being “conquered”. Concentrating all warriors to this spot was regarded as “freedom” and membership to such cities became ever more attractive to the contemporaries in the Mediterranean. In a gradual process kings, knights, tyrants and finally democracies broadened the basis for citizenship. The assembly formed a constitution and while their noble classes’ family affairs still were important matters the politics of a city as whole started to change. A middle class provided bodies of men in close order named “hoplites”, “ὁπλον” meaning “weapon”. They were armed with a large shield (clipeus or ἄσπις), spears and sword, greaves, a helmet and a body defense.

In the beginning these warriors were more a hindrance to an army than its strength: During the march the “hoplites” could not fight at all and had to be protected by the knights and the marksmen. Forming up for battle took time and when it was accomplished the “hoplites” could not move properly and could not hope to catch up with an enemy. Crowded in a spot, they could neither control a surrounding countryside nor live off it. Indeed they could see to any positive action only if they met their like, other close-order infantry. The knights, on the other hand, found their new opponent immune to their attacks as horses which trample a single man into the ground without hesitation, cannot be driven into a dense and noisy crowd whereas marksmen could not do any harm against a disciplined wall of large shields. Hence, whenever “hoplites” found themselves attacked their natural move was to gather to seek each other’s protection.

Such close-order infantry also was in use in the great imperial armies, that of the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Medes and the Persians whose kings had organized them for their sieges. Knights could very well block a stronghold but very often the besieged, sustained by their stock raised in years, could easily hold out longer than a besieging army. As knights generally dislike to work and efforts spent on the subject are fruitless the kings selected half-combatants from their knightly contingents for an active siege and permanent service and gave them the task of sapping, mining, digging, carrying and collecting the materials necessary to breach a wall, throw up embankments or fill a ditch and the like. The ability to work was to become the key competence of the infantry in the Mediterranean too, yet this again was a gradual process.

A city marching out “πανδέμει” (all mobilized) was a rare event and possible in the defense of the city only. The “hoplite” as a man of means who owned his armor tended to maximize its efficiency and one has to assume that the fully armored man carried a man’s load, or “talent” (app. 26. 3 kgs). This load the citizen actually did carry himself in battle only and gave the task otherwise to an armor-bearer (πσίλος), who usually¹³⁹ administered a beast of burden. Thus the infantry’s number doubled gives the number of the pedestrians with the expedition. The knights and marksmen had even more followers and animals. Added to this was a quote of civilian professionals and finally every army was accompanied by further civilians, unaccounted for by the authorities. A single city was unable to feed the whole mass if it was to leave its territory (χώρα).

Offensive engagement therefore involved only fractions of the available manpower, relied on alliances and in conjunction tended to involve non-citizens which were to be paid for their services in coins that were recognized beyond the cities borders. The means of land transport were the men themselves, pack-animals and vehicles.¹⁴⁰ The ox was the principal draught animal. Horses were generally rare and restricted to the knights as the technique of the time could not realize the horse’s draught power.¹⁴¹ Rare also were the mules.¹⁴² As their breeding was a rather sophisticated matter, their supply always was insufficient even for the military. Ox and ass, on the other hand, were the working animals of agriculture and obtainable everywhere.¹⁴³

In the -fifth century an army of 5 000 citizen “hoplites” augmented by an equal number of allies and with knights, marksmen, half-combatants and civilians more than 25 000 heads strong, was a large force. When they were to march on a single road the largest part of the column consisted of the vehicle teams which need much room to avoid stagnation. No numbers or rules are handed down for the time whence I here proceed to invent a hypothetical “Xenophontian dekas”:¹⁴⁴ ten fighters with four half-combatants who administer two asses, two oxen and a vehicle.¹⁴⁵

This allocation roughly corresponds to the requests of early modern infantry in 1500 that claimed one vehicle for every ten men.¹⁴⁶ Thus this armies infantry counts 14 000 heads without officer’s or commander’s baggage, without siege or pontoon train. If further 2 000 knights with as many marksmen are attached (I count two squires per man with at least three horses and a vehicle with two oxen for every three men for the knights) and something for the missing positions is added we arrive at a total number of 25 000 heads, 6 300 horses, 2 300 asses, 3 900 oxen and finally, 1 950 vehicles.¹⁴⁷

A vehicle team’s length much depends on the circumstances: if we imagine an ideal of teams of two pulling a one axle vehicle (cart) with a total length of four meters we may count ten meters per vehicle: double its space to avoid jams, the rest for unit’s intervals. If, on the other hand, due to bad road or weather conditions we have to imagine four teams pulling at that a wagon the required space per vehicle would spread to trice that length. Using the first number the vehicles therefore cover the space of 20 kilometers on the road. So if the army starts its daily march at 3 00 the last soldier would leave at 6 00 as the column of the men, the horses and the asses would add up to fifteen kilometers and the column would march at a speed of 5 kilometers per hour. The vehicles then start. At their speed of three kilometers per hour at most 200 carts or 100 wagons¹⁴⁸ can be set on their voyage per hour. If the army marches for twenty kilometers its head will reach the destination at 9 00 (with resting time) and at 12 00 the soldiers will be gathered. At this time maximal 1 200 vehicles are on the march, the rest is still waiting for its departure. The last vehicle starts its march at 15 30 and arrives at 22 00 at the new point of gathering. Any civilians following would have to do so at the following day if using the same street. In the sources the oxen-powered part of an army figures as “ὁχλος” and Thukydides explicitly differentiates it from the “σκευοφόροι” (who march with the troops at their normal pace) in 7. 78. 2 of his “Histories”.

The assembled masses always were a challenge for regional logistics. The prices for victuals in the region increased and attracted sutlers to sell their goods as well as to purchase what the army might want to sell. To a region’s population its arrival was much to the same effect as famine,¹⁴⁹ yet for the farmers it was an opportunity to sell their goods at reasonable prices. The army often would not pay for its maintenance, of course, yet the farmers would impute it on their taxes to their communities which in turn would impute it on their taxes to a military overlord. Antiquity utilized the “two-field economy” and allowed half of the agricultural area to rest. The area would be covered with pasture in this year. If an army approached and claimed the pasture for its animals these in turn left masses of dung to fertilize the ground for the next year’s grain sowing.¹⁵⁰

Eventually the perpetual state of war which had started together with agriculture indeed had an inherent connection: the former being artificial demand for the latter. Anyway in these general circumstances armies operated in the -fifth century when the Peloponnesian war led to a race of specialization in the beginning -fourth century.

This war ended a sort of political equilibrium that had guaranteed relations since the liberation wars against the great king in Asia. Its course involved all cities, tribes, kings or tyrants of the eastern Mediterranean, thoroughly shook all cities by vicious infighting of oligarchic and democratic factions and consequently produced an ever increasing number of people legally banished from their communities. Those exiles furnished the establishment of an international market for mercenary service of close order infantry.

When it ended in -404 there was Sparta to claim a victory, yet practically all participants had lost in it. Lost indeed were the masses of mercenaries who, disbanded from their services, refused to return to civil life and partly were even unable to do so.¹⁵¹ They chose their commanders and searched for a contractor.¹⁵² They roamed the countries, always on the search for provisions and thereby unable to separate for reasons of security. They frequently melted away and still readily gathered wherever a possibility of engagement opened. “From this time on”, Xenophon relates for the year -394,¹⁵³ “large armies of citizens were no longer employed on either side. Each side had mercenaries and prosecuted war with these.”

The mercenary did his service in expectation of once more becoming a citizen and it came to pass that the reproduction rate in the area significantly increased in the fourth and third centuries which additionally boosted the trend.¹⁵⁴ The mercenary as professional introduced all-time warfare.¹⁵⁵ Citizen armies had had the tendency to solve matters by a straightforward battle, so as to avoid being in the field too long. The battle was announced by heralds, sometimes for a certain date. When all interested had found a place in a battle order a regular engagement was fought out which ended when one side fled. Then the trophy (turning point) was marked and the heralds began the negotiations for the prisoners and the bodies of the dead.

The professional, on the other hand, seeks to destroy his opponent when he is weak, not strong. If he is able to catch the opposing infantry on its march or while forming up or while foraging or while eating and resting he will have an easy victory, a battle aim that is worth waiting for. Waiting with the assembled masses obviously necessitated planned measures for supply. The knights and marksmen regained their importance in war as speedy and accurate intelligence of the enemy’s whereabouts became key in the field conduct and secondary aspects of war, like skirmishing, ambushing and disguise of movement increased in importance. Furthermore it follows from this that victory in a battle was the beginning of an operational pursuit with the aim of annihilating the defeated force. When a defeated city was no longer able to hold the field it was to be besieged which required the besieging force to endure summer and winter alike in the field as well as to organize itself for work in an active siege to a maximal degree.

The mercenary leader’s job differed from that of the “hegemones” of a citizen force. He permanently had to occupy his men and was always exercising them: “Iphikrates never suffered his mercenaries to be idle. When they were actually not in service, he always found some employment for them. He ordered them to pile up earth or to dig trenches or cut down wood or shift their camp or repairing their baggage. Because he considered idleness the parent of plot and mutiny.”¹⁵⁶ Units of daily training had been part of the conduct of the Spartan citizen force, true,¹⁵⁷ yet this could not match with the circuit of “games”, maneuvering, marching and camping, drilling, mock battle and construction that the mercenaries got accustomed to: “He makes trial of the men under him every day, in full armor he leads them on the parade-ground and whenever he is on campaign anywhere (…), but whomsoever he finds fond of war he rewards, some with double pay, others with triple pay, others even with quadruple pay and with gifts besides as well as with care in sickness and magnificence in burial. So that all the mercenaries in his service know that martial prowess assures to them a life of greatest honors and abundance.”¹⁵⁸

To this one wants to add that the mercenaries certainly would had preferred to get back their property and their citizen status right away than being constantly harassed by a drill-sergeant. Anyway the new practice bore results “because citizen armies include men already advanced in years and others, that have not come to their prime. Furthermore very few men in the cities train their bodies. But under my mercenaries no one serves unless he is able to endure as severe toils as myself” reasons Jason about Thessaly’s military potential.¹⁵⁹ And: “The Spartan (citizen) cavalry was poor, because the richest men kept the horses, the appointed trooper presented himself but when the ban was called out, would then get his horse and arms, as he was given and took the field on the moment’s notice. It was the men with the least ambition and body-strength that in this way were mounted on the horses.”¹⁶⁰

Prerequisite of this potential of the mercenaries, however, was the contractor’s liquidity. Metal money legalized by a stamp is first associated with the Lydian kings three centuries before. It was from the beginning utilized in military concerns. To strike coins practically announced the intent to arm, the mercenaries were the first occupation group to be paid in metal money and by levying taxes in metal money the rulers in turn compelled their subjects to produce for the market, that is the soldier’s needs. The ancients well knew that “non aes sed fides”¹⁶¹ are the basis for metal money transfer: ”When Perdiccas was short of money he struck a coin from brass and tin and payed his army. The merchants accepted it as money because of the royal stamp. As it had no worth beyond his dominion, he later took it off them again in payment for corn and the produce of the country.”¹⁶²

Politics in the following century centered on the question who would be able to keep the mercenaries standing, by paying and feeding them. In this contest “the tyrant’s mercenaries are encouraged by a certain prospect of reward, wherefore the mercenaries of a democracy know, that they must loose by victory. For as soon that a democracy has crushed its assailants, it no longer employs mercenaries to protect its liberties. A tyranny on the other hand needs even more mercenaries when its field of ambition gets extended.”¹⁶³

3. Argumentation: Strategy, Logistics and Tactics Interwoven

The armies of the -fourth century were to be much larger than their predecessors. The professionals with their “hetairoi” (staff) aspired to permanent engagement of a “hoplite” core of 20 000 which would equal the double of the army discussed in chapter 2 above. Formed up at double depth it would need no more space in a battlefield. However the “ochlos” for 10 000 men already had a length of 20 kilometers and took a full summer’s day to travel that distance. If these numbers were to be taken twofold an assembled army of this size would travel its twenty kilometers in three to five days, blocking itself with more than 3 000 vehicles.

The ratio of the half- and non-combatants therefore had to decrease and the means of transport were to be maximized. The mercenaries were compelled to carry not only all of their weapons all the time but rations and tools on top of that.¹⁶⁴ The old “hoplite” set weighed a whole talent. In order to achieve the desired the reformers started to issue lighter equipment as the mercenary was to be fed, equipped and payed by the contractor.

Diodor¹⁶⁵ mentions that “μεγάλαις ἀσπίσι” were replaced with “symmetrical peltai”. Nothing in this sentence enforces to see that “pelta” as smaller than an “aspis”. Actually its providing sufficient cover¹⁶⁶ and its light construction are emphasized.¹⁶⁷ Diodor’s wording means: “constructed in the way of a pelta without a wooden core, not crescent shaped but round” and strapped to the arm like the “aspis”. It appears to have been rimless and covered with bronze¹⁶⁸ and nevertheless weighed approximately only 6.5 kgs¹⁶⁹ as opposed to the “megalos aspis” with 8 kgs¹⁷⁰ and more. The Roman armies’ change from the “clipeus” to the “scutum” and the introduction of payment is related to have happened at the siege of Veii at the beginning of the century.¹⁷¹

Nepos further relates that lighter body armor replaced the bronze muscular cuirass. The “linen armor” had bronze plates inlaid and weighed approximately eight kgs;¹⁷² as opposed to the former set with ten kgs and more. New round vision helmets also were lighter. All in all the men’s weapon and armor load was reduced to twenty kgs. While this reduction of course eased movement in the field its main purpose lay in the fact that this infantry could now carry seven kgs of rations, personal belongings¹⁷³ and common goods per man.

This revolution in logistics had its impact on tactics, however: The new shields as well as armor were easier to pierce with a spear: “for the spear (δορὺ) is used in two ways, one in hand to hand combat, the other for hurling like a javelin (πάλτεον), just as the lance (κόντιον) serves both purposes, for it can be used for melee and as a missile for hurling, which is also true for the sarisa and the pilum (ὕσσος).”¹⁷⁴

Throwing the spear prior to melee engagement was universally practiced during all of the millennium¹⁷⁵ and poor performance of citizen forces during the -fifth century was owed to the lack of training.¹⁷⁶ Now its throwing¹⁷⁷ became universally popular¹⁷⁸ and troops started to get trained to deliver all of them in volleys and immediately afterwards to charge with the sword¹⁷⁹ to maximize weapons’ efficiency. The introduction of the “pilum” is mentioned in a speech of Furius Camillus,¹⁸⁰ if the context is to be believed, in the year -367 right before Philipp’s, yet after Iphikrates’ army reform. For: “Philipp armed his men with the sarisa”¹⁸¹ see below. After their new shields these troops were called “peltasts” in Greece and Nepos adds: “a quod postea peltastae pedites appellati sunt, qui antea hoplites appellabantur – whence and since peltasts are named who earlier were the hoplites.”¹⁸²

“Peltast” formerly had been another name for the true “akontists” who fought in loose-order and projected their darts by the means of a string (ἀνκύλε) wrapped around it and thereby gaining momentum. Whenever Thukydides mentions the word he means this skirmisher with his javelins, a buckler and possibly, when strong enough, a long sword.¹⁸³ The name “akontist” is precise as “akontion” is the diminutive of “kontos” and cannot be misunderstood as a large spear. In Xenophon, however, the meaning depends. His “Anabasis” and “Cyropaidia” use the word “peltast” in the meaning of “akontist”. In the “Hellenica” a change occurred: “ἐτάχθησαν μέντοι ἐπ͗ ἀύτο͂ις πελτοφόροι τε κὰι ψιλόι ἀκοντιστάι.” Here Xenophon struggles to differentiate two groups of spear-throwers, one bearing the new “peltai”.¹⁸⁴ Some books later: “And almost all of these neighbouring people are akontists, so that it is likely that our force would be superior in peltasts also.”¹⁸⁵ This sentence were odd if the two words meant the same thing. The “akontists” are only likely to make good “peltasts”. And Diodor¹⁸⁶ relates: ”Philomelus hired foreign mercenaries and picked a force of thousand from the Phocians, whom he called peltasts.” Diodor could have phrased: He picked a thousand “peltasts” from the Phocians, yet prefers not to do so: these “peltasts” were a novelty that had to be named.

The tactical novelty was that the so far uniform body of the close-order infantry split in two, very similar to European infantry in modern times: In a first phase the pedestrians learned to withstand the knights in close formation with spears and experienced being a tactical body. In a second phase fighting against other infantry under the condition of all-time warfare led to the integration of fire-power into the body and consequently into a division of marksmen and their supporting pike men (as the former with his weapon spent might succumb to a feeling of being defenseless). Even a competition for the length of the spears made its appearance.¹⁸⁷ At the end of this phase the pikes were discarded and all infantry alike armed with fire-arms as it had come to mind that infantry defends itself through the firmness of the tactical body, regardless of its armament. The second phase of this development started in antiquity in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian war: Nepos in Iph. 1 and Diodor in 15. 44. drew on the same defective source and present the pike-man but omit the marksman and probably themselves did not understand what they related.¹⁸⁸

Xenophon shortly before his death in – 359 wrote the obituary for Agesilaos and in 1. 25. has him summoning “the whole army” and then enumerates the knights, the “hoplites” as well as the “peltasts” as infantry, and the “akontists” with the “toxotai” as light- armed already for the year -395.

The phalanx too in the Tacticians (Arrian,¹⁸⁹ Asclepiodotus,¹⁹⁰ Aelian¹⁹¹), in Plutarch¹⁹² and also in Polybios¹⁹³ is composed of two distinctive parts, the one called “hoplitai” or “phalangitai” and the other one “peltasts”. The new heavy “peltast” fought in close order¹⁹⁴ and gathered whenever endangered.¹⁹⁵ His key weapon was the heavy javelin¹⁹⁶ to pierce armor¹⁹⁷ closely prior to his attack with the sword. Yet lighter projectiles were utilized too and the “peltast” was no longer to remain passive against “akontists”. The (younger) mercenaries could be dissolved to fight in open order (see Jason’s reasoning above about the men’s fitness) and combined the virtues of close- and loose-order fighting.¹⁹⁸ When “peltasts” or “akontists” were skirmishing in open order, however, they needed a body of troops in close order to rely on.¹⁹⁹

Such a rear division does not actually need any special armament, yet the reformed armies became famous for their use of long spears: The Athenian reform (presumably by Iphikrates in -374) included these according to Diodor who mentions “δόρατα ἡμιόλιο”, infantry spears plus 50 %,²⁰⁰ whereas IG II² 120 mentions “aspidae epichalkae” in different sizes. The Roman army reformed, as tradition has it by Furius Camillus, incorporated the long spear according to Dionysios of Halicarnassos.²⁰¹ The line is corrupted, though, and correctly read: “Those who fight in close combat with cavalry (shields and) spears, grasped with two hands by the middle and who usually save the day in battle are called Triarii by the Romans.” Finally positive proof for the long spear in the Macedonian army is given in Plutarch²⁰², Polyaen,²⁰³ and Livy.²⁰⁴

In one or the other way the Tacticians and also Polybios get confused over the group of the “peltasts” either mixing them up with the half-combatants or else with the “akontists” and eventually picture a close-order body armed entirely with long spears. Polybios²⁰⁵ lengthens broadly on the picture of such a formation. Yet this is mere folly:²⁰⁶ Polybios’ frightening ten pikes that simultaneously strike one opponent cannot move properly and would have no possibility to enter a melee. They would have got stoned to death without actual fighting, as they had to utilize a small shield (the bronze shield with 60 centimeter diameter).

The relationship of the weapon’s to the shield’s weight is not understood throughout by all three Tacticians: Indeed I would not trust any pike-man with a spear longer than 3,2 meters to carry at that a shield at all even if the regulations prescribed it. The pike man needs the close formation, yet cannot maintain it for a minute when confronted with marksmen. His weapon is cumbersome and he can do nothing but to wait for somebody to walk into his pike.²⁰⁷ It is invincible in the melee as Polybios never becomes tired to assure, yet for this reason cannot easy get to it. The long spear has to be wielded upside-down and slow because the long shaft wobbles. Besides his battle contribution a pike man has no use at all, being constantly restricted to manipulate his weapon.

Consequently such a force of pure pike-men never existed and Polybios who, troubled to show the differences of a Roman and a Macedonian phalanx, invents this picture neatly some pages earlier said: “…το͂ις δὲ πελταστᾶις κὰι το͂ις φαλαγγίταις παρέγγελλε διπλασιάζειν το βάθος κὰι πυκνο͂υν ἐπι τὸ δεξίον – (Philipp V.) ordered the peltasts and the phalangitai to deepen and close to the right”.²⁰⁸

Unfortunately there is almost no hint concerning the proportion of heavy- and light-armed in the phalanx. The Roman “legion” incorporated six hundred “triarii” and consequently three men per file of sixteen (see chapter 5). This seems to mark a limit for the beneficial use of long spears per file in close formation (πύκνοσις). Albeit a “pyknosis” formation could have been eight deep too; in which case the usable proportion doubles to three “phalangitai” for every eight “peltasts” which were a well chosen size for a reserve.

One possible support for this assumption is in the anonymous scholion ad Euripides “Rhesus” (v307): “…πολλά πελταστ͂ων τέλη. (..) διελώ δὲ τὴν πόλιν Ἀλέυας ἔταξε κὰι κλῆρον παρέχειν ἐκάστην ἱππέας μὲν τεσσαράκοντα, ὁπλίταις δὲ ὀγδοήκοντα – ἧν δὲ ἥ πέλτη ἄσπις ἴτυν οὺκ ἔχουσα ἐπιχάλκος ἀιγός δέρματι περιτετάμενη – κὰι τριάκοντια ὅι κὰι μακρόν δόρυ πάντες ἐφόρουν ὅ σχέδιον ἐκάλειτο – many peltast units. Aleuas divided the cities into kleroi and demanded from each 40 knights, 80 hoplites with the pelte aspis without rim, covered in goat hide and encovered in bronze, and 30 all with long spears that he called melee (troop).”²⁰⁹

Whichever proportion chosen in conjunction these two parts of the phalanx acted in the following manner: “The Macedonians approached (the opposing Thebans), the trumpet blew the call to arms and the troops on both sides raised the battle cry and hurled their missiles at the enemy.”²¹⁰, “These were soon expended and all turned to the use of the sword.”²¹¹, “When Alexander saw ( ) that his troops wearied in battle, he ordered his rear division (ἐφεδρέια) to enter the struggle. As this suddenly hit the tired Thebans, it bore heavy on them and killed many.”²¹²

I assume that the “ephedreia” from the back indented into the phalanx, creating the “συνασπισμο͂ι – very close” order and with its long spears in this moment was of use, with an opponent already pinned down by the “peltasts”,²¹³ when javelins could no longer be utilized without danger for the front ranks and the persistent enemy had to be warded off by “προβολή”.

Plutarch (Aem 1. 19): “ἢδε τούς ἐν τ͠οις ἀγήμασι Μακεδόνας ἄκρας τάς σαρίσας προσερηρείκοτας τ͠οις θύρε͠οις τ͠ων Ῥωμαίων καὶ μὴ προσιεμένους εὶς ἐφικτόν ἀυτ͠ων τὰς μαχάιρας, ἐπεί δὲ κὰι τ͠ων ἄλλων Μακεδόνων τὰς τε πέλτας ἒξ ὤμου περισπασάντων κὰι τ͠αις σαρίσαις ἀφ΄ ἑνὸς συνθήματον κλιθείσαις ὑποστάντων τ͠ους θυρεόφορους, εἶδε τὴν τε ῥώμην τ͠ου συνασπισμ͠ου κὰι τὴν τραχύτητα τ͠ης προβολ͠ης – He saw the Macedonians in their leading units plunging their sarisai into the Roman shields so that these did not dare to come within range with their swords, while the other Macedonians still kept their peltai over the shoulders and stood without depth leaning to their sarisai – already holding at bay the thureophoroi – and when he saw at that the strength of their synaspismos and the fierceness of their probole”

Livy (8. 8. 9) explains that the Roman “hastati” had the front line skirmishing to provide cover for the rest of the “legion” to march up. Next the “principes” together with the “hastati” formed the battle line and made contact with an enemy. And when Livy (8. 8. 11) continues: ”si apud principes quoque haud satis prospere esset pugnatum a prima acie ad triarios se sensim referebant” this simply is military ignorant speculation. When “res ad triarios venit” they of course from their backward position indented into the wavering line and produced the “synaspismos”.

Again in Plutarch: “προβαλλομένων τὰς σαρίσας μακρὰς πειρωμένων τ͠ῳ συνασπισμῷ τὴν φάλαγγα διατηρ͠ειν ἐν τάξει, τ͠ων δὲ Ρωμάιων τὸυς μὲν ὑσσὸυς ἀυτ͠ου καταβαλόντων – in the “synaspismos” they pushed with the long sarisai, trying to keep their formation, while the Romans threw their pila”.²¹⁴ From this can be gathered that “proballein” denotes the use of the long spear while “katabalein” means throwing spears.

Long spears were unable to operate independently, however. Another motive for their introduction was the field-artillery which in these days first became part of the armies²¹⁵ and which the long spears were to protect against cavalry. The technique was rather complicated, two arms powered by strings of sinew had to co- function at the exact same measure of traction which was determined by listening to the string’s tone. The whole weapon still had the character of an experiment, only few men were proficient to use it and its efficiency depended on the weather. In the field these pieces were unable to produce any outstanding effects of destruction. Their penetration power obviously dwarfed a hand sling and the range clearly outdid any marksmen.²¹⁶ Modern replicas cover hundred meters and more, yet their drawback is an insignificant fire rate and lacking density of fire. If installed opposing an attacking force they would hardly come to a second shot before being overrun by it. The artillery therefore served the purpose to tease an enemy whose position was strong and who would not want to leave it. Here continuous suffering from an unattainable opponent could provoke the defender to move adverse to plan.²¹⁷ The pieces were cumbrous and slow, so guarding them with infantry was reasonable.

The larger part of the phalanx, however, the light-armed part consisted of “Iphikratean peltasts” armed with one heavy and possibly more light javelins, a sword, linen body armor, a helmet and a large shield of light construction: “imitating the close-order fighting with over-lapping shields of the warriors of Troy”.²¹⁸ These large shields are shown on the Alexander sarcophagus and Arrian tells how the “hoplites” crouch under them linked together in order to avoid being run over by wagons which roll down a hill.²¹⁹ Curtius talks of similar “tortoise” tactics being employed by the phalanx at the storming of the Persian gates.²²⁰

There is also proof for the use of javelins in the phalanx: “Two hoplites of the taxis of Perdiccas, living in the same tent and being messmates, happened in the course of their conversation to be extolling himself and his own exploits. Hence a quarrel arouse between them as to which of them was the braver. And, being somewhat inflamed by wine, they agreed to arm themselves and on their own accord go and assault the wall facing the citadel. ( ) Some of the men in the city ( ) rushed out upon them. But they slew those who came near and hurled darts at those who stood at a distance.”²²¹ Arrian explicitly uses the word “ἠκροβολίζειν”. These men of the “taxis” of Perdiccas clearly did not use long spears. He also says of the “Hypaspists” of king Alexander III: “ἔι τὲ το͠υς ἐπιβάτας ἀυτ͠ων ἀκοντίζοντες”²²² and also of the members of the bodyguard, that they used javelins.²²³

“τὰς δὲ ἀσπίδας ἀνέιλοντο κὰι ταὶς σαρίσαις ἐπιδουπήσαντες” – they took their shields and clashed their “sarisai” against them.²²⁴ A thing most unlikely to have been done with long spears.

Further I mention Macedo in Curtius:²²⁵ “Macedo justa arma sumpserat, aerum clipeum hastamque,- sarisam vocabant- laeve tenens, dexterae lanceam gladioque cinctus.” Macedo’s shield is called a bronze “clipeus”. He is armed with two spears and first uses a light javelin: “igitur lanceam emisit ( ) antequam ille hastam transferret in dexteram, adsiluit et stipite eum fregit.” The “sarisa” gets shattered and Curtius continues: “amisso utroque telo Macedo gladium coeperat”, and by the use of the word “telum” implies that the “sarisa” was a missile too.

And the same story in Diodor reads: “Ε͂ιθ’ ὁ μὲν τὴν Μακεδονικέν σαρισάν προβεβλημένος ἐπεπορέυετο, ὁ δ’ ἐγγίσαντος ἀυτο͂υ τῷ ͑ροπάλῳ πατάξας τὴν σάρισαν ἀπέθραυσεν.”²²⁶ Here “he charged with advanced sarisa” rather implies the use of a substantial spear. Anyway it is hard to believe that its length exceeded two meters if it was to be of any help in that single fight. Macedo’s fighting style clearly is the “peltast’s” and similar to Polybios’ “legionary”.

Livy²²⁷ too compares these fighters: “arma clipeus sarisaeque illis id est hastae, Romano scutum maius corpori tegumentum et pilum, haud paulo quam hasta vehementius ictu missuque telum”. This sentence again implies two things: the Macedonians had different “sarisai” and some of them were thrown as the “pilum” (in the opinion of Livy’s source) was the projectile with the greater impact.

Theophrastus²²⁸ gives the enormous length of twelve cubits (= 5,4 meters) for the “longest sarisai”²²⁹ but fails to give the shortest. Yet “sarisa” also was the name of the “ἀκόντιον βαρύτερον”²³⁰ and the probable reason why the Macedonians so persistently differentiated rather was the material of the shaft, the wood. Being lumberjacks by profession they could not help promoting their home product and whenever some people received “Macedonian spears” or “sarisai”, this implies but little concerning the length.²³¹ Contemporary representation often is misleading: Alexander’s lance on the Mosaic in Neaple certainly is exaggerated in length to fit the composition and very often the mosaics show soldiers with spears that have long cutting edges, whereas weapons of war, as Grattius²³² informs, had small heads to be able to pierce armor.

Leaving aside the never ending story about the spear’s length²³³ the question arises in which manner the army reformers solved the problem of the thousands of vehicles. To Athens, a single city, the question does not fully apply. It usually based its operations on the sea and supplied per ship. It never mustered armies of that size. Macedonia, a tyranny and Rome, a confederation of cities, were the two exponents of the century to develop militarized trains to answer that question.

4. Macedonian Army Reform of -359

Anaximenes of Lampsakos relates a king Alexander to have formed the knights into units and the mass of pedestrians into “λόχοι”, “δεκαδο͂ι”, and the other “ἀρχίας”.²³⁴ When general Teleutias of Sparta in Macedonia had asked for troops in -384²³⁵ he received the usual knightly contingents and no infantry at all. Therefore its seems reasonable to assume that this Alexander was the second, who reigned from -370 to -368, despite the remarkable shortness of that reign. It will be remembered, however, that king Philipp II. too rallied his army within one year. Alexander was assisted by Iphikrates and was able to cover some Thessalian cities with garrisons.²³⁶ While this led to his assassination by Ptolemaios Alorites it nevertheless shows that the Macedonian army had made some progress in these years.

When this army in -360 was defeated by Bardylis the Illyrian²³⁷ it presumably contained a “hoplite” core of 1 500, named “πεζετάιροι”,²³⁸ 1 500 “hoplite” mercenaries, 600 cavalry, some archers and a larger number of “akontists”. This was standard for the armies in its neighborhood too: King Bardylis was fostered by Dionysios of Syracuse who furnished him with “hoplite” armor and mercenaries.²³⁹ The king of the Taulantians is said to have utilized close-order infantry in the battle of Pelion²⁴⁰ and the Lynkestians according to Thukydides.²⁴¹

King Philipp in -359 again reformed the army. His first step was to acquire mercenaries. When his rival Argaios with the Athenian general Mantias and three thousand “hoplites” landed at Pydna, he surprised them on the march, defeated his opponent, sent home the Athenian citizens, but kept the exiles.²⁴² Those were the teachers and supervisors for his new infantry. The former “Pezhetairoi”, so far recruited from “Lower Macedonia” (Emathe), were doubled in strength and re-named “Ὑπάσπισται” (shieldbearers). King Philipp probably dispossessed some of his barons, those who had supported his enemies, and gave these lands to them. They became the king’s guard, were in future recruited from the whole army for their loyalty to the king and were to operate together with the cavalry, whence I imagine them armed as pure “peltasts”²⁴³ without artillery allocation.

Further close-order infantry formations were created which inherited the name “Pezhetairoi” and were divided into “τάξεις” of 1 500 men. The Pierian or Elimiotid “taxis” can have been present at the revanche battle against Bardylis (3 000 “Hypaspists”, 1 500 “Pezhetairoi”, 3 000 mercenary “hoplites”,²⁴⁴ 2 000 Macedonian “akontists” and 500 archers besides the 600 knights being my guess for this battle), yet their number rose to twelve²⁴⁵ in the year -336.

King Philipp “transplanted peoples and cities hither and thither, as places appeared to him proper to be peopled or left desolate”²⁴⁶ and “distributed prisoners of war to fill up the number of the inhabitants. Out of various nations he formed one kingdom and people.”²⁴⁷ The new settlements in the conquered lands²⁴⁸ produced the future “Pezhetairoi”.²⁴⁹ Their legendary xenophobia therefore directly corresponded to their actual lack of identity. This was restricted to the “taxeis” from Upper Macedonia whose princes esteemed themselves as equals of the king and who prided themselves with their unruliness. Those in the narration became so dominant that many actually do not believe in any others. Anyway with this rapid expansion the king gained the support of these people while maintaining his relations with the (Macedonian) land-owners, which had been Jason’s unsolved problem in Thessaly (who had not dared to free the “Penestai” and in consequence could muster no own infantry).²⁵⁰

Besides Anaximenes, some more lines explaining organization can be quoted. The first from Frontinus:²⁵¹ “Philippus, cum primum exercitus constitueret, vehiculorum usum omnibus interdixit. Equitibus non amplius quam singulam calones habere permisit, peditibus autem denis singulos, qui molas et funes ferrent. In aestiva exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo portari imperavit. – Philipp forbade the use of vehicles by everybody when he first constituted his army. Riders were allowed one squire per man, the infantry had but one man in ten who carried the ropes and the mills. During summer marches he ordered thirty days of flour to be carried on the back.”

The second from one of the surviving “Tactica” texts: “The row’s number has been made eight, by some ten, by others twelve and by some else sixteen.”²⁵² And: “The row is known also by the name: στίχος or else δεκανία, namely if it counts ten.”²⁵³ The last important line is in Aelian.²⁵⁴ He there states that in his model army the number of the half-combatants were half the number of the heavy-armed infantry and the number of its cavalry again half that number. Public institutions can be described in three classes, the “archias”, the “hyperesia” and the “epimeleia”.²⁵⁵

I will start with the “archias”: The basic administrative unit of the infantry was a group of ten men named “dekas”. Of these at least one was a half-combatant. The battle formation was either sixteen²⁵⁶ or eight²⁵⁷ deep so it is reasonable to assume that eight soldiers each were served by two half-combatants. This is confirmed by Aelian’s statement above: If eight infantry soldiers and two cavalrymen together had four half-combatants the riders need two of them for themselves and only two remain for the infantry men. One of these carried the ropes and the mill. The tent is to be added as the “dekas” also was a “suskenia”,²⁵⁸ a tent and mess party. It was commanded by a “dekadarch” who presumably received double pay and had the van in battle. Second in command was the “ouragos”, the tail, with one and a half pay.

This is altogether no surprise as the ratio of four to one is attested for the Roman republican as well as imperial army as we will later see. Yet so far I have not found it anywhere stated for the Macedonian army. The group size of eight soldiers as opposed to the groups of six favored by Xenophon of course resembles economic reasons: One man effectively can supervise no more than seven others.²⁵⁹ Hence one double-payed per seven ordinary salaried men gives the minimum of the necessary.

A number of these units of ten built the tactical body of the infantry named “lochos”. This name, meaning “ambush”, by that time already had had a long history. Its size in the Macedonian army of Philipp II. cannot be determined as the authors contradict themselves on the matter. In Xenophon one can read that this unit moved in one on the field and consequently cannot have been too large. That is it certainly had not 512 fighters,²⁶⁰ rather around hundred²⁶¹ or somewhat more.²⁶² “Lochagoi” were the social equivalent of Roman “centurions” with triple pay. In Xenophon they are elected by their comrades, rank for seniority and acknowledge an “epilochagos” who takes over command when the “strategos” fails. They there command “dekadarches” and “pempadarches”. The Tacticians favor their unit of 128 men, yet Arrian in one passage suggests a “lochos” of 120 men.²⁶³ I would tentatively suggest 10 “peltast lochoi” each 120 fighters strong and two “phalangitai lochoi” with 225 fighters and 60 artillerymen with six field-pieces (4/1000) and twelve “Lochagoi”.²⁶⁴

The reason for the confusion concerning the “lochos” stems from the fact that this infantry unit in the course of the century was succeeded by a larger infantry body named “σπέιρα” (spiral), the equivalent of a Roman “manipulus” (handful), as we will later see. The Tacticians wrote centuries later and had their difficulties to remember a state of affairs in the Macedonian army that had prevailed from -370 to presumably -331 only. Anyway the prudent Arrian knew that king Philipp’s army still employed the tactical body named “lochos” and kept the name throughout his “Anabasis” with discipline. In his “Tactica”, however, he follows the tradition of these writers and reserves the name “lochos” for a single row of sixteen.

Next there should have been and certainly was a command level above the four “lochoi” which was named “mora” in the Spartan army. As Curtius’ talk of “cohortes” is only assistance to his contemporary reader we have no positive tradition. I’d like to suggest three “meroi” or “moerai”, commanded by three “strategoi”, the first commanding the whole “taxis” with quadruple pay as the most plausible supplement. This would add to 1 500 fighters.

Concerning the riders Asclepiodotus informs that they fought in units in Philipp’s days.²⁶⁵ This then was comparatively new. To keep mounted men in a unit and to make them move in this manner is a difficult task which presupposes the men’s will to participate in such efforts. The knight dislikes the trumpet.²⁶⁶ The new tactic spread from Thessaly and the riders were compelled to move as a tactical body on the field in small groups of 30 to 40 (“tetrarchies” or “oulamoi”). Various formations were in use (“wedge”, “oblong” and “square”), yet of course the cohesion of the body gave the new strength and not its form.

Xenophon explains why a deep formation worked for the cavalry: While the files produce no pressure upon the front rank familiar with the infantry by this the most daring and outstanding warriors alone make first contact with an enemy and as they most likely would win their personal engagement an “oulamos” eight deep would usually break an opposing line. Not all riders chose to do so. Polybios mentions for example the Aetolian riders skirmishing as single fighters.²⁶⁷ In the melee the close-order groups outdid the most heroic single fighter and even in the armies’ wings it became more important to march up densely than to charge to daring single feats.

When King Philipp fought his battle against King Bardylis in -358 he had with him the traditional 600 cavalry the country could produce. A line in Athenäus²⁶⁸ suggests a number of eight hundred, albeit without any hint for the point of time. At that it does not refer to a cavalry unit but to the circle gifted by the king. Many of whom would be officers and knights but in no way exclusively. The number given by Diodor in 16. 85. 5 includes Thessalian allies with no hint for the Macedonian portion. The same applies to Diodor 17. 9. 3. It is not until the invasion of Asia in -334 that we are told anything concerning the composition of the Macedonian cavalry.

Diodor²⁶⁹ lists 1 800 Macedonians, the same number of Thessalians, 600 Greek allies and 900 Thracians and Paionians. He then gives 4 500 as the total. This enumeration includes a compilation error. 600 “Sarisophoroi” are counted double: First in the number of the Macedonians, then in the number of the Thracians and the Paionians.²⁷⁰ The total of 4 500 therefore is correct. The “Companion” cavalry of the invasion force in -334 was only 1 500 fighters strong.

In Arrian²⁷¹ the Anthemusian and the Leugean “ila” together amount to 300. From this follows that the invasion force counted eight regular “Companion ilai”.²⁷² Assuming this strength for the “ila” the number 900 for the light cavalry becomes more acceptable. It is then four “Sarisaphoroi”, one Paionian and one Odrysian squadron. Further the double strength of the “Royal Ila” becomes more acceptable: It then amounts to the classic size for such units that is 300. Finally the sub units of the “ila”, the “tetrarchies”, get a more suitable size comparable to a Roman “turma”: presumably 36 men.

To prove these sub units in the “ila” was surprisingly difficult. None of the ancient authors relates anything useful and only recently (1935) some inscriptions²⁷³ were found at Amphipolis that name the “tetrarch” and order them: “Ἐφοδεύειν δὲ τὴν μὲν στρατεγίαν ἐκάστην κὰτα μέρος τοὺς τετράρχας ἄνευ φωτός κὰι τὸν συγκαθήμενον ἥ καθεύδοντα φύλακαι – The tetrarchs patrol the whole strategia in all parts without light and catch the sleeping sentries”; which in the Roman army too was the knight’s job to do.²⁷⁴ By this a “tetrarchy” in the infantry, as fancied by the Tacticians and countless publications thereafter, should be proven false.

I would like to suggest that the king’s plan provided for twelve squadrons of knights of 150 fighters each in a one to ten ratio to his twelve “taxeis” of 1 500 infantry, as was the usual practice. This amounts to a total of 1 800 and makes that mistake of Diodor appear even more understandable. At that the king assembled 300 knights in his “Basilike Ile”. This was composed of his bodyguard (“Somatophylakes”) and the hetairoi/philoi present at court and mirrored the strength of the 3 000 foot-guards, the “Hypaspists.

Additionally the king provided for a national force of light cavalry. The “Sarisophoroi” are thought to have been ethnic Thracians; not out of a single tribe with their native commander but of mixed origins with Macedonian officers. This ambiguous status favored misunderstandings, not only in Diodor, yet again shows the king’s deep rooted military understanding: who found his men prone to plunder, natural warriors, riders and pathfinders and forged them into cavalry. These warriors stood socially apart from the “hetairoi” and presumably did not become land owners. While their military tasks were different (see chapter 10) there is no evidence for differentiation concerning fighting technique. Both groups use light projectiles (λονχός, πάλτεον, lancea) and heavier spears (ξύστον, σάρισα) alike for stabbing and throwing²⁷⁵ and both would assemble on the battlefield in their “tetrarchies”.

On the other hand the use of a two-handed lance is implied²⁷⁶ by the mosaic in Neapel only and does not fit in with the tactical role of the cavalry in an infantry-based army. Whether either of these riders employed shields I dare not decide. A cavalry-shield cannot be too weighty regardless of its size. The horses with the armed men carried beyond an easy load and got exhausted within a short period of time, whence king Alexander changed for his actual fighting horse in the last moment before action.²⁷⁷ While a shield would increase that load it serves no tactical purpose: Infantrymen hid behind their shields, whereas cavalrymen could never hide their horses behind whichever shield one imagines. The cavalry knew no defense. It either attacked or retreated and gathered for a defensive formation (testudo) in maneuver only.

As for the “Sarisaphoroi’s” number I would like to suggest that, as Alexander III. took with him two thirds of his “Companion” cavalry in -334, he did likewise with his light cavalry. So with Antipatros in Macedonia remained two further squadrons of “Sarisophoroi”, giving a total of six. The Paionians and Odrysians were to fill that gap in the invasion force.²⁷⁸ King Philipp therefore increased the Macedonian cavalry from 600 to 3 000 (in number equal to the “Hypaspists”), 1 800²⁷⁹ of these were regular “Companion” knights; a huge undertaking and a social revolution in Macedonia. The men were Macedonians and mercenaries from all over Greece.²⁸⁰

No force could operate without a number of archers, slingers and “akontists”. In these weapons “internationalism” was far older than in the heavy infantry. The isle of Crete functioned as place of contract for the archers, the isle of Rhodes and the Balearics were famous for their slingers. The “krethi and plethi” formed a core of mercenaries in the army of king David, six centuries before our period.²⁸¹ Yet the names are pseudo-ethnic. The men came from wherever in the known world. Whence the formula even for us today implies the meaning of “anybody”. As the weapon needs constant training and its tactical use presupposes the individual will to fight and the individual decision when to advance or to withdraw, yet readily to reassemble without command, it is always few in numbers.

King Philipp had one “taxis” of 480 “Cretan” archers. These apparently were constantly training Macedonians for the purpose, two more units of this size seem to have been Macedonians. In battle the corps of “toxotai” involved these archers with an attached force of slingers, as weapon’s combination was thought to maximize its efficiency. Stone throwing by hand or sling was universally practiced and not only soldiers of all branches but civilians defending their city were well capable of it. In secondary warfare the “toxotai” were split up into very small groups. It was usual to combine a group of eight “akontists” with one single archer in skirmishing and reconnaissance.²⁸² Philipp’s “toxotai” corps probably counted 2 000 at the most²⁸³ (another possible source being “Scythians” from the Danube delta). The rest of the light-armed were “akontists”. It is reasonable to assume that dogs were the peculiar animal in this weapon.²⁸⁴

In -359 this force would have consisted of Macedonians, yet as the more of these were converted into heavy infantry in the years to come the more vassal contingents were to take their place. Most famous among these were the Agrianians, a tribe whose king Langaros made alliance with Philipp and provided him with a portion of his troops. 480 men²⁸⁵ and later with Alexander III. even 800 of them were a special fighting elite, frequently in the first line of any surprise, night or stealth operation. Besides these the generalizing term “Illyrians” is used by later writers. Actually the Paionians since -358, and the Thracian confederation of the Odrysai since -346 were vassals to king Philipp.²⁸⁶ They probably counted 3 000 “akontists” in the invasion army of -334. Ardiaian, Taulantian or Dardanian mercenaries from actual Illyria are possible but nowhere specifically mentioned. The Triballians certainly did not contribute before King Alexander III. actually brought them to terms in -335. They are mentioned as actual reinforcement only in -331 in Sittacene, numbering no less than 3 500 light-armed infantry.

The combat range of the “toxotai” is often keenly exaggerated: While it is true that a king from the top of his citadel could cover a distance of hundreds of meters with his very best bow and a light whistle arrow,²⁸⁷ yet the effective range for the weapon is markedly shorter: the typical intersection of city walls being sixty meters. From this one can see that a shot against an equipped and moving target was thought to be effective no farther than thirty meters at the most. At these distances the “akontists” could equally well be of use. The light infantry besides its scouting task also had to clear the way for the army. Arrian²⁸⁸ mentions Thracians who level the road in the mountains. And according to Xenophon²⁸⁹ some of these in tool sections carried shovels, mattocks and axes.²⁹⁰ One might fancy how a pontoonier’s train with its vehicles to carry “μονόχυλαι” (dugouts)²⁹¹ was to be combined with their scouting screen to form the “προδρόμοι”. The light-armed seem to have been commanded in “taxeis” of 480 and administered by “pentekosiarchs” (800 in “chiliarchies” after -331).²⁹² Their basic body possibly was six groups, or 48 men commanded by a “pentekonter”,²⁹³ named “telos” or “pentekostys” and being often grouped together with one cavalry “tetrarchy”.

Next I will describe the “hyperesia”, the organization of the half- and non-combatants:

“Philipp accustomed the Macedonians to constant exercise before they went to war. So that he frequently made them march three hundred stadia, carrying with them their helmets, shields, greaves, spears and besides these arms, their provisions likewise and utensils for common use.”²⁹⁴

“Über die Fortbringung des Verpflegung läßt sich für diese Epoche wenig sagen, insbesondere, ob und wieviel der Mann mit sich trug und wieviel vom Train fortgebracht wurde.”²⁹⁵

One “medimnos” of grain equals 52. 8 liters.²⁹⁶ Polybios gives the monthly allowance of grain per man as two thirds of a “medimnos” (32 “choinix’), therefore one “choinix” of about 1. 17 liters and approximately 850 grams was the daily grain ration per man.²⁹⁷ This suffices to maintain even a hard-working person,²⁹⁸ yet people in antiquity would not feast exclusively on barley if they could help it. If the army truly procured barley only the men would barter part of it for other victuals. For twenty men carrying barley there are mentioned three with olives, one with garlic and one with onions.²⁹⁹ Some salted meat was added.³⁰⁰ This daily ration cannot well be estimated below 1. 3 kgs³⁰¹ including a quantum of wine, the “cotyle” (ca. 0,27 liter). This was not essential,³⁰² yet important as soldiers frequently were unable to boil the water they had to drink and used that wine, even in the quality of vinegar, as means of disinfection. The grain ration in flour weighs approximately 765 grams. “Flour for thirty days” therefore means a load of 23 kgs per man. Together with a 20 kgs load of arms this clearly exceeds a man’s carrying capacity even without a position for common goods.

As we recall of ten men only eight were carrying the armor load and one may picture the two half-combatants as porters, each carrying a “talent”, together 52. 6 kgs of flour.³⁰³ The remaining load for the individual armor bearer is reduced by this less than a kg as the porter carries only little more than his own ration. Therefore our half-combatants could be pictured as administering two asses. Yet this allowance is altogether insufficient. Three “arthabas” carried the ass, about 75 kgs.³⁰⁴ Of course one can pack an ass with more, yet the army would not allow to load the animals over the limit so as not to overuse them. 230 kgs of flour load alone now could be transported provided that the two ideas are combined, the half-combatants carrying their load and simultaneously leading those asses.

Alas, there were common goods to be transported as well, as we already know, the cooking gear, the mill,³⁰⁵ the ropes, the tent, the pack saddles, and a set of tools. Xenophon lists shovels, mattocks, sickles and axes. From Flavius Josephus³⁰⁶ baskets and a hook can be beneficially added. Those came in the lightest possible version. As for distribution I would suggest two shovels, two mattocks, four sickles and two axes, whereby half the group could labor on wood, earth, grain or hay indiscriminately. The tent weighed 18, the mill 27 kgs.³⁰⁷ For ropes and the pack saddle (σάγμα) I estimate five kgs, and 1. 8 kgs per tool, save for the sickles, the basket and the hook which together should amount to 3. 6 kgs. This roughly adds up to 65 kgs; the group load again were too high for the means of transport.

In this situation we have to recall that Frontinus did not state at all that vehicles were prohibited from Philipp’s army, only their unrestricted use “by” everybody. If “omnibus” here would mean “for all” the word could be skipped altogether. As he also stresses that only one man out of ten carried the mills, ropes and tent (by the help of an ass)³⁰⁸ I would like to suggest that the second administered half a carriage that is, two groups of ten together had one which was powered by teams either of horses no longer serviceable in the cavalry, mules or oxen.

Xenophon indicates that the army employed different vehicles.³⁰⁹ I picture the troop carriage as a cart pulled by one team and imagine a larger four-wheeled vehicle pulled by two pairs in the army train.³¹⁰ The pair of oxen (ὑποζύγια) pulled 25 “talents”.³¹¹ If the cart’s weight is assumed as 175 kgs about 380 kgs remain as possible load. The larger vehicle presumably weighed 250 kgs and transported about 550 kgs. These figures are small compared to civilian transport capabilities³¹² and without proof³¹³ as technical data concerning ancient carpentry is not handed down. The military loads, however, remained small throughout history well into the age of railways as they always were required to cope with all possible circumstances of transport and the worst roads: 40 men combined would then have had one cart and one wagon.

With this allowance Frontinus requirements can be fulfilled: 920 kgs flour, 260 kgs common goods, 140 kgs personal belongings and 640 kgs weapons and armor load can be moved by the men (1050 kgs), four asses (300 kgs) and the vehicles (930 kgs). The vehicles were further loaded with reserve ammunition, spare axles and wheels³¹⁴ (35 kgs each), a winch³¹⁵ and a medic’s kit.³¹⁶

Still some carrying capacity remains as an army would be very unhappy to feast after a day’s march on pure flour. The “30 days of flour” are a calculation example. A realistic ration weighs 1. 3 kgs per man and day even if an iron ration with biscuit (ἄρτος δίπυρος) might have been lighter. Now if the armed man carried one day of rations, 20 kgs of weapons and armor, an 1. 8 kgs tool and finally three kgs of personal belongings this added up to a “talent”. One half-combatant in each group led the ass and those carried together the mill, the tent, rations for nine men and two to three days (24- 36 kgs), something as nutrition for the animal and the cooking gear. The vehicles and their crews carried 15 days of rations.

Together with the three days the troops carried themselves this almost meets Cyrus’ requirement: “We must prepare food for ourselves and the animals for twenty days, for in reckoning it up, I find that there will be fifteen days of journey in which we shall find no provisions at all. For everything has been made away with: the enemy has taken what he could and we took the rest.”³¹⁷ Which estimation contrasts peculiarly to Rüstov and Köchly’s: “Wenn man in angebauten Gegenden Krieg führte, bedurfte es der Mitführung von Proviant nicht. Ging derselbe aus, so wurde in der ersten besten Ortschaft requiriert, was man brauchte.”³¹⁸

Now indeed this requirement was fulfilled as experienced and well marching mercenaries could bear an initial extra load³¹⁹ of 2. 6 kg, melting away within two days. By this I believe to have established that the army was capable to transport twenty days of food for the men and that this could have been done over-land only by the help of all possible means of transport which included the use of vehicles.

Its movement further required pasture, fuel and water along its route as oxen and asses almost exclusively had to live of the land. This of course does not rule out that the men did transport some hay wrought in wreaths, that the ass carried some turnips for itself and emptying carriages were loaded with fuel and hay, if possible. Anyway the required quantities could not be transported in this way. For the horses we will see that they need 7 kgs of hay and 25 liters of water each and per day besides their barley. Mules need somewhat less, yet they still need barley, three choinix (2. 46 kgs per day)³²⁰ and hay, water and straw respectively. The ass is the most frugal. If it gets enough hay or grass and water, no concentrated feeding is necessary for weeks. Oxen feed on hay or grass too, yet need vast quantities: A strong ox needs up to seventy kgs of hay and up to 100 liters of water per day. This is the reason why D. W. Engels rules out the use of oxen by the army and claims that it exclusively employed mules for its transport.³²¹

Certainly never in antiquity thousands of oxen made the travel from Gaza to Pelusion, seven days of march in a true desert without water. A fleet of water carrying ships accompanying the expedition is conceivable but unlikely. It was far easier to transport the baggage by ship and obtain new animals of burden in Pelusion and to employ camels for the load that was to be carried. Naturally only part of Alexander’s army made this travel. Including reinforcements which possibly arrived per ship no more than 20 000 men would have been with the king in Egypt. The larger part of the army after Gaza returned to Syria for wintering.

Anyway behind a “taxis” of 1 500 fighting men on the muster consequently marched up at least 360 half-combatants, 15 attended to the artillery train and 50 to the siege train. Yet not all members have been listed so far. Each “lochos” had attached a staff of presumably four men, the so-called “ἐκτακτο͂ι” (those outside of the “taxis”). These were a herald (stratokerux), a trumpeter (salpinctes), a sergeant-major (hyperetes) and a secretary (grammateus), all presumably at one and a half pay. Then there were the civilian professionals, the smiths, the carpenters,³²² the leather-workers, the masons³²³ and the engineers.³²⁴ These I choose, conveniently enough, to number one in 30 fighters. Thus the “taxis” was followed by 50 civilians and 48 “ektaktoi” plus their attendants. There remains the question for the officer’s baggage. A “lochagos” certainly had a pack-animal and a tent for himself and consequently an attendant too. “Strategoi” besides their own tents also had horses, sometimes in considerable numbers,³²⁵ and therefore extra vehicles to carry their nutrition. All in all the assembled “taxis” in three “pentekosiarchai” should have included 2 050 men with 75 carriages, 25 carriages in the siege section and ten with the artillery train and the civilians.

In Arrian the so-called “Asthetairoi” are mentioned as part of the assembled “taxis”³²⁶ and this word has not found its proper place so far. “ast-” has nothing to do with the star, but probably means the same as “vastu” in Hindi: “city”, “house” or “baggage”. And this is to be counted as king Philipp’s principal and revolutionary military reform: he militarized the train and fixed it at minimum numbers. He created a light baggage unit and a troop train (σκευόφωροι)³²⁷ that made the army independent of its heavy train units (ὑποζύγια κὰι το͂υς φύλακας).³²⁸ The train units (τάγματα)³²⁹ were recruited, paid and fed by the king, servants to him in the manner of the soldiers themselves: “who because they had been trained in war with the rest, ought not to be distinguished from the fighting men. As they were in their master’s service in times of peace, they did undergo the like dangers with them in times of war, insomuch they were inferior to none, either in skill or strength, only they were subject to their masters”.³³⁰

Now they were of markedly lower social status³³¹ than the soldiers³³² and were to serve them. On the other hand they certainly were not slaves as is sometimes argued.³³³ The “Baggage Friends” were to be support and not a hindrance to the soldiers. They were to lead the oxen and the asses on the march. They were to feed and water the animals after the march. Feeding sometimes included foraging the material and gathering it to the camp. They also had to forage for the soldiers: water, fuel and whatever victuals could be made available. They were to use that mills and to prepare food. They also were commissioned to handle their classic task: they had to organize the plunder and any captured cattle or prisoners. In battle, they had to guard the camp and to keep touch with the fighting forces, to supply them with extra missiles and to transport back the wounded. After the battle it was theirs to search for the lost materials, bring in the booty and to finish off the wounded of the enemy. They also had to bury the fallen as well as to execute punishments.

This multitude of tasks needed motivated employees: When ambushed during foraging, on the march, almost at any time slaves would take any opportunity to evade and the army were constantly occupied to guard them. This certainly is the opposite of what king Philipp intended. Socially the men could very well be Macedonian veterans who prematurely had to cancel their career because of sickness or wounds. Others would be very young men, children of married soldiers. At that “ἁρματοπηγόι” (cartwrights), “ἵππιατροι” (veterinarians), fleet-sergeants, medical aides or profoses also had professional background and certainly were rewarded and recognized. The “Asthetairoi” were commanded by the “hyperetai”, characterized by Xenophon the following way: “trustworthy, familiar with military affairs, intelligent, quick, energetic, resolute and steady.”³³⁴ The “hyperetai” in turn were commanded by a “πεντεκοσίαρχος”,³³⁵ an administrator of five hundred, and later on by a “χιλιάρχος”, an administrator of one thousand.

We are told that the cavalry were allowed one squire per man. Diodor³³⁶ uses the name “Asthippoi” and again I would like to address these squires with that name. Evidently an army would consist within short time of pedestrians if there were no remounts. The hooves of the time were not iron-shod yet “hipposandals” (plaited plant material) were in use. Even with veterinarians attached, maximum carrying weight proscribed and the troopers walking on foot whenever possible,³³⁷ the number of active fighting mounts always was a source of worry to a commander. On the other hand feeding the horses even with medium numbers reveals to be quite a challenge. Polybios³³⁸ gives the daily ration of barley for a horse as four liters and approximately 3 kgs.

This seems to be rather weak, as horses can consume 4 to even 5 kgs of concentrated food per day,³³⁹ yet Junkelmann asserts that the “Camargue” horses he employed need only 3 kgs per day.³⁴⁰ Horses in action had to carry more than twenty percent of their body weight, I estimate 90 kgs for a horse weighing 400 kgs. Transporting barley presupposes that water and fodder were to be collected from the countryside. Cavalry could go nowhere if there was no hay. This could be gathered but never be transported in suitable amounts. With only 3 kgs of barley, 7 kgs of hay and twenty five liters of water plus 1 kg of straw were the daily requirement equaling 2. 5 percent of their body weight as nutrition.

Polybios calculates two horses per fighting man. If we now imagine a row of six riders with their six half-combatants and together 12 horses it is obvious that they could not possibly have transported their rations for the number of days requested by Cyrus, if the barley for the horses was to be transported. The men, their weapon load of 20 kgs³⁴¹ and their personal belongings add up to our maximum if only one day of rations is included. The squires had no arms and could have carried more rations. On the other hand cavalry had to mount on fresh horses. Only half of them can have carried to their limit during a march. So we do have to accept a number of vehicles with the cavalry too especially as cavalrymen would have needed tents and mills no less than the infantrymen. I suggested one carriage for every three men with nine horses in our army in the introduction and hence here for our reformed army try another number: 25 vehicles for the “ila” and consequently one vehicle for each row of six fighters and one for the “ilarch”.

The men of one row can carry 315 kgs, half their horses carry 480 kgs and the wagon loads 550 kgs for a total capacity of 1 345 kgs. 120 kgs weapons and armor, 42 kgs personal belongings, 55 kgs common goods and another 60 kgs for reserve arms, saddles, gear and spare wheel still allow for rations for 18 days, nine days (49kgs/day) with the men, the rest with the wagon. The reserve horses mostly belonged to the officers: A “tetrarch” would own three of them, his sub-ordinates two each. An “ilarch” with his staff many more. Yet the rights of property yielded to the armies’ needs: The “episkopoi” (see below) were empowered to requisition and redistribute horses according to actual necessity.

Baggage and train being centrally commanded and administered obviously had the happiest influence on the armies conduct in the field. Marching became easier with the “ochlos” reduced. Feeding the troops became easier, both because of the reduction in quantity³⁴² as well as by better foraging abilities: A landscape could now be exploited by a plan which prevented the later arriving to be worse off and also that the men got lost in private undertakings. The distribution of the goods through the king’s hands strengthened his position and plugged a potential source of quarrel in the army. The more efficient the “Asthetairoi” were, the more services the king could claim from his mercenaries in exchange for his care.

Nevertheless, with all this striving for minimalism and efficiency one must not forget that the new army was standing and was to be fed all year round. After campaign they would need winter-quarters, either barracks (στήγνας) or civilian quarters (ἐπισταθμέια) as well as tents in the field (ὑπαίθριοι). Its nutrition was to be secured by all means; that is, a commander would not do the necessary if he paid his troops in money while being amid a desert. King Alexander once in a fury ordered the money being brought by a satrap to be thrown to the horses to demonstrate this.³⁴³ The system of supply shown above very much resembles that of the European kings of the 18th century: Three days for the man, six days in the troop’s carriage and another nine days in a general reserve that slowly followed the army.

In a third structure, the “epimeleia”, the army was administered: I already mentioned the “grammateus” attached to each “lochos” and “tetrarchy”. They were to keep the “syllogismoi” of their units³⁴⁴ which gave the current strength and according to which pay, rations, equipment, animals and reinforcements were distributed. The king employed as many “royal secretaries” as bodyguards, that is seven, one of whom was the army secretary. This in Alexander’s army was Eumenes from Cardia. In between were the “pentekosiarchai” and “chiliarchoi” respectively (whose “grammateis” held the “syntelesas”, the sheets of conduct), who decided over promotion and in disciplinary matters and handed over mutineers to the “hyperetai” for punishment.³⁴⁵

The army secretariat employed a number of supervisors (ἐπίσκοποι), who had to check for reality behind the paperwork and “ταμίαι” (pay-masters). Obviously the number of the men needs constant observation. The “lochagoi” always were tempted to give the number of their men too high as to embezzle the difference in funds. And the men themselves always have their reasons for unauthorized retreat and on the muster the missing would be substituted by camp-followers disguised as soldiers. It was common practice to pay in arrears³⁴⁶ to avoid the men’s deserting.

It was also common practice not to pay at all. King Philipp never had the means to guarantee a regular budget. Regardless of the build-up of his incomes the ever multiplying mercenary force followed its king for the sake of booty, expected him to make them rich through plunder and ultimately to settle them as citizens in one of his new founded cities. The sold, however, could not be payed regularly.³⁴⁷ This was by no means negligence or inability of the king but is inherent to the principles of such an army. Demetrios “Poliorketes” being asked by his friends how he were to pay for his doubling of the mercenary force, replied: “The more powerful we can get, the weaker are our enemies. We will win in war, which also will fill our coffers”.³⁴⁸

The mercenaries principally were paid in money (μίσθος) and relied on the local market³⁴⁹ if stationary and on the royal magazines during travels to provide their needs. When the army gathered in one place this normal method of supply no longer functioned and was replaced by centrally commanded measures: One Timotheus during a siege of Samos in -366 forced his company commanders to purchase the supplies for all their men wholesale, so as to avoid famine.³⁵⁰ Half of the basic pay³⁵¹ was “σιτερέσιον”, the allowance for nutrition which was retained for the duration of central supply³⁵² which according to Aristoteles was the case when the king himself led the troops, that is when they went out for war.

During campaign the king’s militarized train units were to provide the needs and besides nutrition we are also informed that medical supplies and arms,³⁵³ animals and vehicles³⁵⁴and clothing and goblets³⁵⁵ were issued that way. Aristoteles recommends to have “under personal control” all the craftsmen in the army and the hucksters who trade with the soldiers by barter and “to enjoy a complete monopoly”, that is to exploit the mercenary force in a truck system. Certainly things like: “being accustomed previously to issue his men rations on the second day of the month, in the first month he postponed the distribution for three days, and in the second for five, proceeding in this fashion until at length it took place on the last day of the month”,³⁵⁶ frequently happened.

The men initially received their arms,³⁵⁷ clothing³⁵⁸ and equipment from the arsenal (ὁπλοθήκα) and animals.³⁵⁹ Horses were then procured from studs all over Greece, twenty five brands are known (the caduceus for Macedonia, the axe, centaur and ox-head for Pherai, Larisa and Pharsalos in Thessaly, the Σ for Sikyon, the K for Corinth). Their cost is given as between 200 and 1 200 “drachmas”³⁶⁰ in the “Athenian Cavalry Archives”,³⁶¹ depending mainly on the horse’s age. The horses needed to be at least three years old to be serviceable and statistically remained so until their tenth year when they were written off. In Athens public money was lent to the future riders (κατάστασις), the precise procedure employed by king Philipp is not known. Anyway the documents make it clear that horsemanship was a great responsibility. The king replaced horses lost in action yet there was no guarantee he could grant a horse in the same quality. In Athens there was a regular yearly valuation (τιμέσις).

The panoply cost three minai (300 “drachmas”) at the end of the century.³⁶² The fines on the Amphipolis stone³⁶³ therefore are not meted out for loss of equipment but for failing to produce it at the muster. All the equipment had a statistical endurance and the man was indebted to maintain or else to replace it if it wore out prematurely. Combining our figures suggests that helmet, greaves and “kotthybos” (presumably the arming jacket³⁶⁴ with “pteruges”) were around 20 “drachmas” each, sword and spears 30 “drachmas” each, the shield 60 “drachmas” and the armor 120 “drachmas” in production cost.³⁶⁵ Prices for oxen during the century were between 50 and 80 “drachmas”.³⁶⁶ A pair of mules between five and eight “minas”.³⁶⁷ An ass presumably about 30 “drachmas”.³⁶⁸ A sheep between 10 to 13 “drachmas”.³⁶⁹ A medimnos of barley or wheat varied widely from 5 to 18 “drachmas”.³⁷⁰ A pair of simple shoes three “drachmas” and a “chlamys”, a soldier’s main dress, is given as 12 “drachmas”.³⁷¹

It proved most difficult to come to a price for a vehicle in antiquity. The very few remarks³⁷² are useless. I therefore took the liberty to compare Emperor Diocletian’s price edict from the year 305³⁷³ to our ideal price structure for the -fourth century, being both very similar in their approach. If this is read one “drachma” for 30 “nummi” the prizes match. Unfortunately the prizes for vehicles given there comprise the wooden parts only without explanation concerning the smith’s work. So I had to conjecture about this also: a carpenter finally gives this cost as 110% of the wooden parts.³⁷⁴ Eventually I arrived at a cost for the wagon which corresponds to the worth of one horse: between 300 and 1 200 “drachmas” depending on the type and quality of the vehicle. A military vehicle would therefore cost four to seven “minai”. Higher prices would indicate painting, plating or elaborate interior work, whereas lower prizes included primitive wheels and/or wheel’s suspension.

Soldier’s pay was calculated in months of thirty days.³⁷⁵ Concerning its height I have to speculate: Two “obols” of “sithos” and another two as “misthos” seems to have been the basic pay in Philipp’s days.³⁷⁶ The Macedonian infantry man presumably got a “drachma” (= 6 obols) per day,³⁷⁷ a cavalryman trice that amount. Albeit not only their personal “sithos” but their attendant’s and animal’s had to be deducted: Two “obols sithos” and one “obol” for the half-combatant leaves three “obols” of pay per day for the infantryman. Two “obols” sithos for man and half-combatant each, two “obols” pay for the latter and six “obols sithos” for two horses leave six “obols” pay per day for the cavalryman.³⁷⁸ Higher grades got their basic pay increased, the personal “sithos” remained the same. Nevertheless some higher grades also were allowed to keep animals and attendants, in which case the “sithos” was to be raised too. Perhaps the guards (“Agema” of the “Hypaspists” and the bodyguard) received one and a half pay as basic remuneration. Thus an unskilled muleteer earned 120, an “ilarch” with quadruple pay 1440 “drachmas” per year as ordinary pay excluding the “sithos”.³⁷⁹ Pay additionally was to be increased for a variety of circumstances: For duration of service, for bravery, for technical skills and later on for having children. Anyway the pay did not exclude presents, rewards and boni; in which case the proportion of one for infantry to three for cavalry was usually kept.³⁸⁰ King Philipp not only was unable to regularly pay his mercenaries, he once also was in difficulties to feed them.³⁸¹ The reproaches for piracy are true, the king captured the Athenian grain fleet without declaration of war simply to relieve his “craving want”.³⁸²

All this in view military discipline cannot have been very good. There is the story of the two generals Aeropos and Damasippos who got banished from the kingdom for having brought a “singing” girl to the camp³⁸³ and it may well be that king Philipp made an effort to banish the soldier’s families from the camp and succeeded to campaign without them.³⁸⁴ Yet this is directly connected to proper feeding, regular pay and health care. Very soon, Alexander III. allowed the soldiers to marry: “… so that they felt less desire to return home, if they had a home in their camp and that the fatigues of war would be relieved by the company of their wives. He saw that Macedonia would be less drained if the sons succeeded to veteran fathers and serve within the ramparts they were born. This custom was continued by Alexander’s successors. Maintenance was provided for the boys, arms and horses given to them when they grew up and rewards assigned for the fathers in proportion of the number of their children. If any of the fathers were killed, the orphans received his pay; and their childhood was a sort of military service.”³⁸⁵

So whatever King Philipp achieved in the subject was immediately lost with his demise, never to return. On the other hand hellenistic potentates often withheld the soldier’s families “at home” as hostages for their well-behavior. It goes without saying that the advantages of reduced trains in maneuverability are much questioned by the measures described above.

The king’s position in questions of military law certainly was stronger than that of the citizen “hegemones” who had not had the authority to punish in the field or to enforce obedience and had had to accuse the offender in court at home after the campaign. He wielded his judicial competence together with the assembled Macedonians, yet could impose capital punishments. Arbitrariness and bias were the marks of this court which was frequently summoned by the king himself. Daily disciplinary routine, on the other hand, cannot have been too severe, judging from the “Amphipolis code”: Sleeping sentries are to be “fined a drachma” and loss of equipment is “to be fined”. Which is mild and civil compared to the Roman practice where soldiers are said to have risked death so as not to lose their equipment in fear of punishment and sleeping sentries were stoned to death, if Polybios³⁸⁶ is to be believed.

The mercenaries were the most international occupation group of their time after all. If their contractor was all too severe and happened to alienate some officers as well, whole contingents could change the side in the most crucial moments. The mercenaries’ attitude is easily deducted from the work they were prepared to do: Besieging a city with the prospect of its plunder always was an option and outstanding performances are handed down. Daily fortification of a camp, on the other hand, is not mentioned and certainly no word at all concerning any efforts in street building.

5. Roman Army Reform in -313

One Roman “legion” in the -fifth and well into the -fourth century counted 3 000 fighters³⁸⁷ led by thirty “centurions” together with thirty “signae” and therefore was since then accompanied by 300 riders. For this period a “century” justly was called a “signum”. This structure, however, was abandoned in the course of the century. While I cannot say exactly when this happened, as Roman historiography had the habit to rewrite and adapt related facts according to actual ambitions, it is nevertheless clear that at one point the number of the “centurions” was doubled to 60 (the newcomers earning the title “posterior”) and the “signae” were taken from the “centuries” and given to the newly established “manipuli”.³⁸⁸

Livy in his book 8. 8 describes a conflict between Rome and its Latin allies put into the years -340 to -338 and mentions a strength of four citizen “legions”. Indeed the victory in this conflict seems to have been the prerequisite for the military reform, as much land of the vanquished then became Roman and allowed for expanding the army.³⁸⁹ In the year -313 the republic first is reliable reported to have gathered an army of that size. Livy reports 16 tribunes to be elected in that year and omits that further eight were “rufuli” (which means they were appointed by the commander).³⁹⁰ Therefore the number six for -362³⁹¹ allows for no conclusion concerning the bodies they administered, as the number of “rufuli” is unknown.

„Clipeis antea Romani usi sunt, dein postquam stipendiarii facti sunt, scuta pro clipeis fecere, et quod antea phalanges similis macedonicis, hoc postea manipulim structa acies coepit esse, postremo in plures ordines instruebantur. Ordo sexagenos milites, duos centuriones, vexillarium unum habebat. Prima acies hastati erant, manipuli quindecim, distantes inter se modicum spatium. Manipulus levis vicenos milites, aliam turbam scutatorum habeat, leves autem qui hastam tantum gaesaque gererent vocabantur. Haec prima frons in acie florem juvenum pubescentium ad militiam habebat. Robustior inde aetas totidem manipulorum, quibus principibus est nomen, hos sequebantur scutati omnes, insignibus maxime armis. Hoc triginta manipulorum agmen antepilanos appellant, quia sub signis jam alii quindecim ordines locabantur, ex quibus ordo unus quisque tres partes habebat. Earum unam quamque primam pilum vocabant. Tribus ex vexillis constabat, vexillum centum octoginta sex homines erant. Primum vexillum triaros ducebat, veteranum militam spectatae virtutis, secundam rorarios, minus roboris aetate factisque, tertium accensos, minimae fiduciae manum; eo et in postremam aciem reiciebantur. –

Earlier the Romans had had the round shield in use, later, when getting paid, they changed it for the long shield. And, after previously forming up in the manner of a Macedonian phalanx, they then choose to form up in structured maniples. Behind that, they divided in even more units. Each ordo had sixty soldiers, two centurions and one vexillarium. The first line were the hastati, grouped in fifteen maniples, with a small distance between them. Each maniple had attached twenty leves, the others had the long shield. These leves also are described as carrying „hastam tantum gaesaque“. This first line contained young, flourishing men. They were immediately followed by a second line, of more advanced age, known as principes, with long shields and with arms specially marked. This whole of thirty maniples they call antepilani, because behind them, under the eagles, other fifteen ordines stood, which were subdivided into three groups. The first of these each was called the first pilus. It consisted of three vexillae and numbered all together one hundred eighty six men. The first vexillum was led by the triariii, men distinguished and experienced, the second line were the rorarii, with less age and experience and at last the accensi, supernumeraries without experience, sent to the rear line.”³⁹²

These lines have troubled many, puzzled most and are not easy to understand because Livy did make mistakes by copying from his source. This source seems to have been „De Re Militari“, written by Cato the Elder³⁹³ around -180. Livy’s first mistake is to use his source material for a battle formation. Cato’s book contained an examination order: combatants, half-combatants and non-combatants were listed alike. Livy´s second mistake is that he had had read something about fifteen units in the “legion” and remembered that there had been “ordines”, “vexillae” and “maniples”, yet could not figure out which were what and in the end decided to use this number for the whole “legion”. A legion of 45 “maniples” never existed, the cited passage is the only one that speaks of it. The number of “maniples” per “legion” was of course thirty.³⁹⁴

Hans Delbrück³⁹⁵ recognized these mistakes and suggested the following picture: ten “maniples” each of “hastati”, “principes” and “triarii”³⁹⁶ form the battle formation whereas 1 200 half-combatants in groups of 40 which went by the name of “vexillum” took care of the “legions” animals and vehicles. These 30 groups would unite into ten “ordines”. An “ordo” had to sustain one “maniple” each of “hastati”, “principes” and “triarii”. He further shows, that an “accensus” by Cato’s time was no “reserve-soldier” but a clerk (grammateus) in public service. There would be six of these per “ordo”, one for each century. Thus the number 186 becomes understandable: The “ordo” has 60 soldiers, that are the “triarii”, three “vexilla” of 40 half-combatants and six “accensi”, non-combatants who give the number.

So far this is great help in correcting Livy. Concerning the question why he persistently repeats his number 15 (three times, makes copying mistake no option) Delbrück has no answer. He also follows a dangerous line of argumentation concerning the distribution of the half-combatants and fancies the elder “triarii” would have had more rights in transport than the younger groups.

That they had not and these numbers can be rectified. It says in the text that twenty “leves” were attached to each “hastati” maniple and these are to be understood as part of the 1 200 half-combatants. So remain 1 000 true “rorarii” (ἐρῶεω = to run, to urge, to crowd) to attend to the animals and carriages; and 200 “leves” in the very front line of the “legion”. If the latter had to attend to animals their place would have been behind the combat troops. So they were fighting men and usually are assumed to have carried light javelins. Livy uses the phrase: “tantum hastam gaesaque”. This means no javelin but rather is: “all of the projectiles”. And why these 200 in front of lines and lines of other spear-throwers?³⁹⁷ I would suggest that these 200 “leves” were the very opposite of what their name implies: they operated the heavy arms of the “legion”, the artillery, at that time presumably twenty bolt shooters (later known as “scorpio”).

Now if they had to operate the machines they would have needed transport as all the other fighters. And that surplus “rorarii” with the “triarii” could fit in this role. Anyhow there is no established rule for the distribution of the “rorarii” so far: Livy himself gives the strength of his “legion” as 5 000 men.³⁹⁸ If 600 “triarii”, 1 000 “rorarii” and 200 “leves” are deducted, 3 200 remain as “principes” and “hastati”. That gives 160 men per “maniple” and 80 per “century”. The ratio is then four to one, as each “ordo” had 120 half-combatants, 60 “triarii” and “two centurions” (of the first class, we must add) together with their four centuries of 80 fighters each. Now Delbrück’s problem with the surplus “rorarii” of the “triarii” is solved. For of course those twenty “leves” are fighting men, number together with their “triarii” 80 and consequently need the remaining “rorarii” as their support. Practically now fifty “centurions” commanded 100 men³⁹⁹ and ten “primi ordinis” an “ordo” of 500 each.

There remains the problem with the number fifteen. Possibly Livy had in mind the fact that the “antepilani” were double the number of the “pilani” (five groups of three hundred twenty hastati, the same number principes and so many triarii and rorarii) if the artillerymen were left out of the calculation. On the other hand involved Cato’s scheme the non-combatants which Livy had to omit as he wished for a formation of battle. The “accensi” are mentioned as surplus “soldiers” which is Livy’s free invention.

The “legion” was accompanied by a series of specialists in crafts, taken from their respective guilds ever since it existed. There are smiths, carpenters and pioneers mentioned (further fabri, cobblers and masons, can be imagined). The “accensi”, musicians, “significeri” and “optiones” as “ektaktoi” are to be added. Likely “centurions”, “primi ordines” and “tribunes” had their attendants and the “legion” too would have had a siege section. And this “hypotaxis” in five units stood beside the “triarii” on Cato’s scheme (postremo in plures ordines instruebantur, …sub signis ordines quindecim) and led to Livy’s mistake of the legion of forty five “maniples”. One could imagine that two more “vexilla” of “rorarii⁴⁰⁰ were part of five “ordines” of specialists whichever composition they might have had. These would also give the reason why the “legion” had six tribunes (chiliarches) at a strength of five thousand.

I believe with these assumptions Livy 8. 8 is better understood. It follows from it a picture of the “legion” fairly comprehensible and with few contradictions. This state of affairs should have prevailed from about -313 to about -110 when the “legion” again was expanded to 6 000 men.

Polybios description of the Roman “legion”, however, which he gave in the sixth book of his “Histories”, written around -140, is an amalgamation of misunderstandings and errors too. He used the same source as Livy, “De Re Militari” by Cato the Elder. He very well knew the “legions” true strength of 5 000 men⁴⁰¹ yet decides to present to his Greek speaking audience the old number of 3 000 fighters combined with the new number of sixty “centurions” which is an obvious and plain mistake. He names the four age classes, mentions their number in the legion and their respective equipment and then explains that ten “merai” (=ordines) received three “taxiarchoi” each as commanders (and so many “posterior centurions”).

He then spells “κεντύριο” as the name of these officers, yet fails to explain that this means commander of one hundred, or “hekatontarches”, as his 60 centuriones with only 3 000 fighters clearly command too few to earn that name. He then says that each “meros” was called “tagma”, “speira” and “semaia”⁴⁰² which correspond to the “vexillarium”, the “manipulus” and the “century”. One sentence later he remarks: “δύο δὲ ἑκάστων τάγμα ποιο͠υσιν ἡγεμόνας ἐικότως – Two leaders in each “tagma” have a reason” Polybios here is puzzled by the two “centurions” of the “triarii” in the “ordo”. He probably did not realize that all others effectively commanded one hundred men.

“ὁ μὲν πρ͠ωτος ἀιρεθέις ἡγ͠ειται τ͠ου δεξι͠ου μέρους τ͠ης σπέιρας, ὁ δὲ δέυτερος τ͠ων ἐυωνύμων ἀνδρ͠ων τ͠ης σημάιας ἔχει τὴν ἡγεμονίαν – The one first chosen commands in the right of the meros the speira, the second chosen the left men of the semaia.”⁴⁰³ Here Polybios confuses “maniples” and “centuries in the maniples”. From here he looses track of the system of his own terms and never finds back to it. Where he later does not discuss the legion’s structure he generally refers to all Roman “maniples” as “semaiai”, as the standard was the peculiar feature that was genuinely Italian. On the other hand non- Italian infantry is arranged in “speirai” even if they do not fight as a phalanx.⁴⁰⁴

6. 24. 8 implies, that the “hastati” alone are to be termed “semaia” and the “principes” “speira”. This is in accordance with 15. 9. 1 where the “semaias” build a first line and the “speiras” a second. Polybios, however, never positively declares to believe so nor could have explained what were the reasons for this differentiation. When he later discusses Scipio’s reform of the Roman army in -211⁴⁰⁵ three “speirai” and a cavalry unit form a “syntagma”. Again a few lines later⁴⁰⁶ the name “cohort” is explained as: The whole of which is a “speira”. Finally when the Numidian prince arrives with: ”δέκα σημάιας Ρομαικάς, ἱππέων κὰι πεζ͠ων κὰι πρεσπευτάς.”⁴⁰⁷ this implies a “legion” and “semaia” here should mean a “cohort”.

Most commentators (e. g. Bauer p. 444, Krohmaier-Veith p. 132, Erdkamp p. 51) claim to believe that all three words invariably mean “maniple” in Polybios. They in fact capitulate in view of the man’s cluelessness. All in all not much concerning the Roman “legion” is to be learned from Polybios but one thing: in his own days the name “speira” no longer exclusively meant the “maniple” . It could also mean “cohort”. Indeed I would like to ask how it came that generations of classical philologists actually praised this man as most eminent of all historians of antiquity and as military expert if, as I believe to have established here, the man really was in difficulties to keep a chosen terminology. He perhaps had heard from Scipio that a “legio” could have had different sizes, depending on which magistrate assembled it and to necessity. Scipio, however, did not elaborate on the fact that any body of troops would have been composed of tactical and administrative units in discrete sizes and Polybios who seemingly would have had to ask about this did not care to do so. Dazzled by his imagined insider knowledge he interpreted his source arbitrarily, with gross impertinence and a result that makes everything else he said no more trustworthy than any comment of Diodor; whose mistakes are many, yet humble in comparison.

Livy and Cato stress that their “legion” owed nothing to the Macedonian “phalanx”.⁴⁰⁸ Yet, after comparing the Macedonian reform of -359 to that of the Romans towards the end of the century the very opposite seems to be true. One would like to correct that the Roman army prior to its reform was a citizen army in the manner of chapter two and afterwards was similar to a Macedonian phalanx: Two parts, one heavy armed with the (long) spear (hasta), guarding the artillery and the vehicles. And a light part consisting of Iphikratean “peltasts” (except that the “thureos/scutum” replaced the “symmetrical pelta”) henceforth known as “legionaries”.

Indeed the significant differences in the -fourth century lay elsewhere. The Roman confederation was poor and had no access to silver. Its bronze coins did not attract any international professional:“ It is not, however, the custom of the Romans to employ mercenaries, as they lack the sufficient funds.”⁴⁰⁹

6. Army Reform of Alexander III. in -331

Curtius relates⁴¹⁰ a new and bigger structure for the “Asthetairoi” units in Alexander’s army, being expanded to “chiliarchies” instead of “pentekosiarchiai” in the infantry in -331. He further adds that the new jobs were to be applied for in form of a contest of bravery, a mode that emphasized the idea of equality in the army.⁴¹¹ 3 200 “Hypaspistes”⁴¹² were now administered in four, and the “Pezhetairoi” reformed in 24 “chiliarchies”. Two of these stayed in Susa and Babylon and Arrian enlists 11 “taxiarches” at the start of the Indian campaign: Krateros, Polysperchon, Attalos, Alketas, Gorgias, Kleitos, Meleagros,⁴¹³ Koinos (after his death Peithon) and Balakros,⁴¹⁴ Philipp and Philotas.⁴¹⁵ The newly arriving Macedonian infantry out of all 12 districts, see below chapter 7, explicitly was grouped “κατὰ ἐθ͠νη”.⁴¹⁶ Curtius gives a list of only eight names for the winners of the contest,⁴¹⁷ perhaps one for the “Hypaspists”, one for the “xenoi” and six for the “Pezhetairoi”.

Asclepiodotus reports⁴¹⁸ that the “ektaktoi” (surplus men of the body not belonging to a file: the stratokerux, salpinctes, hyperetes and grammateus) “earlier” belonged to the “taxis” but “now” to the “syntagma”. To him a “taxis” is the unit of 128 fighters⁴¹⁹ and its double, the “syntagma”, therefore 256 men. Indeed Arrian keeps the “lochoi” in his “Anabasis” right through to king Alexander’s death and Asclepiodotus gives no date for his reported change. On the other hand there is no later reformer connected to this: in the early -third century a body named “speira” was established as the common tactical body of the heavy infantry.⁴²⁰

It is mentioned in Plutarch,⁴²¹ Strabon,⁴²² Arrian,⁴²³ Polybios (see above), Flavius Josephus⁴²⁴ and also is the regular expression for the infantry body both in the old⁴²⁵ as well as in the new testament.⁴²⁶ Most eminent the inscription of Philipp V.⁴²⁷ addresses his: “strategoi”, “tetrarchiai”, “speirarches” and the other “archontes” (baggage, engineers, administration). This formula meaning the whole army. If this change were to be attributed to any of the “diadochoi” or “epigonoi”, let’s say Pyrrhos, we would certainly know. At that the Roman army employed the large body at the latest in -313, as I have shown, and in this period military innovation and experimenting centered in the Greek world.

Therefore I suggest that the tactical unit of the infantry in the Macedonian army too was enlarged by Alexander III. in -331⁴²⁸ by introducing the “σχήμα ἐις σπείραν”.⁴²⁹ The “lochos” number was diminished, from 120 to 80 fighters⁴³⁰ and two⁴³¹ of these built the new body “speira”,⁴³² commanded by the “speirarch”.⁴³³ The second in command retained his title “lochagos”,⁴³⁴ yet the word “lochos” now being interchangeable with “hekatostuas” vanished from the historians and degenerated into a name for one file of 16 men in the Tacticians.

Of all the unit sizes and names they mention I believe to be valid only one thing: a “chiliarchy” was composed of four “syntagmas”. This was, however, no tactical body. The word “syntagma” in the whole literature concerning the -fourth century usually denoted a combination of different units while “tagma” as unit name meant the half- and non-combatants, as mentioned by Diodor.⁴³⁵ So I count 160 “peltasts”, 30 “phalangitai”, 10 artillery men, 50 “Asthetairoi” and 6 men as “ektaktoi” to form this “syntagma”.

The new Macedonian “chiliarchy” then would be composed of 4 “peltast” “speirai” of 160 men each and one “speira” with 120 “phalangites” and 40 artillerymen (5/1 000). This adds up to 800 fighters⁴³⁶ with a “tagma” of 200 men. Here indeed the tactical body would have changed in size and together with the “ektaktoi” the unit would count 1 024 men, the equivalent of four “syntagmata”. The new “taxis” would be commanded by two “strategoi” and ten “speirarches” and administered by two “chiliarchs”.⁴³⁷ Compared to Philipp’s army where three “strategoi”, three “pentekosiarches” and 12 “lochages” would have commanded about the same amount of men this indeed was a reduction. The “taxis” again may be pictured as 2 000 men; without siege section and the other “hypotaxis”.

The arrangement with “chiliarchies” and “speirai” remained as classic for a very long period of time being the peculiar organization of the close-order infantry: Athenäus refers for king Antiochos Gryphus, who reigned from -125 to -96: “Herakleon of Beroea trained his soldiers to dine in silence, sitting on the ground in groups of thousand, eating simple, coarse food, served by doryphoroi”.⁴³⁸ The “doryphoroi” here mean the half-combatants whose ratio of one to four to the combat troops remained unchanged for the rest of the period, well into imperial times.

Diodor relates a conference of Romans and Phoenicians in the year -265 during which the latter party threatened that without their consent no Roman could even dare to wash his hands in the sea. Whereupon the Romans reply one should never underestimate them: They already had learned close order-fighting from the Etruscans and to fight in maniples.⁴³⁹ This last remark in Diodor reads: “κὰι κατὰ σπείρας μαχομένων”. “manipulatim ordinare” should therefore translate to “σπειρήδον τάξειν”. This conviction, however, is strongly challenged by other writers.

The names “speira” and “manipulus” derive from “valati” and “apisat” in old Indian, in Latin “volvere”, “spira” and “pinsere”, in Greek ”ἐιλ͠ειν” (ila, oulamos), “σπείρα” and “πτίσσω” which mean “revolve”, “wound together” and “to be walked (upon)”; which words belong to the production process of wool into felt. To this correspond the “pill” (in Latin the voting globule), “πίλος” for “felt”, “pilleus” for a felt cap and further the “pilani” (=”triarii”) with the “pilus” as their unit and finally the mani-“pulus”. Consequently Pilatus does not mean “javelin armed” but rather “the beaten up” or “who likely clothes in wool”.

The new tactical body in the infantry became necessary because of the substantial growth of the armies in the -fourth century and marked a limit in size. Had it been equally possible to combine two of the old “centuries” or “lochoi” of 100 fighters to form a “maniple” that would move equally well in the field with the like cohesion this would have been done. After all tactics were considered a “techne” in these days. Ultimately I cannot prove neither the identity of “maniple” and “speira” in the -fourth century nor the strength of 160 fighters for the latter, unless one accepts Diodor’s statement literally: that the Romans had “learned” to fight in “maniples” by -265. They then could most likely have done so from Alexander III. only.

The new tactical body remained in constant use, however, throughout antiquity until the close-order infantry ceased to exist: Arrian reports in his “Periplus”⁴⁴⁰ to emperor Hadrian to have inspected the garrison of Apsarus (Gonio-castle in present Georgia) where according to him five “speirai” were stationed. G. Gamkrelidze⁴⁴¹ points out, that the castle covers 44 460 square meters which size fits for one “cohors millaria” but not for five “cohorts”.⁴⁴² Furthermore the army in Cappadocia with only two “legions” at Melitene and Sattala in peacetime could not possibly have dislocated itself in such a way. So these “speirai” then were the five “maniples” of the “Cohors Claudiana II Millaria”.

On the other hand many later writers, including Arrian himself and of course Polybios⁴⁴³ tend to use “speira” as name for a “cohort” which is a rather unlucky choice as the “cohors, quod ut in villa ex pluribus tectis conjungitur, acc quidam fit unum, sic hic ex manipulis pluribus copulatur”.⁴⁴⁴ As a “co-hort” by definition is built from various parts and cannot form the one dense body which “speira” implies. At that “cohorts” could be of various sizes. Being principally the tenth part of a “legion” (500 men),⁴⁴⁵ during the -first century a “cohors quingenaria” with 600 men became standard. Later in the empire “cohortes millariae” with 800 fighters were created.

So whenever for example Flavius Josephus reports a number of “speirai”⁴⁴⁶ he certainly means “cohorts”. Albeit one must take care to see which: “σπ͠ειραν δὲ ὁπλιτ͠ων χιλιαρχόν”⁴⁴⁷ is to be understood as a “cohort” which explicitly was administered by a “tribune”, that is it was five “maniples” strong and effectivly the equivalent of the earlier “chiliarchy”. Plutarch with his most developed sense for language saw trough this veil and correctly formulates (Lukull. 27): “κὰι τάξιν ἁι σπείραι κὰτα λόχους λαμβάνουσαι”.

Nevertheless since the -second century in a process highlighted by Polybios’ recordings the term “speira” became the equivalent of a “cohort”, whence Arrian considered it a modern unit name for Roman “cohorts” which he would not use in his account of the glorious past and, where he would have had to mention it, produced that peculiar failure to invent “lochoi” in the cavalry. Arrians last sentence in Anabasis 3. 16 therefore should be corrected into: “He also established two lochoi (each 100 strong) in every speira, whereas before this time speirai did not exist in the infantry;…” as it had been written by Ptolemaios Lagos.

7. The lesser Chapters: Alexander III.’s Army Strengths

Beloch⁴⁴⁸ estimated the entire Macedonian population in the -fourth century to half a million souls (15 to 16 humans per square kilometer). Billows⁴⁴⁹ recons the Macedonians to have numbered triple that size. Even if defeat in battle from -360 to -323 (e. g. against Bardylis or Onomarchos) was seldom to happen, the Macedonian war effort were impossible if the first figure were treated as a constant during Philipp’s and Alexander’s reign: 7 500 Macedonian fighters in -359 resemble 1,5%, 25 000 in -334 amount to 5 % and 36 750 in -324 give nothing less than 7,4% of this population.

While Beloch’s numbers are too small, Billow’s are too large: If every year 14 000 young Macedonians were to have grown to military age neither the complaints concerning shortage of man-power in Macedonia nor the dramatic crisis in -322, when the world power virtually found no men to defend the motherland, were comprehensible. King Philipp and king Alexander were most generous to promote to Macedonianship whomsoever they found useful for their purposes. Albeit this policy always had its borders in the valiant Macedonian contempt for foreigners. I myself propose a total number of 800 000 Macedonians in -336 (Macedonia now covering 43 000 square kilometers) and consequently about 7 500 boys growing per year into military age. By this size a “meros” of 3 000 infantry and 300 knights comprised Macedonia’s yearly replacement capability. The army then fully mobilized amounted to 4% (without mercenaries), yet its standing part to only 1,5% of the population (including the mercenaries).

I further propose that king Alexander from the start of his reign continuously recruited,⁴⁵⁰ that in -334 two further “taxeis” and “ilai” of young Macedonians were raised,⁴⁵¹ that by -323 43 100 Macedonian men (5,4%)⁴⁵² were in military service and the army in Asia then had “Asthetairoi” and a “hypotaxis” composed of foreigners. Concerning Alexander’s army strength in -334 there is endless debate⁴⁵³ ever since this date which nevertheless I will reproduce once more: Plenty of numbers are given.⁴⁵⁴

Since -336 “10 000” men⁴⁵⁵ under Parmenio were in Asia⁴⁵⁶ while in -335 30 000 infantry/3 000 riders were with Alexander at Thebes,⁴⁵⁷ while some Greek mercenaries garrisoned Korinth,⁴⁵⁸ Chalkis,⁴⁵⁹ Pherai/Pagasai,⁴⁶⁰ Ambracia,⁴⁶¹ Nicaea in Phokis⁴⁶² and the Cadmeia.⁴⁶³

The royal army numbered 21 000 heavy infantry, 1 000 archers, 2 100 riders and about 20 triremes.⁴⁶⁴ Its “Xenikon” comprised the “Sarisophoroi”, the Agriani, 500 “Cretan” archers and mercenary hoplites, about 10 000 in -334⁴⁶⁵ for a total of 36 000 fighters. The Greek “symmachoi” contingent numbered 20 000 infantry, 1 500 riders and 140 Greek “triremes”,⁴⁶⁶ including another 25 200 rowers and sailors. The men might mainly have been mercenaries hired by the members of the “koinon”.

Justins number, however, excludes the Thessalian contribution⁴⁶⁷ without reason, as IG II² 236b lists Thessaly as regular member of the “koinon” and it there contributes a total of 16 units.⁴⁶⁸ Unfortunately only the lines 26 to 36 of this list are available, so the contributions of the Peloponnese, Athens, Boiotia, Euboia and the southern Islands are lost. At that the meaning of the units on the inscription is unknown. Whence a hypothetical amendment⁴⁶⁹ here will be tried: The numbers in the inscription aimed at even distribution of the war effort. A unit therefore here is believed to resemble a number of either riders, infantry or ships. Further the numbers are not concerned with the worth of the equipment involved. Theoretically the “strategos autokrator” could lay hands on whatever means the members possessed. They rather define how many men had to be provided and maintained by each community. Four of the Thessalian units belonged to the Perrhibaians and Magnetes. These likely were light-armed infantry which leaves twelve units for the knights. If one “ila” for each of these is assumed this amounts to 1 800 Thessalian knights. I further assume a daily cost of 600 “drachmai” for the unit. The equivalent in infantry would then be 600 men.⁴⁷⁰ Finally the equivalent in ships were five triremes with 900 men.⁴⁷¹

With these relations established next the list is to be augmented. First there is a line where the names are missing, yet “ἀπο Θραίκης” can be read. These were Aenos, Abdera and Maroneia (2 units). In the Peloponnese with Sparta missing still the military potential was slightly larger than in Thessaly. I estimate 20 units, three for Elis, three for Achaia, three for Messene, four for Arcadia and seven for the Argolis. For Megara one, for Boiotia six, for Euboia three, another three for the Isles and finally for Athens nine units.⁴⁷² By this 44 augmented units join the known 43. This total of 87 allows for 22 “ilai”, 28 naval squadrons and 37 infantry units. Thus Justin’s 20 000 men, 1 500 riders with 140 ships augmented by 1 800 Thessalian knights and 2 400 Thessalian light-armed⁴⁷³ give a total of 25 700 soldiers (plus 25 200 as ship-crews) as Greek war effort on the Macedonian side in -334.

“τοὺς Θρᾷκας κὰι τ͠ων ἀλλ͠ων ξένων ἔς τετρακισχιλίους – the Thracians and the other strangers numbered 4 000”.⁴⁷⁴ Paionia sent one “ila” and presumably 600 light-armed infantry. The Thracian provinces presumably sent three “ilai”⁴⁷⁵ and 2 400 light-armed infantry. The Agrianes are mentioned above as part of the royal army. 1 000 Ardiaian, Taulantian, Dassarethian and Dardanian mercenaries made up for the number.

In -334 Antipater was left in Europe with 12 000 infantry, 1 500 riders⁴⁷⁶ and still about 5 000 Greek “hoplite” mercenaries in the garrisons. The field army presumably was composed of 9 000 Macedonian infantry and 600 “hoplite” mercenaries, 500 archers, 1 900 Thessalian light-armed and 600 Macedonian, 300 each of Thracian and Thessalian knights and 300 “Sarisophoroi”.

Alexander at the Hellespont massed 12 000 Macedonian infantry, 5 000 Greek “hoplite” mercenaries, 7 000 Greek “hoplite symmachoi”, 6 000 light-armed, 1 500 Macedonian knights, 1 500 Thessalian knights, 600 “Sarisophoroi” with 300 Paionians and Thracians and, finally, only 600 Greek “symmachoi” knights for a total of 30 000 infantry and 4 500 riders. Together with the fleet then still 900 “symmachoi” knights and 9 000⁴⁷⁷ “symmachoi” infantry from the Greek contingent are missing in this number for the field army.

Symmetry governed this ideal army composition: 1 000 infantry each corresponded to one “ila”, the light-armed were 20 % in the cavalry as well as in the infantry and there surpassed the cavalry by one quarter, so that each “tetrarchy” corresponds to one “pentekostys”. One wing is Macedonian, the other Greek while most light-armed are foreigners.

While these numbers are acknowledged and secure the next reliable information is given only for -331, the date of the battle of Nineveh/Gaugamela. Here Alexander III. had with him 40 000 infantry and 7 000 cavalry. This question even in antiquity was unanswered. Polybios⁴⁷⁸ proposes a reinforcement of the army of 5 000 Macedonian infantry and 800 riders up until Issos. Yet is this quite improbable: The Macedonians then held Asia Minor against a superior fleet and hostile neighbours. They would have needed any surplus troops to do so. Even if it is not related it seems reasonable to assume that those missing “symmachoi” during the fall and winter -334 successively⁴⁷⁹ arrived in Asia Minor and replaced provisional regional armies at the Hellespont and in Lydia⁴⁸⁰ that so far had consisted of the allied/mercenary wing of the field army.

Mercenary garrisons too in ten places are mentioned (see Maxim Kholod). The cities had to maintain these, as Alexander had no money then. Only when they were mobilized did the king take over. Arrian⁴⁸¹ mentions further 3 000 mercenary infantry with 200 mercenary riders as regional force in Caria and at the Hellespont Amphoteros and Hegelochos fought several engagements against the Persian fleet.⁴⁸² Only after Issos did it dissolve and allowed the Macedonians to reinforce the field army and to take the offensive on the sea. Arrian⁴⁸³ further mentions 3 000 Macedonian infantry, 300 Macedonian, 200 Thessalian and 150 Eleian knights joining the army at Gordion in -333.

As Alexander earlier had sent “the fresh married” back to Macedonia for the winter some commentators are uncertain whether this proposes a reinforcement. Arrian himself believed so. His reckoning is: six initial “taxeis” plus these two plus four later in Sittacene gives twelve. Anyway he mentions no additional “taxeis” at the battle of Issos. So the two new “taxeis” of young Macedonians with probably 200 knights in -333 stayed with Antigonos in Phrygia.⁴⁸⁴ Curtius⁴⁸⁵ further indicates that a second taxis of Agrianians had arrived. So I assume that Alexander III. at Issos had an army of 30 500 infantry and 4 950 riders while his regional armies in Asia Minor amounted to 15 000 infantry with 1 150 riders.

Antipater in Macedonia then still commanded 12 000 infantry with 1 300 cavalry. In -332 the Persian pressure on his coasts slackened and the fleet left its position at the Hellespont and took the sea. This immediately led to unrest in Thracia and Antipater had to intervene with his whole army⁴⁸⁶ to aid Memnon, his “strategos” there.⁴⁸⁷

Antipater quelled the unrest and recruited further 500 Thracian knights for an ideal cavalry proportion in his army. He next via Serdica moved into the lands of the Triballians and there commanded them to provide their contingent. With this force he returned to Macedonia and in autumn sent his surplus to the king: 500 archers with 300 Thracian riders to Cilicia and Memnon with 500 Thracian riders to Egypt.⁴⁸⁸ Then Cleander too came with 4 000 Greek mercenary infantry to Alexander⁴⁸⁹ while Asclepiodor sent 500 Greek mercenary riders to Cilicia and another 400 to Aegypt.⁴⁹⁰ Amphoteros and Hegelochos in this year dispersed the remnants of the Persian fleet and took Pharnabazos prisoner with 1 500 hoplites on Lesbos⁴⁹¹ while Chares surrendered another 2 000 on Chios.⁴⁹² They removed another garrison on Kos as had been ordered in -333,⁴⁹³ installed own garrisons⁴⁹⁴ on these islands as well as on Rhodos⁴⁹⁵ and transferred the mercenaries to Aegypt, completing thus Arrian’s number for the regional army there.⁴⁹⁶

We know almost nothing of the armies redeployment in Asia Minor. Regional armies and garrisons in Lydia and Caria and garrisons at the Hellespont might have been reduced in -332. I imagine a movement of all the Greek “symmachoi” cavalry, the men of the regional army from Lydia except the Argives, any surplus Greek mercenaries out of their garrisons, 1 000 men captured from Orontobates⁴⁹⁷ and the Carians to Antigonos in Phrygia. He in -332 then united about 12 000 infantry with 1 150 riders and fought three battles against remnants of the Persian army from Issos combined with their allies from Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and Pontos. In this Kalas, the governor of the Hellespontum, was involved (he fell in Bithynia). Antigonos then “sent many to Alexander”⁴⁹⁸ presumably in the spring of -331: Callisthenes⁴⁹⁹ says that 5 000 young Macedonians with 800 riders arrived. The date for this reinforcement seems to have been the early summer -331 when Alexander approached Cilicia from the south.⁵⁰⁰ The losses of Issos, Tyros, Gaza and Antigonos’ battles had to be replaced up to this year. The remaining surplus from -336 to -332 could very well have amounted to this number. In Cilicia during -332 a regional army under Balakros kept open the communication to Phrygia and then seems to have consisted of allies or mercenaries of the field army. It must have been replaced in spring -331 by further 4 000 men sent by Antigonos, allies and mercenaries.⁵⁰¹

At Nineveh/Gaugamela a few new units nevertheless can be identified: The archers counted 1 500⁵⁰² and the Agrianians were 1 000 strong.⁵⁰³ The other “akontists” presumably were 1 500 Greeks, 2 400 Thracians, 600 Paionians and 1 000 other mercenaries. Alexander for this campaign had massively expanded the cavalry to a maximum, right over the ideal number: 33 “ilai” in -331 were augmented by 300 Thracians from Antipater, Antigonos sent 800 and the allied contingent of Greek riders in two units under Erigyios and Koiranos thereby came to its full strength of 1 500.⁵⁰⁴ The Macedonians and Thessalians were twenty “ilai” strong, two of them at double strength. Arrian skipped Pantordanos, Peroidas and Sokrates⁵⁰⁵ as “ila” commanders without reflection because his source had done so. By this the cavalry counted 4 800 knights and 1 200 light-armed riders, the ideal proportion for 40 000 infantry. Alexander trough Asclepiodoros and Arimmas nevertheless had hired another 1 000 mercenary riders under the command of Menidas and Andromachos.⁵⁰⁶

The heavy infantry should have counted 32 000 Macedonians, allies and mercenaries. One half of these should have been Macedonians to combine each a Macedonian and a foreign “taxis”.⁵⁰⁷ Diodor⁵⁰⁸ lists seven “Pezhetairoi taxeis” in the battle line whereas Arrian⁵⁰⁹ and Curtius⁵¹⁰ can be read in the way that four “taxeis” and the “Hypaspists” built the right wing and consequently ten parts the infantry front. Surprisingly most commentators⁵¹¹ agree on only six “Pezhetairoi taxeis” as at Issos and the Granikos and ultimately in -324 cannot explain the “Argyraspids” and “Hypaspists” remaining in Babylon while still 10 000 Macedonians were sent home. The authors furthermore contradict themselves concerning the commanders. Philipp and Balakros⁵¹² could have commanded two further Macedonian “taxeis” in this battle and the numbers would have allowed for one further infantry “taxis”. Five divisions of Greek allies and so many mercenaries were 15 400 “hoplites” strong.

Another large force of 15 000 reinforced the king’s army in Sittacene in the winter of -331.⁵¹³ The battle at Nineveh/Gaugamela took place on first of Oktober in that year. The date for the battle of Megalopolis in the same year is unknown, yet would Antipater hardly have been able to give away no less than 6 000 Macedonian infantry and 500 Macedonian knights prior to that date. This after Megalopolis was the substance of Antipater’s force and included all who were able to march (3 500 reported dead in this battle indicates that half the army was wounded afterwards).⁵¹⁴ Antipater also sent 4 000 Greek mercenaries with 380 riders and 3 500 Triballians with 600 riders and even 50 Macedonian noble youths for the “paides basilikos”.⁵¹⁵

They must have been shipped from the Peloponessos to Alexandretta in Cilicia in October and indeed must have done a march to arrive in southern Iraq by December. Here Alexander reformed his infantry as explained above in chapter 6. By this whole reorganisation the number of Macedonian heavy infantry with the expedition then rose from 16 500 at Nineveh/Gaugamela to 20 800 and the heavy infantry’s number remained at 24 000 (proposing four “chiliarchies” of pure “xenoi” with the field army) as 700 Macedonians with 300 mercenaries remained in Babylon and further 1 000 Macedonians in Susa as garrisons. 2 000 mercenaries in Assyria (Menes and Apollodor)⁵¹⁶ and 3 000 in Sittacene (Achelaos)⁵¹⁷ were to guard the ways.

Philotas was the “hipparch”, the senior general⁵¹⁸ of the “Companion” cavalry and united the 12 “ilai” in -331 in Sittacene. In the following campaign in Persia, Arrian uses the expressions: “ἴλα βασιλικός” and “τετραρχίαν πρὁς ταύτῃ μίαν ἱππικήν”, the cavalry in four parts, and implies that this was the whole Macedonian cavalry.⁵¹⁹ From this I assume that the “Ila Basilikos” still numbered 300 and the size of the four parts was three “ilai” each (450 men). In Persia a mercenary force garrisoned Persepolis and 3 000 under Nikarchos⁵²⁰ guarded the ways. In Ecbatana 3 150 allied cavalry, 7 000 “symmachoi” hoplites and 1 500 Greek light-armed were dismissed. The regional armies at the Hellespont, in Lydia, Caria, Phrygia and Cilicia changed their composition. How many enrolled as mercenaries is unknown. We are told many,⁵²¹ yet in the case of the Thessalians that actually were 130 riders.⁵²² From Europe came news that Zophyrion, the governor of Thracia since -332, after Antipater’s victory in the Peloponnessos had taken the offensive against Scythians on his own account and had perished, 3 000 Macedonian men (and consequently eastern Thrace) were lost.⁵²³ Antipater by this time presumably had only 3 000 young Macedonian infantry left and was unable to further enlarge the contingent in Asia.

Therefore in -330⁵²⁴ Alexander III. issued commands concerning the future. He ordered the governors “of all provinces”⁵²⁵ to train “παίδες” (youths) from the provincial population.⁵²⁶ This was to be a lengthy undertaking as the chosen were to learn the Greek language.⁵²⁷ The means for the measure in Asia Minor, Syria and Aegypt must have been instituted earlier, in the winter -332/331. Besides that he allowed his soldiers to marry (see above chapter 4) with the idea of keeping the offspring with the army.

During the hunt for Dareios the army split. Alexander took with himself 20 000 infantry with 3 000 riders⁵²⁸ and left Parmenio with four Macedonian “taxeis” and the rest⁵²⁹ for recovery in Ecbatana, to guard the gathering of the treasure there and to await Plato the Athenian who was to arrive with 5 000 Greek mercenary foot and 1 000 riders. When it reunited in Arachosia, still the Paionians, Odrysians, half the riding Triballians, perhaps 800 Thracian light-armed and 5 000 Greek mercenary infantry stayed in Media with Parmenio.⁵³⁰

Next king Alexander murdered his chiefs of the cavalry and infantry, permanently split up the “Companion” cavalry into four “hipparchies”⁵³¹ and expanded the “Royal Ila” to 600 fighters. The “Companion” cavalry still marches up in: “ὀρθιάις τα͠ις ͗ίλαις”⁵³² and nothing changed with the tactical body “tetrarchy”. Assuming a possible total of 2 000 Macedonian knights⁵³³ some 400 newcomers must have been admitted into their ranks⁵³⁴ to allow for the 16 “ilai” which would have mirrored the infantry number. While this number of riders for the Macedonian cavalry in -330 admittedly is hypothetical, in favor of it can be argued: 3 200 “Hypaspists” and “τὰς πάντας τοξοτάς”⁵³⁵ number together with the “Companion” knights 8 000 fighters in -325.⁵³⁶

Four “ilai” as regular strength before -324 is unlikely as Arrian gives the number 600 in one occasion without calling this a “hipparchy”⁵³⁷ and at that does not give this unit name to the “Sarisophoroi”.⁵³⁸ That a “hipparchy” was to be administered in “hekatostuas”, as Arrian’s vague expression seems to claim,⁵³⁹ is unlikely: an “ila’s” quarter would be 72 men and horses. Besides the knights the other cavalry too was commanded and administered in “hipparchies”⁵⁴⁰ from then on which explains why up to eight of theses units are mentioned in India.

Concerning the “stathmoi” between Zadracarta and Arachosia nothing certain is related. Only 3 000 Triballians arrived in Artacoana⁵⁴¹ so presumably 500 together with half their riders stayed in Parthia (from where they hurriedly were transferred to India three years later).⁵⁴² The 1 500 former enemy mercenaries⁵⁴³ possibly were augmented by Curtius’ 2 600 “Lydians”. These with 300 riders were “peregrini”.⁵⁴⁴ They and Plato the Athenian are the only new troops arriving in -330. Anyway they are never heard of again.

After the expedition to Hyrcania Arrian mentions a new corps of “hippokontistai”^⁵⁴⁵ which he calls a “τάξις”, thereby admitting he knows nothing concerning organization or numbers. The Hyrcanians have a reputation as able van-guards in Xenophon⁵⁴⁶ and since then were with the army among the “foreign mercenaries”, presumably 3 “ilai” strong.⁵⁴⁷ For Arachosia a regional army of 4 000 foot and 600 riders is mentioned⁵⁴⁸ and probably Plato the Athenian’s march east ended here. Before the Paropamisos was crossed probably a garrison of 1 000 was installed in the new founded city there. The field army then counted again 30 infantry “chiliarchies”, 6 000 light-armed and 5 080 riders.

In Bactria 10 “ilai” of Greek/foreign mercenaries (Koiranos, Erigiyos, Andromachos), the Thessalians under Philipp, the Hyrcanian “hippokontistai” and the four “ilai” of “Sarisophoroi” were soon augmented by “hippotoxotai”, Scythai and Dahae from Turan 1 000 strong.⁵⁴⁹ Another reinforcement is mentioned to have arrived then,⁵⁵⁰ numbering 20 000 infantry and 2 600 cavalry, whereas 900 of the oldest and the 130 Thessalian knights were sent home.⁵⁵¹ Probably 4 000 Lycian or Syrian, 4 000 Greek and 2 000 Triballian mercenaries were to stay as regional army in Bactria and Sogdia together with 3 500 riders.⁵⁵² Three mayor regional centers had been planted here and were presumably garrisoned by 1 000 Greek mercenary infantry each. Nevertheless Greek mercenary cavalry remaining with the army is specifically mentioned during the later campaign.⁵⁵³ Whereas “all remaining Thracians”⁵⁵⁴ were later given to the regional army in India. Presumably at the start of the Indian campaign Alexander commanded to gather “paides” to Babylon in the year of his return.⁵⁵⁵ When 25 000 sets of armor had arrived the “Pezhetairoi” with the expedition accepted the new name “Agyraspids”⁵⁵⁶ after their new tinned shields.

In India the army was accompanied by satrapal levies (“symmachoi”) from Drangiana, Bactria, Areia, Sogdia, Arachosia and the Paropamisadae.⁵⁵⁷ In the battle against king Poros Alexander has 5 000 cavalry with him which seem to have consisted of the 1 000 horse-archers, three “hipparchies” of “Companions” and the “agema” (here the former royal “ila”) with 2 000 men and finally an equal number of “Bactrians and Sogdians”. The fourth “hipparchy” of “Companions” together with Arachotians and Paropamisadae stayed in the camp and a force of mercenary cavalry of unknown size held the shore in between. Arrian does not mention the “Sarisophoroi” or the “hippakontistes” in that context.

By this Alexander’s cavalry appears at that time again as a huge force, presumably 7 050 men, which found no equal opponent in India and decided even the main battle with only two thirds of its strength. With the end of the campaign the satrapal levies returned to their countries and the army regularly would have been accompanied by the “agema”, four knightly “hipparchies” and other 15 “ilai”, so that the king, Crateros, Perdiccas, Demetrios and Hephaistion commanded almost 1 000 fighters each (and every “hipparch” still 1 000 men). Hephaistion then first got the title “chiliarchos hippike”⁵⁵⁸ thereby deciding over promotion and dealing with supply for the whole knightly cavalry.⁵⁵⁹

Arrian and Curtius give the strength of Alexander’s army during its invasion of India as 120 000 “machimoi” (fighters).^⁵⁶⁰ Plutarch’s number⁵⁶¹ includes another 15 000 cavalry. These numbers are rather improbable for the field army as there was no need to assemble an army triple the size of what was sufficient to conquer the great king^⁵⁶² if the main battle of this campaign was then fought out by only 11 000 men. On the other hand the number could carry some significance if we assume it to describe the king’s total strength in -326. If we add up the regional armies and garrisons in Macedonia (14 000/550), Hellespontum/Lydia/Caria (5 000/200?), Phrygia (5 000/200?), Cilicia (5 000/200?), Egypt (7 000/900), Iraq (6 500/450), Iran (10 000/900), Turan (10 000/750?), Bactria/Sogdia (13 000/3 500) and further imagine a field army of 32 000 infantry/7 050 riders that may then have been joined by a future regional army and garrisons for India⁵⁶³ (13 000/300?), this makes up the total.

D. W. Engels claims that Alexander traversed the Gedrosian desert with an army of 157 000 and lost more than 100 000 of them in the process.^⁵⁶⁴ Had such a thing really occurred, no one would have called Alexander III. “great”. Indeed the invasion army left a force of probably 10 000 in northern India as regional army, fought its way south and then split: one part including the veterans, the satrapal levies and the elephants made a secure way over the Bolan pass. The remainder installed another force of possibly 3 300 in Pattala⁵⁶⁵ and manned a fleet (presumably 18 000 men). In Oreitia Leonnatos kept the Agrianians, one “chiliarchy” of archers, two “ilai” of “Sarisophoroi”, one last Greek “ila” and the 3 200 veteran mercenaries. Only the remaining part of another 18 000, including half- and non-combatants, made the way through the desert. While this march certainly did cost many lives, the king nevertheless in the next year divided his Macedonian forces as if not one man had perished.

The king in -324 again rejuvenated his army, sending 10 000 Macedonian⁵⁶⁶ veterans home and replacing them with 30 000 “paides” trained in the satrapies for close-order fighting. 13 000 Macedonian infantry (“Argyraspides” and “Hypaspists”) and still 2 000 Macedonian knights stayed with the king in Babylon.⁵⁶⁷ The “paides” then grown up were enrolled into the army as privates and 10 000 “Argyraspids” got the leading positions. There was no intent to abolish the phalanx and no idea of a “mixed” phalanx. The people Arrian is talking about⁵⁶⁸ are those 20 000 “Persians” arriving with Peucestas, presumably 6 000 Persian and Median “paides”, 10 000 Persian archers and slingers⁵⁶⁹ and finally 4 000 Tapurians and Cossians who, besides the “paides”, fought outside the phalanx. Diodor⁵⁷⁰ says they were mixed in with the “phalanx” units in maneuver, not that they were part of it. This is Arrian’s free invention.⁵⁷¹

The new infantry strength for the field army can at best be a guess, perhaps 38 “chiliarchies”, or 30 400 fighters. A corresponding new foot-guard unit would be 3 200 Macedonian “Hypaspists” augmented by the “Melophoroi” (2 000 men), the former foot guards of the great king,⁵⁷² and by further men drafted from the Persian minor aristocracy⁵⁷³ for a new foot-guard of 7 “chiliarchies” with 5 600 fighters. The reported fifth⁵⁷⁴ “hipparchy” of knights which the king produced “mainly” from his Iranian nobles would suffice only if the five “hipparchies” were at that expanded to four “ilai” each out of these. In this force the Macedonians still would have formed a majority (2 000 out of 3 600) and nevertheless all the Persian “Euakidai” (1 000 fighters)⁵⁷⁵ gained access to the “Companion” cavalry. By this reform the king provoked a major conflict with his Macedonians.

Some details in my narration may seem arbitrary. There is, for instance, no proof for two or even three more Macedonian “taxeis” at Nineveh/Gaugamela. It follows from symmetrical reasoning only and the decision to accept a Macedonian contingent of 25 000 men in Asia. By “contingent” I mean that the given reinforcements were not replacements. Polybios justly complained⁵⁷⁶ that those are not mentioned with one word in the sources and thereby produce a picture of “Immortals”. Yet keeping units up to strength was a common requirement for commanders and authors unfortunately neglect to relate how this was done. Callisthenes, Theopomp, Anaximenes, Ptolemaios, Aristoboulos, Onesikritos, Nearch and Marsyas certainly contained information concerning the topic, yet later authors, principally systematizing Kleitarch in Alexandria, thought such details negligible and compiled the canon still available to us. I suggest the following picture:

Macedonian Infantry	Europe	Asia	Newly Raised	Replacement
-336	16 500	4 500		3 000
-335				3 000
-334	9 000	12 000	3 000	3 000
-333		15 000	3 000	3 000
-332	12 000		1 500	3 000
-331	6 000	22 500		3 000
-330	3 000		3 000	3 000
-329	6 000		1 500	3 000
-328	7 500		1 500	3 000
-327	9 000			3 000
-326				3 000
-325			1 500	3 000
-324	10 500

Dead	3 500	1 500	5 000
Wounded	2 000	6 000	8 000
Sick/Exhausted	1 180	6 540	7 720
Expelled	70	210	280
			36 000	36 000

The knights would have been promoted to posts outside the “Companion” cavalry too. Ten in each foreign “ila” seem to have had “Companion” status. “Satraps” and regional “strategoi” would have had some of them in their retinues and still more in other functions,⁵⁷⁷ whence I cannot produce a comparable table for them. The number for the dead is a minimum, the low number for the wounded in Europe takes into account that with Zophyrion no infantry survived.⁵⁷⁸ The dismissed for disciplinary reasons are mentioned.⁵⁷⁹ Antipater sent no new troops after -331 to Asia and rebuilt the army at home. Yet in -323 after seven years he had only 13 000 infantry and therefore after -331 still sent willing Macedonians to join the army as organized replacements. Else those disbanded at the Oxus were difficult to explain. The table is conjectured, of course, but helps meditating Diodor’s comment⁵⁸⁰ that king Alexander in -324 sent home 6 000 veterans from -334 and 4 000 that had arrived later.

Most of what is told concerning the years -330 to -327 goes along with more confidence in Curtius’ accuracy than can be rightfully claimed. The related figures fit, however, if they equally are understood as contingent numbers and then allow for the related total strength of 135 000 “machimoi” in -326 which is, after all, only double the initial strength of 66 300 “machimoi” in -334. According to Pausanias⁵⁸¹ no less than 50 000 Greek mercenaries returned to Greece after the king’s mercenary decree. This number certainly is too high: in -334 perhaps 10 000 Greek mercenaries were with king Alexander and 30 000 with the great king. In -326 Alexander presumably had about 61 500 infantry/3 500 mercenary riders from Greece⁵⁸² in his service, well under 2% of its total population. The surplus men hired by the satraps and the chief-financial officers must have been fewer than that amount.⁵⁸³ Another 9 850 “machimoi” came from the Balkans and at least 24 000 from Asia: 2 900 Lydians, 4 000 Carians, 4 500 Lycians, 5 000 Syrians and 8 000 men from the upper satrapies are mentioned prior to the gathering of the “paides”.

Things are less clear when it comes to king Alexander’s activity as “κτίστης”, as founder of cities. This question in a strict sense does not belong into a text concerned with army reforms, yet will it be remembered that both Argeads accomplished the latter by the help of the former. If the late N. G. L. Hammond’s conclusions⁵⁸⁴ concerning the matter are to be taken serious king Alexander planned to co-habituate no less than 2 000 000 inhabitants of his future empire into his new founded cities, either voluntarily or else as prisoners of war being bought back from the soldiers and settled again as free citizens, to a number of 400 000 together with a stratum of Greek-speakers in the eastern regions.

These must have been composed of dismissed soldiers, dismissed half- or noncombatants or greek-speaking civilians following the army. Using Diodor’s ratio⁵⁸⁵ those would have amounted to 126 000, which is a fantastic figure. Yet Theopomp confirms this scale with his number of 2 000 Macedonians that king Phillip had sent to Philippopolis in -342.⁵⁸⁶ Naturally a so far pastoral population being drummed into city walls could have been taught Greek language and been organized for agricultural labour only by a substantial admixture of knowledgeable people. Further it is to be considered that more than 70 cities⁵⁸⁷ with walls of 6 to 12 kilometers must be estimated to 500 km of city-walls, to be constructed by 24 000 men in ten years. These walls, even imagined as rather provisional measures and completed in one case in twenty⁵⁸⁸ or even seventeen days,⁵⁸⁹ would nevertheless make the army dig for 1 400 days out of 3 650.

Easy to explain are the foundings after a battle or siege (Illium after Granikos, Iskenderun after Issos, Tyros, Gaza, Arbela after Nineveh/Gaugamela, Nikaia at the Kophen, Nikaia in India and Bukephala). The wounded with their attendants were the settlers of the future city and set the frame for its Greek character and Macedonian institutions. (e. g. for Issos between 500 and 1 000 reported dead indicates 4 000 wounded who would not recover for future service. Of these only a fraction would have been Macedonians, of course.) Surprisingly enough indeed Illium in the Troas and Iskenderun in Cilicia are in the number of the most contested foundations of Alexander III.⁵⁹⁰ Equally easy to explain are the late foundations at the mouth of the Tigris, in Uxia, Cossia and Tapuria. By then the “paides” had been gathered (that those in Babylon were “epilektoi” means that their original cities still were garrisoned by such troops) and lots of mercenaries got dismissed from service.

Only between -330 to -324 it is difficult to see where from the king could possibly have gotten his settlers. 18 of the supposed over 70 cities can be situated in the West (Europe, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt) and at least five in Iraq/Iran. That still leaves around 50 for the East. I estimate twelve cities in Turan, twelve in Bactria, six in Sogdia, twelve in India, six in Oreitia/Gedrosia and two in Carmania. We are informed that some “poleis”⁵⁹¹ were arranged as clusters⁵⁹² with a mayor regional center and a handful of smaller settlements at a distance of a day’s march. Only the centers were to be fortified, the rest relied on its natural strength. The number of men following the king into central Asia on their own behalf cannot even be estimated.⁵⁹³

Anyway his readiness to give away thousands and indeed ten-thousands of “talents” in pursuit of his aims must have been strikingly attractive and perhaps actually some 35 000 Greek-speaking civilians were settled in Parthia, Areia, Drangiane, Arachosia, Sogdiane and Bactria. Founding in India, Oreitia, Gedrosia and Carmania presumably was more of a legal act, mapping the land into “kleroi” and planning future walls and streets while the actual settlement was more symbolic. Even king Philipp’s settlements in Thrace years later still left much to be desired in numbers of citizens and Antipater in vain tried to convince poor Athenians to take their residence there.

Commentators have always tried to scale down the reports⁵⁹⁴ as they deemed most to be boastful and exaggerated. On the other hand accurately this is the likely reason why people called Alexander “great”. This they did not because of his victories in battles alone but for the man’s demonic impudence; getting ready to force all the world within his grasp out of their unproductive pastoral existence into regular agricultural work! Indeed the settlements in India and Oreitia instantly dissolved with the king’s death as his subordinates were unable to stand the Indian counter-offensive. Nevertheless they had been founded.

Alexander’s Money

When it comes to money ancient numbers are to be treated with even more consideration than army strengths. They are fewer and more isolated. They often are bare estimates even by the contemporaries and are easier to exaggerate. Finally antiquity had no genuine interest in the documentation of its economic condition and surviving data reveals by chance only.⁵⁹⁵ Money’s worth in antiquity was a volatile affair no less than it is today and then depended on the amount of available precious metals. Successful mining in scale or else capture and expenditure of eminent treasure led to inflation. In Greece a continuous decrease of the metal prices from the -6^th to the -3^rd century generally can be stated. The price structure introduced in chapter 4 is a compromise thought most valid for around -350.

When Alexander III. became king he: “inherited a few silver and gold goblets and there were not even 60 talents in the treasure” and found himself “charged with a debt of 500 talents and had to borrow another 800 talents.”⁵⁹⁶ When he started his campaign in -334 he had 70 talents with him (says Aristoboulos) and 200 talents debt (says Onesicritos).⁵⁹⁷ The date of the succession is unknown. I choose the 1^st of september -336 and the 1^st of may -334 for the gathering in Amphipolis, thus describing a duration of twenty months in between. During all of these months Alexander III. had to pay for “10 000” men in Asia and his standing army in Europe. According to the principles developed in chapter 4 the cost of these forces can be calculated:

		Misthos per year	Sithos per year	~Total per year
“Ila”	150 fighters, 150 squires, 16 ektaktoi, 316 horses	12,72 tal.
	28 ouragoi, 24 dodekadarchs, 4 tetrarchs, 1 ilarchos	3,42 tal.	15,8 tal.	~ 32 tal.
Inf. “meros”	480 fighters, 120 half-combatants, 16 ektaktoi	17,52 tal.
	60 ouragoi, 56 dekadarchs, 4 lochagoi, 1 strategos	3,15 tal.	12,32 tal.	~ 33 tal.
Art./Siege section	120 half-combatants, 4 ektaktoi	4,38 tal.
	6 ouragoi, 6 dekadarchs	0,27 tal.	2,48 Tal	~ 7 tal.
Guard bonus	Agema Hypaspists & Compagnions	8 tal. each		16 tal.

I propose three Macedonian “taxeis”, 3 000 mercenary “hoplites”, 2 000 light-armed and three “ilai” for the “10 000” men. This adds up to 455 “talents misthos” per year and 758,5 “talents” in twenty months. The “Basilike Ile”, the “Hypaspists”, Agrianes, archers, the “Sarisaphoroi” and the mercenary garrisons were continuously to be paid in Europe. This adds up to 616 “talents misthos” per year and 1 026 “talents” in our period. In between, however, the king called up his remaining army from the 1^st of may to the 1^st of december in -335, for a total of another 737 “talents” of “misthos”. Thus at least 2 550 “talents” were spent on the army during the twenty months. This sum still should be slightly increased as no boni for valour are included and it further cannot be ruled out that the king at times also had to pay for “sithos”; so 2 700 “talents” seem to be a prudent estimate.⁵⁹⁸

The Macedonian king besides his army had a number of other obligations. There was his court, of course. “ὁἱ πὲρι τὴν ἀυλὴν- those around the court” by definition are a shifting collection of people and concerning the cost of their maintenance nothing is related. The “Basilike paides” with their foster-fathers and teachers presumably 200 strong certainly were to be maintained by the king. The “paides” served in the “basilike therapeia” where seven chief-attendants administered to the king’s kitchen, wardrobe, horses, armory, treasure, to his health and security. The king’s wifes with their attendants built an inner court. At that Philipp employed a “basilike grammateia” with seven secretaries to administer the realm and therefore an archive in Pella too. While the scribes were few, I estimate them to 30 men, the number of the “therapeia” was larger and tended to increase by itself. The court had to be occupied with hunting, gaming, feasting and learning throughout the year and numbered with the king’s family, his friends and foreign guests and ambassadors about 200 people⁵⁹⁹ when it gathered to a feast at Dium in -335.

Besides this the king employed some of his friends in civilian functions, as ambassadors, “epistatai”, “episkopoi” and “oikonomicai” and it seems that king Philipp employed all the young and most of the grown up of his 800 barons either at the court, the army or in such functions. Even the elderly were employed as foster-fathers. Ultimately I cannot procure a number of “talents” for the yearly cost of the court and administration, yet a rough estimate for bare maintenance without any entertainment includes 150 “talents” per year, while expenditure for entertainment naturally depended on the circumstances.⁶⁰⁰

Further the king was chief-priest of his country which made it necessary to routinely provide for sacrifice, to support the above mentioned “national” games at Dium as well as to give 10% of the war booty to the gods. The campaign of -335 generated such extraordinary income: 440 “talents” by enslaving the Thebans, another unknown sum for other people sold.⁶⁰¹ When king Alexander III. borrowed those 800 “talents” he too had to attain to his father’s funeral and arranged a number of killings. He certainly in these months cut costs where ever possible and managed to reduce his public debt from 500 to 200 “talents”. Certainly his father’s friends in the Greek cities would no longer receive any gifts for past merits and perhaps the engagement with horses in the Olympic games was canceled. Finally in the spring of -334 King Alexander again issued bonds to his barons, promising royal land as security.⁶⁰² This he presumably did to engage a further host of Greek mercenaries, increasing their total to 10 000 men, to pay for the newly arriving contingents from Thracia and Paionia, to arm and equip two new “taxeis” and “ilai” and to interest his associates in his future success. I assume that in total rather more than 3 000 “talents” were spent during the twenty months, making a regular income of 1 500 silver “talents” per year probable.

This is hypothetical, of course, and neglects to count the 10% paid in kind. It can be related, however, to other figures. When King Alexander died in -323, there were 50 000 “talents” in the treasure and the annual income amounted to 30 000 “talents” in silver.⁶⁰³ This estimate obviously does not mean that such an amount of silver actually had been gathered to Babylon from all over the empire in that year. It does not even mean that this amount then actually had been payed to the government. I would like to understand it in the way that, provided functioning collection and effective suppression of fraud had existed, this amount was thought possible to have been collected in the realm. This then presumably was inhabited by 40 000 000 people, so in average 1333 inhabitants were thought to produce one “talent” of taxes. The realm of -334 with only 2 000 000 inhabitants consequently suggests and confirms an income of about 1 500 “talents” per year. Again Antigonos in -315 boasted a yearly income of 11 000 “talents” in silver.⁶⁰⁴ This suggests a population of 14 500 000 in his realm. If his positions in Asia Minor (including Cappadocia, yet excluding Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Pontos and Armenia), Assyria, Babylon, Susiana, Persis and Media are added up this fits in readily. It anyway includes that the farther east – Parthia, Arachosia, Bactria, Sogdiane or India – did not contribute to this collection.

The related numbers fit together, yet seem rather weak. If we suppose that only half the total population was engaged in gainful employment and further propose that one drachma was earned a day this computes to 1 200 000 “talents” per year as national income for the realm of -323 and consequently the whole revenue expectation to a mere 2, 5 % of this total. It must be again recalled, however, that another part was to be paid in kind, that the tax amount was sold to farming companies which lived of the surplus they could squeeze out of the taxables and that the king was not the only one gathering revenue: The cities and the temples too had their share and finally people in antiquity were accustomed to contribute to social funds too. The true burden therefore was considerably higher than the king’s share implies.

With these numbers in accordance another figure must be mentioned. In Athens Lycurgos presumably from -338 to -326 was in charge of the revenue which at one point had decreased to 60 “talents”.⁶⁰⁵ He lent money from citizens, invested it⁶⁰⁶ and thereby opened new perspectives of income for the city. He is reported to have multiplied the cities revenue to 600 “talents” and by adding 600 “talents” from alleged “tributes” to have contributed to the city 1 200 “talents” per year, as during the times of the first Attic league. Those 600 “talents” out of “tributes” are difficult to believe. While it is true that the allies in -339 agreed to pay 500 “talents”⁶⁰⁷ for the conduct of the war, the league after Chaironea was dissolved and afterwards nobody felt obliged to pay tribute to Athens. Still the contribution of Imbros, Lemnos, Skyros and Samos might go by that name but cannot have exceeded 20 “talents”. Plutarch’s material implies that the single city Athens spent 14 400 “talents” in twelve years, a number that compares not well to the framework established so far. Within that frame a regular income of 550 “talents” plus those “tributes” seem to be a much more acceptable amount and still is a testimony of Athen’s leading position in trade, banking and insurance services. Lykurg’s accomplishments could very well have been achieved with half the reported sum.

When king Alexander started his campaign in -334 a total of 4 000 “talents” per year would have been necessary to pay the total forces and another 3 000 “talents” for maintenance (sithos). 2200 “talents” pay were his own obligation, the rest fell to the Greek allies. Yet this total never was mobilized at the same time. 6 Macedonian “taxeis” with 600 knights stayed in Macedonia, 9 000 Greek infantry with 900 knights were not mobilized until later in the year. When the Greek contingent finally was fully mobilized the states immediately complained to Alexander who decided to dissolve the fleet for the winter.

The campaign of the next year presents the main question and is not easy to conceive from the viewpoint of finances. King Alexander pretended to free the Greek cities in Asia from Persian “oppression”, thus relieving them of the “phoroi” they had been accustomed to pay to their satrap⁶⁰⁸ and changed government to democracies where desired. He ordered his army not to ravage the country and treated it as friendly territory. Besides the treasure stored in Sardeis⁶⁰⁹ only the plunder from Milet and Halicarnassos generated extraordinary income. Alexander took over the Persian system of taxation⁶¹⁰ and installed Nikias as financial officer of the seaboard⁶¹¹ yet the satrapies in -334 hardly produced any revenue. In Caria the capital was destroyed and further 3 200 mercenaries were taken in service. When Hegelochos and Amphoteros were sent to again gather the fleet, they received 500 “talents” to do so while still another 600 “talents” had to be sent to Antipater.⁶¹²

The incomes of the Macedonian king as well as those of the Greek states, on the other hand, must have diminished considerably once the enemy fleet entered the Aegaean sea, obstructing trade and again unleashing piracy. The Persian fleet in -333 should have established a second front in Greece and surely would have succeeded in doing so, had its commander had a sufficient amount of money with him. Instead Memnon the Rhodian had to live of contributions he laid upon the cities conquered⁶¹³ and despite his numerical superiority achieved nothing of consequence until his death. Only then the strategic balance shifted, allowing Alexander to move on to Cilicia while Dareios gathered his Greek mercenaries to Syria. These months of waiting at Gordion and later in Cilicia must have proved challenging to Alexander, prior to the battle of Issos the whole world expected a Persian victory and king Alexander and his Greeks must have been in some pain to satisfy their creditors. Surely all possible credit had been exhausted to the limit, new satraps attended to the matters of Phrygia and Cilicia and Alexander in between had started to take true war-contributions from single cities, 100 “talents” from Aspendos and another 150 “talents” from Soli are mentioned.⁶¹⁴ The king’s expedition to Rough Cilicia was a plundering raid. The “free” cities in Asia Minor were compelled to contribute again: these payments for cosmetic reasons were named “syntaxeis”.

The victory at Issos turned the tide. 3 000 “talents” worth were captured from the Persian army⁶¹⁵ and another 2 600 in silver with the train at Damaskos.⁶¹⁶ Further the whole of Syria submitted bearing presents⁶¹⁷ and consequently the Persian fleet dissolved. Trade now would have had a chance to recover, had it not been Alexander’s new plan to destroy Tyre. Anyway the revenue increased significantly. Occupied Asia Minor with more than 3 000 000 inhabitants can be taxed at 2 500 “talents” per year, Syria with 4 000 000 to 3 000 “talents” per year. Finally Egypt immediately produced 800 “talents”⁶¹⁸ from the treasure and with presumably 7- 8 000 000 inhabitants contributed no less than 6 000 “talents” in silver per year.⁶¹⁹ So at the start of -331 king Alexander had a yearly revenue expectation of 13 000 “talents” and consequently now could feed, pay and reward his army with ease. The Greek fleet had been reduced to 80 ships in the end of -332. While in -331 Antipater called them up at home for the duration of six months in -330 the Greek contingent in Asia was disbanded, leaving the “league of Corinth” without military obligation for seven years.

The numbers of the treasure taken in Susa, Persepolis and Pasagardae are all suspicious and I simply do not know how many “talents” Alexander gathered to Ecbatana. I however know for sure that leaving and giving this treasure to Harpalos or anybody else for guarding was a decision uniquely clueless. The administration of Aegypt too shows a shortsighted and narrow-mind and neglected the welfare of the future empire. In order to deliver those 6 000 “talents” in silver Alexander’s representative exploited famine in Greece and Alexander knew about it, yet confirmed his associate in his course. Ultimately the world certainly could have wished for a better administrator than Alexander, anyway this was preferable to the chaos that followed his death.

9. Movement and Drill

Besides some lines in Xenophon,⁶²⁰ drill is explained in all Tacticians and very similar: being often criticized as dogmatic and dull, these pages effectively are the strongest part of their works. Words of command, movements and formations are thoroughly explained. The “Handbook of infantry”⁶²¹ from 1814 starts with: “all movement depends on marching, facing and wheeling” which exactly corresponds to: “προάγειν, κλίσις and στροφή” of the Tacticians. Perhaps one has to accept that drill is a rather tiring thing to write about. As Rüstov and Köchly already convincingly did this,⁶²² I will add only some lines.

The man was in his file, the files were composed to a tactical body which moved in one on the field. Marching the body was an “ὄρθιον λόχος” (single file).⁶²³ It could gather into “φαλάγγια” (column), “φαλάγξ” (line) or “πλίνθιον” (square formation). While movement in column was much the same as marching, in line or square the formation easily got disrupted. Those figures also were built with larger numbers of units and ultimately a whole army could be marshaled into these. In detail it made a difference whether a column was composed of lochoi in single files or else of files grouped as the ranks of the column. Any line or column could be formed in various depth. If the body was to wheel this was to be done with minimum depth and probably the short gait of the soldier⁶²⁴ rather should be mentioned here than in combination with marching.

Deploying an army either from a camp, out of the line of march or from an approach formation (in multiple columns) into battle formation accurately was compared to dancing and took time. How much decided the outcome of the battle. If battles are related to have lasted for hours this includes the time for marching up. Actual fighting was to be measured rather in minutes. Neither theory nor the most eminent capacities in antiquity as well as modernity ever came to a stringent formula for the tightness of their files. Yet everything depended on this and proposed fighting often was aborted by poorly arrayed forces if they still could help it.

An army of 10 000 “hoplites” 16 deep formed up in a line about 500 meters long. Once in this formation the army could move only very short distances, else the line would break. To move a deployed line first one half of the units advanced and the other half followed behind, keeping the distances and building a chessboard. This was named “προτετάγμενον” in Greek, fascinates to our day as allegedly unique Roman “manipular tactic” and was necessary to bypass obstacles in the field. To the same end the moving unit reformed in greater depth (βάθος) to allow for six feet room per file. Such a broken line of course was to be filled in by the rear units (παρεμβολή)⁶²⁵ prior to contact with an enemy. An army of 50 000 “hoplites” still marched up in a line only 1 000 meters long which presumably was thought to be a maximum for a concerted attack or retreat.

When the infantry marched up their protecting screen of light-armed divided into the wings which were strengthened by the heavy cavalry from behind. A wing’s length even with the strongest armies hardly ever exceeded 1 000 meters for the same reasons as in the infantry. Polybios⁶²⁶ explains that cavalry “tetrarchies” marched up with intervals in unit size for reasons of movement. He recons 800 men for one “stadion” (app. 180-190 meters). The “toxotai” and “akontists” were of use in shallow formation only, in a line two deep they produced their maximum effect. If anywhere during battle rapid change from line into column and back into line was necessary then it would have been their groups of 48 to do so in accordance with their supporting riders.

Horses don’t intend to clash with each other and if it nevertheless occurred this was considered an accident. Two “tetrarchies” meeting heads-on was much of a “chicken” game, the party with the greater cohesion overthrowing its adversary prior to a true clash.⁶²⁷ An attack would be most efficient if its speed could be increased during the charge, from walking into trot and only during the last meters culminating in a canter and thereby resuming the officers into the body which so far had led at the front. All amounted to this gesture of determination in the last moments. Because naturally the very opposite happens: at approaching each other the riders curb their mounts to avoid what must lead to their destruction. The cavalry sought to catch its opponent in the flanks and much effort was spent to make a “tetrarchy” reassemble after the attack and to realign the axis of its movement.

Marching at an approaching enemy and expanding the line by reducing the depth requires discipline. That orders are to be followed is but a prerequisite to this. The question is what to do when no orders are available. Ideally the commanders of an army knew each other personally, had together moved their forces in the field and could foretell the other’s reactions without direct communication, while orders reached trained and willing men in the process of their execution. Armies lacking this or else a unified command were in danger to become engaged with their leading parts while the mass still was on the march and thereby being unable to unfold their potential.

The Tacticians also talk of doubling an already deployed line by ranks (διπλασιάζειν). While they warn to do so in vicinity of a foe, such maneuvers are related as actually having been done in some battles (Kynoskephalai, Mantinea). Wheeling excessive wings to outflank an approaching foe for each army was a learning process. Being formerly known as “Spartan fashion”, it became standard repertoire of the Greeks in the course of our century. The Romans, however, did not have the tactical ability to do so until -211 when Scipio as permanent commander finally inaugurated professionalism in their force.

It was a matter of practice. Arrian⁶²⁸ narrates how a column composed of “ὄρθιοι λόχοι” of the whole phalanx, 120 deep, stormed a defended ridge. During its way up it was unapproachable as the outer “lochoi” could stop and gather in any endangered spot. Upon reaching the summit the column not only there drove the defenders away but deployed to either side, ready to attack in two directions. By this the enemy who never had seen such artistic mass movement before, was amazed and gave way without fighting. Nor should that practice be underestimated concerning an armies security: nightly riots in the camp unleashed by panicking animals were a frequent occurrence. And sometimes inexperienced men could get caught in such feelings too. Once out of order a fleeing mass becomes its own enemy and tramples itself to death in each bottleneck.

Concerning weapons training there are some lines in Plato often quoted,⁶²⁹ he mentions “ὁ πελτάστικος” as modern way of fighting,⁶³⁰ enumerates the weapon branches and even goes into some detail how to organize “ἀγ͠ωνες” (contests with prizes for the winners), yet eventually shows himself to be no military man when he assures that his “ἀθλήται πολέμου” would be able to conquer a mass threefold their own number. Xenophon believes that the sword’s usage is natural and does not need to be taught.⁶³¹ Concerning the spear he restricts himself to pleas for practising.⁶³² As the mercenary’s professionalism was the answer to the lack of training in the citizen armies that Plato and Aristotle lament, I would like to conclude that the Macedonian army by king Philipp was accustomed to a perpetual code of training that included marching, maneuvering, camping, foraging, working in bridge building or sieges, swimming,⁶³³ medical aid, parading and finally fighting: “…κὰι τὰ πολέμια ἐς τὸν τρόπον τὸν Μακεδονικόν ἠσκημένους – exercised in military discipline after the Macedonian system.”⁶³⁴

The gymnasium in the course of the century in most states changed into a military installation and those established by king Philipp II. in Macedonia certainly were. He would head for one gymnasium for each of his twelve “taxis” and “ilai”, and one for the guard. A stone script⁶³⁵ announces the opening of the gymnasium of Beroea, lists the staff and its payment and in general terms explains what was to be done. A course was to be started if a minimal number of apprentices could be gathered. Archery and javelin-throwing was to be practiced every day. The men were split in groups, led by “λαμπαδάρχοι” (torchbearers) and spent much time with running, mock battle and their weapons training by the “ὁπλόμαχοι” (melee trainers), “ἀκοντιστής” (spear-throwing trainer), “τοξοτής” (trainer in archery), “ἀφέτης” (stone-throwing trainer, both by hand and sling) and the “καταπαλταφέτης (trainer in artillery-use, maintenance, repair and seemingly also in building). Besides these also the “πολοδαμαστής” (horse trainer) is mentioned. There were tests by a chosen board from the city and prizes for the winners in contest.

Aim of all the effort were “ἐυέξια” (well-being), “ἐυτάξια” (order, discipline) and “φιλοπονία” (readiness for work) of the apprentices. The king warns the “γυμνασιάρχος” (head of the institution), his “διδασκαλόι” (teachers) and the “βραβέυτες” (referees) not to spoil the men; some lines on discipline follow. A teacher who failed to attend the gymnasium without being sick was fined. Apprentices who cheated in the contests were to be whipped, as were people who mingled into the course without permission. Slaves, freedmen, unfit, hucksters, drunkards and insane were forbidden to enter. The whole was sacred to Hermes, the prizes were ordained to him, his was the sacrifice (not more than two drachmas per man) and at his temple the ceremonies took place.

10. In the Field:

“There was a great number of four horse vehicles, if one was damaged, all were delayed. If they found many roads, all thronged them at the same time and the pack horses frequently ran into serious hindrances. For this reason the death of horses was a common occurrence, and so were the complaints about the short distance traveled every day.”⁶³⁶

The reformed army of the -fourth century materialized to its full potential in the force Rome first produced in -313 and in Alexander III.’ army. According to the above developed ideas the latter’s composition in -334 adds up to 14 500 attendants, 4 000 asses, 1 300 mules, 6 500 oxen, 9 500 horses and 2 410 vehicles. The army further needs a position for the siege train; as the vehicles reserved for the civilian professions hardly carry their own rations, reserve materials and tools (300 carriages with 600 men and 1 200 oxen) and the commander with his staff, court and baggage. The commander besides his bodyguard was surrounded by seers, heralds (chief officers to the heralds and trumpeters in the units), a chief officer of the baggage (σκοίδος),⁶³⁷ a chief officer of the engineers (τέκτος βασιλικός), his household of attendants (βασίλικη θεραπεία),⁶³⁸ the army secretaries with their “episkopoi” and finally, doctors (ἰάτροι). I estimate these together to 1%, including their baggage.⁶³⁹

Thus, this army counts 50 600 men, 4 000 asses, 1 400 mules, 7 800 oxen, 9 600 horses and 2 800 vehicles. In comparison to the numbers in the introduction we notice that the ratio of vehicles to men has dropped, from almost one in thirteen to one in eighteen. The striking difference is the ratio of the combatants and non-combatants. The new army is double the size, but is 2. 5 times the number of combatants.⁶⁴⁰

It also comes to notice that this gigantic organism still could make a day’s march of twenty kilometers (four to five parasangs) in one day on one street if the heavy vehicles are excluded as “army train” and the cavalry had space to protect the column on either side.⁶⁴¹ The size resembles a modern army corps.⁶⁴² Even the reformed army could no longer move properly, however, if this limit was to be exceeded.⁶⁴³ Dareios army at Damaskus and both armies at Gaugamela needed three days (including train) to make a day’s march on one road. An army continuously acquires vehicles and trains always tend to increase during campaign. If official allocation is insufficient it is supplemented by in-official. Constant supervision is necessary to keep superfluous materials out of the line of march. Much additional capacity in the short run is justified and has to be quit later on. Here belong the lines in Polyaen and Curtius, where king Alexander destroys vehicles from his commander’s baggage.⁶⁴⁴ They then exceeded our statistical allocation of one percent which after years of campaign likewise was the case with his officer’s and even troop’s baggage. By no means was there any intent to abolish wheeled transport altogether.

When Alexander III. started his operations in -334 the army from its winter quarters in Macedonia had to concentrate to Amphipolis. They had been quartered all over the country,⁶⁴⁵ presumably each “ile” and “taxis” in its own district for reasons of nourishment. These early marches through Mygdonia, Crestonia and Bisalthia would utilize all possible routes in separate columns⁶⁴⁶ and rely on magazines, as no sufficient pasture could then have been available. During the march from Amphipolis to Sestos in -334, which took only twenty days if Arrian is to be believed, only three quarters of the army accompanied the king as the van of 10 000 already was in Asia. It there had secured means of provisioning, as the army had started with supplies for thirty days.⁶⁴⁷ These partly were transported by ship and presumably some of the troops also traveled that way. The army gathered for the battle at the Granikos and then immediately broke up again. One corps marched on Daskyleion, the king with apparently one half of the force down the coast to Sardeis and Ephesus. During all the events in between until to the general unification at Gordium in spring -333 this division was kept.

Once united the armies day’s march on the road from Gordium to Cilicia could not have been conducted in one day for the whole. The mass was to be divided⁶⁴⁸ and it is reasonable to assume that the troops with their baggage (3 days of nourishment) and troop train (six days of nourishment) built one component, whereas the army train (9 days of nourishment), the siege train and eventual heavy parts of the commander’s and officer’s baggage built a second component which was to follow in the rear at a general speed of 3 km/hour and 15 kilometers per day.

At the head led the “prodromoi” followed by the vanguard, a strong infantry and cavalry unit without any baggage (the “legions” took daily turns for the position, the “Hypaspists” held it with the Macedonians) then the field artillery. These would be called the “agema” of the column. Behind came the commander with his heralds, guards and baggage. Then the infantry with its baggage and troop train, followed by another unit of pioneers to clear the way for the army train. In the end a rearguard (infantry and riders without baggage) built the tail.

Marches in friendly territory would allow each unit to be followed by its own troop train section, whereas in enemy territory the soldiers would have to form one part of the column, the train another. In case the army had to march up for battle formation, the vehicles would have been in the way otherwise. If defiles intersect a line of march the narrowest of them gives the rule for the marching order, as narrowing an already marching column leads to long waiting times and to the failure of the march. The Greek terminus for the order of march is the “φαλάγγια” which in the ordinary circumstances must be imagined as some hundred meters in width and twenty kilometers in length. If, however, a line of communication left open to move more than one column simultaneously, that is they could march less than 10 kilometers from each other (διφαλάγγια) the march with flanking baggage/train units becomes advisable. The advantage of this of course was that the men after their march had not to wait too long for their baggage to arrive. Anyway columns must never collide to avoid waiting during the march.

The army could skip the contact to its train and march on its own with the baggage only. Enforced marches of fifty kilometers are related which were to be covered in one day with consecutive rests of only three hours. After this distance had been covered a longer rest of course was necessary. Under normal conditions an army would rest three to four days after five days of march to wait for its rear parts to catch up. A days march was likely intersected by rests as specifically the animals needed constant supervision. If their load started to work loose it could hurt the animal and render it useless.

On the other hand, covering twenty kilometers as day’s march did not rule out further secondary marches in the afternoon: The van had to disperse and to reconnoitre the surroundings for food and forage⁶⁴⁹ and the whereabouts of a possible enemy. The animals after arriving first were to be unsaddled and then brought outside the camp for watering and feeding. Their masters afterwards had to collect the reported materials.⁶⁵⁰ Of course the “prodromoi” in the process mobilized all transport capacity in the region they could lay hands on, with or without the consent of its owners. Yet either an abundance of provisions or else a scarcity of vehicles made it necessary for the army to collect itself. If this was to be done it naturally took time and success also depended on the relations to the local population: If the command of an “͗έπιτροπος” was sufficient to gather the materials, it was of course easier than to dig for hidden stocks⁶⁵¹ in the landscape while being constantly on the guard against hostile ambushes.⁶⁵² Anyway if time and provisions were plenty, large masses of supplies could be gathered.⁶⁵³

Besides these transports trickling in at at the place of the rendezvous the army was followed by the merchants (αγοράιοι)⁶⁵⁴ too, who sold a variety of goods central supply would not furnish, were waiting for booty to be purchased at mock prices and lived a dangerous live as the army would not protect them in the field. Anyway a commander would not antagonize them either: Cyrus⁶⁵⁵ ordered “that no one should interfere with the market in camp, but that the hucksters may sell what each of them has for sale and when they have disposed of that, get in a new stock, that our camp may be supplied.”

Many of them had their ties to single units and their usual place would be in the camp at the market place and the fact that they get expelled from there by Metellus⁶⁵⁶ rather confirms this. In Latin they were named “lixae”. This word with the same origin as “liquor” ideally describes the fluent coming and going outside the “taxis”. The “agoraioi” could amount to no less number than the army itself, as Diodor reports, and could include music players, jugglers, dancing girls and harpists.⁶⁵⁷

Ultimately, an army was followed by utterly unwanted people too: “…outside the ranks a mixed crowd of rabble also followed along for the sake of booty, men who are no use whatever to an army, but are the source of tumult and irrational confusion, from which the most extreme dangers often arise”.⁶⁵⁸ All in all a general produced a decent lead if in his army the combatants predominated.⁶⁵⁹ To attain a ratio of two fighters to one non- or half-combatant presumably was top performance, especially with growing army size.⁶⁶⁰

11. Reconnaissance and Intelligence

It is necessary to know the own strength as well as the enemies.⁶⁶¹ He who does not, will perish in the war against a stronger opponent.⁶⁶² Its not only about best finding out the enemies plans but also how he might be least likely to learn our’s (sic!).⁶⁶³ And it is not only about the enemy: “If you are to rely upon the friend’s rations it is good to know, how much he has”.⁶⁶⁴

King Philipp employed seven “somatophylakes” as the chief-officers of his bodyguard. They in seven watches were to stand guard over the army and the king. The bodyguard was the armies headquarters where information was evaluated, plans made and commands issued. They were to familiarize themselves with a potential area of operation even in times of peace,⁶⁶⁵ had to administer the “bematist” account (they had to count the steps done each day) and presumably had a section to produce maps. Each “somatophylax” was permitted to engage spies (κατασκοπόι) on his own behalf⁶⁶⁶ to acquire knowledge concerning the terrain, the communications, the coast and its anchorages, strength and weaknesses of the strongholds, possible nutrition and foraging sources and the whereabouts of a possible enemy.

On its march the army usually was surrounded by small three men detachments⁶⁶⁷ of light cavalry which scanned the countryside in considerable distances⁶⁶⁸ from the columns. These were without armor and with two horses per man. They would of course not interfere with an enemy, lest it be a single letter-bearer,⁶⁶⁹ yet would instantly report back.⁶⁷⁰ Much depended in war on the speed and accuracy of their work, they were called the armies “eyes”.⁶⁷¹ Reconnaissance could be done by boat down a river,⁶⁷² by ship over the sea⁶⁷³ and Vegez recommends to use “boats with sails dyed blue and waxed hulls for silent running.”⁶⁷⁴ In difficult terrain the screen was to be composed by groups of light-armed foot.⁶⁷⁵ Their range naturally was smaller than the cavalry’s and tended to mute into a “reconnaissance en force”, the second scout mode. The scouts were then followed by a reserve, infantry in the mountains,⁶⁷⁶ or cavalry in the plains⁶⁷⁷ and at least the reserve was prepared to fight. This usually was done with no enemy in the vicinity, sometimes in the plain need to fetch somebody to tell the way.⁶⁷⁸

Alexander III. in his approach march to the battle of Ninive/Gaugamela received the report that the enemy was in sight and started to marshal the army into a battle line when sounder reports corrected: the sighted enemy was only a thousand strong.⁶⁷⁹ This capability of estimation was a much needed gift of officers and few are really good at it.⁶⁸⁰ Scouts could simply produce bad results by reporting things they had not actually seen,⁶⁸¹ yet one must not forget that when two such screens overlapped in a hostile manner a very fast retreat often was not enough and the stress would impede the reliability of the reports.

A commander sees best by himself.⁶⁸² Alexander, once the foe’s number was established, gave chase in person and caught some of the enemy scouts for interrogation.⁶⁸³ On the other hand quite a number of generals got ambushed during their reconnoitring, which shows that besides quickness and strong wits the light cavalry also needed strength. In all history most armies had not enough of these riders and king Philipp with his “Sarisophoroi” and Antigonos with his “tarentines” truly set up a new standard by procuring such troops not as unruly mercenaries in trifling numbers, but from their own training; a thing that the republic of Rome and even the emperors never achieved.

Besides the military intelligence the king/commander himself had other sources of information. In this field delegating was possible only in special cases⁶⁸⁴ and keeping one-self ignorant of the information flow was a certain path to doom. Hence the absolute ruler was a slave to constant letter-reading, which they frequently lamented upon as an unspeakable burden.⁶⁸⁵

Of the seven “grammateis basilikos” at least one would have had to collect and to channel information being regularly transmitted from the realm. Any community in these days would include a system of watching posts in its territory to secure the labour in the fields from raiders. If rationally connected the kingdom of Macedonia and indeed much larger rooms could be supervised by few persons.⁶⁸⁶ A watchtower typically was to be garrisoned with three men who too were called “κατασκοπόι”, whence derives the name of the present capital of Macedonia, Skopje. Through the towers information was channeled either by torches,⁶⁸⁷ drums, mirrors or garlanded arrows to a regional center, where an “epistates” or “hyparch” would have to transmit it to the “grammateus basilikos”. Presumably a second “grammateus” would be responsible for the king’s correspondence and a capable king tried to find time to listen to ambassadors, emissaries, petitioners in person. Only because of king Philipp’s absence the crown prince was to do the conversation with the Persian emissaries.⁶⁸⁸

Besides the “grammateis” of the state the royal “therapeia” would include another seven chief-magistracies to administer the court, one of which would be Alexander’s “σκοπάρχος”⁶⁸⁹ who was to spy on everybody by the means of the “ὡτακόυστης”, the eavesdroppers. An absolute ruler has absolutely no true friend, every ally can turn into a foe and a Macedonian king’s position was particularly weak due to polygamy. There always was a host of potential rivals to the throne and Alexander III., who had killed a number of them at his throne accession nevertheless during his campaigns suppressed numerous true or imagined plots against his life.

Sun Tsu explains that “information concerning an enemies dispositions can be fetched from spies and spies alone”,⁶⁹⁰ while Xenophon warns that the most truthful informant can by numerous reasons be unable to report in time.⁶⁹¹ From the “local” spy pictured as an observer Sun Tsu differentiates the “inward” spy recruited from the enemy. Citizens of neutral states, ambassadors, merchants and other traveling professions or their attendants were always a possibility; being observed anyway as possible enemy spies eventually the one or other was of use to gather a contact in the enemies camp. The city states had their “proxenoi”⁶⁹² who informed about abroad and the aristocracy used their channels of intermarriage. Besides this the numerous temples kept their mutual chatter. Sun Tsu further recommends the commander to have the most intimate relationships with his spies, to treat them with utmost sincerity and to reward them more liberal than anyone else, especially a converted spy.⁶⁹³ He also demands “subtle ingenuity of mind” to make sure of the reliability of their reports,⁶⁹⁴ recommends to kill superfluous secret-bearers and finally also mentions the possibility of deceiving the enemy trough what his spies believe to be true. Aneas Tacticus⁶⁹⁵ devotes a whole chapter to secret messages, Plutarch⁶⁹⁶ relates the Spartan system of encoding messages by the means of their “scytalae” and pigeons carrying news were in use.⁶⁹⁷

All of this amounts to nothing compared to the elegant methods of surveillance and supervision familiar with my present time. Nevertheless it shows that waging war could become a rather difficult thing to do back then too and it becomes understandable, when Xenophon closes his “Cavalry Commander” with the words: “If anyone is surprised at my frequent repetition of the exhortation to work with God, I can assure him that this surprise will diminish, if he is often in peril and if he considers that in time of war foemen plot and counter-plot, but seldom know what will come of their plots.”⁶⁹⁸

12. Sieges

The best way to wage war is to quell the conflict, before armies are to be gathered. If this cannot be hindered, it is preeminent to strike the enemy, before he is gathered in one place. If this cannot be hindered, there is no other way than to risk a battle. If this does not lead to the end of the war, as its worst policy, sieges have to be conducted.⁶⁹⁹

Fighting against prepared positions in antiquity was the very opposite of our modern experience: Whereas in our days no defensive seems to be possible at all and weapons of mass destruction can be brought to action anywhere with astonishing speed and accuracy, ancient armies principally were hemmed by any guarded wall. Fortification therefore was a military branch of great importance and not only cities but the villages and even any suitable height in their neighborhood were protected by walls. Thus the number of fortified places in every region was potentially infinite.

The superiority given to a defender by the height and inaccessibility of his position, by his better communications and means to concentrate fire-power in a spot was very great: One “cohort” defended itself in its redoubt against two “legions” (twenty to one) for hours.⁷⁰⁰ A garrison but strong enough to close the doors would suffice to hold a place if the attacker had no means to climb the wall.

One the other hand to defend everything means to defend nothing. Each place needs its garrison and soon a countries defense forces were split up into many small groups which could not support each other. If then an invading army undertook the task of besieging or blocking a number of these places, no relief force could be mustered in appropriate time. Indeed, as stated in the introduction, the city itself was a military move to concentrate a landscape’s potential to one spot that alone was to be defended (and ideally amassed its resources there too).⁷⁰¹ Anyway their numbers still were impressive and sieges could fail for a variety of reasons.

Practically this depended on the fighting spirit of the participants, a factor not easy to describe. If a siege was to be conducted its success depended on the garrison’s strength, its provisions and the strength of the fortification. Yet the central question was the gain that was to be expected from it and this, besides the provisions that could be obtained, entirely co-depended on the expectations of the opponent. The strategic eminence of a fortress is a thing, that cannot be described purely in military terms: the fortress may be a “depot-place” for provisions, a “gathering place” for the own forces or else a “bottle point” for communications, yet its significance in a campaign is governed by the expectations of all participants, not the military alone. They very often find themselves defending positions that are of no apparent use to them and the fall of a fortress could either herald the surrender of hundreds of others, or else lead to no change in the opponent’s will to defend at all.

Invading armies usually arrived with the time of harvest and an anticipating opponent might not had sown in spring. The cities were able to store their provisions for ten years, and Clausewitz reasons⁷⁰² if a well-organized defense might not be able to prohibit the enemies’ stay at all. Indeed if a supply basis in the country to be invaded could not be found there was no campaign to be conducted there: Alexander relieved Arimmas from his post as governor in Syria because he had failed to collect the supplies for Alexander’s planned march “to the interior”.⁷⁰³ Which means that Alexander intended to besiege and conquer Tadmor/Palmyra, some hundred fifty kilometers away from it all in the desert and prudently desisted when he realized this task would take very much more effort than he had expected.

During the -fifth century Greeks and Romans alike were quite unskilled in siege warfare. They usually blocked the place by surrounding it by a fortification and then waited for its provisions to run out. The siege of Veii in the beginning of the -fourth century ended when the besiegers found their way through the cities’ sewerage unnoticed. The knowledge about active siege came via Sicily in the conflicts with the Carthagians. These successfully used battering rams in some sieges on the island and the tyranny of Syracuse chose to take this matter to heart. Dionysios of Syracuse is reported to have established scientific research for the possibilities of technical warfare and as a result produced not only artillery and a larger type of war-ship (quincereme), but also the method and machinery for an active siege⁷⁰⁴ which almost immediately became standard for the Macedonian army of the -fourth century.

For a start there was the possibility to climb an unguarded or weakly guarded wall by the means of ladders.⁷⁰⁵ A wall’s height could be calculated by trigonometry, as Polybios points out, yet errors could occur: Phillipp V. of Macedon arrived at the town of Melitaea after a day’s march unexpected and ordered the ladders forward to catch the town by surprise. But, astonishing, the ladders proved to be too short.⁷⁰⁶ There were movable bridges too: A pole fixed to the ground with a guarded wheel on top, which held a ladder via a rope like a crane. Vitruvius distinguishes two models, one where the ladder was fixed to its pole on ground level (κόραξ), another where the bridge was fixed to its pole in greater height (έπιβάθρα).⁷⁰⁷ There also were in use wall sickles and grappling hooks (harpagones) for various purposes. All these were easy portable, yet the disadvantages are obvious. Until the materials arrived with the siege train any prospects of surprise had vanished. Alexander’s troops at least once used their packsaddles as material to pile up a ramp in order to quickly produce results. With nothing else at hand they would try to undermine the wall on ground level.⁷⁰⁸

If a wall was guarded and the enemy aware a more formal approach was to be observed: Sturdy penthouses with a conical head, traveling on wheels (ἁμάξοποδες) and named “χελῶναι”⁷⁰⁹ or “ορύγγες”, were moved over the cities’ glacis. They cleared the area of traps (popular were large jars dug in: they resisted the weight of men but collapsed if a siege engine tried to pass over it), filled in the ditch or else protected the construction of a mound (χώματον).⁷¹⁰ Behind their position decked causeways (σύριγγες κάταστεγοι) led to a secure rear. The decking apparently was transported with the army and was named: “στόαι” or “plutei”. All of this happened under fire cover of the artillery which was installed in batteries (βελοστάσεις). Polybios once gives a ratio of one to six between field pieces and “petrobols”,⁷¹¹ so that our large army presumably counted only twenty five of these machines. Their whirled stones were to destruct the battlements (επάλξεις) of the wall. Possibly more than one type was in use: The “μόναχος”, an equivalent of the “onager” is mentioned and possibly true steep firing machinery was in use, too.⁷¹²

When a passable way to the enemy fortifications had been paved, turrets (πύργοι), a wall drilling tortoise (τρύπανον) or even a ram (κρίος) were moved⁷¹³ up to it while the artillery came closer behind its stationary shields (λᾶισαι). Ideally the ram’s work simultaneously was to be supported by mines (ὑπορύγματα). It was customary to mine those 60 meters between two towers.⁷¹⁴ If all worked out well, the wall collapsed (πεσήμα) into the hole underneath and the way was open for the machines to enter. Sometimes mining alone was easier than to construct dams and employ rams. Sometimes a wall could not be shaken by a ram, drilled or undermined. Notably dams at the rear side of the wall or else a superior building technique (murus gallicus) could rule this out. In this case the chosen section of the wall was to be built over: between the siege towers an armored roof was placed, winched up and built under until it reached the height of the walls.

Vitruv relates that Diades’ and Chares’ siege machinery was collapsible and could be taken on campaign. This easily is to be believed for the ladders, the movable bridges, the decking for the causeways and the stone throwing artillery (πετροβόλοι). Less easy for the towers, the “xelonai”, the wall-driller and very hard for the giant ram. After all the possible allocation of 300 vehicles⁷¹⁵ for the siege train resembles only 150 tons capacity. The ram described as Diades’ alone weighed more than one hundred tons and what is more, its known parts are too heavy to be transported in a suitable way: One “hamaxopod”, the machine’s wheel which presumably were not easy to produce weighed more than 1. 5 tons. Too heavy for teams of oxen.

So it seems reasonable to assume that the army carried only light and medium machines as full kit and the tower’s, the ram’s and driller’s (much lighter) structure parts and wheels⁷¹⁶ and no mantling. Heavy machines became necessary only if an enemy city was defended by artillery. This penetrated the transportable coverings and possibly destructed a transportable tower. In this case the machines had to be constructed in the place in stronger pieces of wood. The ram (its efficiency depends on its weight) presumably often was built that way. Indeed Alexander abandoned his after the siege of Tyre⁷¹⁷ as had been done before Troy nine hundred years earlier. After all the park had to transport the construction machinery (cranes and tool-ram) and means to move the machines (ropes, pulleys, winches) as well. Concerning movement of the machines Diodor⁷¹⁸ relates for the famous “helepolis” that it was powered by 3 400 men, partly under the machine and partly behind it. The actual traction power was produced from numerous winches operating from behind while 200 men under the machine had to clear the way. Anyway speed was the hallmark of the new active way of fighting walls. As it took a siege train days to reach the destination this time was spent to gather intelligence, collect materials and build a circumference.

The besieging army mobilized its full working potential to overpower the defender’s measures. Frequently we are informed that the men worked in shifts and attacked in relays. This is altogether noteworthy in a society based on slave work. The very definition of the free man was that he was to do no useful labor and it is worth to recall how Alexander made this acceptable for his mercenaries: The Tyrean city god in his dreams popped up as “Heracles”. The seer Aristander interpreted that Tyros would be taken by labor as Heracles was the one (insane) in Greek mythology who actually provable did 12 works.⁷¹⁹

13. Epilogue

When Alexander III. with his vast army conquered in a series of battles and sieges the Persian empire an ancient tradition has him battling 100 000, 600 000 and 1 000 000 men successively. These numbers are obvious exaggeration in the manner of Herodotos. In reality the great king with himself had a core of 10 000 infantry, a militia of 10 000 archers and slingers and his guard, all in all an army of 23 000 fighters. If the ban was called out the satraps with their standby forces assembled. Their retinues numbered between a few hundred (Areia) and 3 000 (Bactria).⁷²⁰ If we accept 1 500 as average this adds 30 000 fighters, partly knights and partly marksmen, provided that all twenty satraps could be gathered. If to this the number of the Greek allies and mercenaries that could be mustered for the great king (an educated guess from antiquity⁷²¹ proposes 50 000) is counted, this indeed adds up to an army of 103 000 fighters.

Anyway this army never was gathered. And, what is more, it could not have been gathered. The Persian knights would not cope with one attendant each or one vehicle for a group of six or only two horses per man. Their organization still resembled the traditions introduced in chapter two. At the Granikos five satraps with their Paphlagonian allies (3 500 riders, 5 000 light-armed ?), 20 000 infantry and a divided command were too weak for opposition. Had they withdrawn to Anatolia the invader would have had to split without decision. The satraps were not prepared for such a move. Their army would have dissolved in the process.

At Issos Dareios was slightly stronger than Alexander. Kardaces were men from Corduene, as we say, Curds. They were regarded as “heavy” infantry but did not actually fight in close-order like the 10 000 “Immortals” and the 2 000 “Melophoroi”. Of the Greek mercenaries 4 000 escaped to Egypt, 8 000 fled for the Peloponnese⁷²² and 4 000 remained with the great king. They should have numbered 16 000 at Issos. So a 28 000 infantry core with 7 000 light-armed and 5 250 riders outnumbered the 35 500 Macedonians. This armies actual total would have amounted to 70 000. A part was detached to Damascus so the numbers are a tenth of what is related: 60 000 men.⁷²³ 3 000 riders/2 000 light-armed was the advanced screen, 2 000 light-armed the corps of Aristomenes the Thessalian on the Persian left wing. The Pinaros is the Payas as the Macedonian army could not have crossed the “Cilician Gates” and marched much farther in this one day as it is related. The Macedonians deployed but did not attack with their left wing or even their center. All activity fell to the right wing where king Alexander managed to be slightly stronger than his opponent. 4 250 riders/2 000 light-armed on the Persian right were opposed by only 2 550 riders/2 000 light-armed on the Macedonian side. In the center 26 000 heavy-armed infantry were bound by 21 000 Macedonians, allies and mercenaries.

On the left only 3 000 Persian light-armed were attacked and routed by 4 500 Macedonian light-armed with 3 000 “Hypaspists” and 2 100 Macedonian riders behind as Aristomenes had become isolated on the Macedonian side of the river and blocked by only 300 “Companion” knights whereas the Great king with his guard (1 000 “Euakidai” and the “Melophoroi”) first had to hasten to the left wing. While the ground is unfavorable to cavalry it has to be remembered that the street ran here. When the Persian left wing and the great king had been routed, the “Hypaspists” deployed to attack the Persian center. This then decided to retreat and the right-wing cavalry did likewise. Only then did the Macedonian center and left wing advance. Had the “Immortals” changed places with the “Melophoroi” in this battle array, the Macedonians would have lost the battle.

At Nineveh/Gaugamela the forces seem to have been quite even: The great king’s infantry then consisted of his “Immortals”, the 4 000 Greek mercenaries and the foot-guards. As for the number of cavalry and marksmen there is no base whatsoever for calculation. Anyway a number above 12 000 horsemen seems unlikely⁷²⁴ as this is the largest number of cavalry reported to have been gathered in one spot elsewhere⁷²⁵ and the related number of 40 000 riders has not the slightest credibility. That still would amount to an army of 55 000 fighters,⁷²⁶ could have amounted to a number near 100 000 men with 40 000 horses and would have equaled Alexander’s army despite its weakness in infantry.

The main authors produce equally poor descriptions of this battle: Macedonian infantry deployment at Nineveh/Gaugamela was the “Hypaspists” and the other Macedonians with the mercenaries and the “symmachoi” in alternating “taxeis” 32 men deep. The body was to make a unified attack which means that neither the picture of the two separate phalanxes nor Arrian’s idea of the “phalanx amphistomos” are correct. It had to rout the weak opposite infantry before being engulfed by the opponent’s strong wings. If the infantry had become surrounded by the Persian knights it would have had to stop and form square regardless of what king Alexander had ordered before.

The Macedonian wings were composed of all the light-armed and all the cavalry except the Thessalians and the “Companions”, who stood in column (ἐν ἐπικάμπο) each at the joints of the wings and the center. Both Macedonian wings after the initial clash of the light-armed and chariots were bent back while the infantry was still approaching and when Alexander ordered Menidas to “attack” the enemy this actually meant the right wing to stop and hold its ground. The “Companions” then charged together with the infantry, broke through the left wing of the enemy and relieved the hard pressed own right wing by charging the enemy left wing from the flank and rear. Dareios in the center met the breakthrough and was routed.⁷²⁷ On the left Parmenio could not do the same thing as the army in the approach had shifted to the right.

He had to receive his retreating wing, had to engage the enemy frontally and could do little for Andromachos at the wing’s outer end. Eventually the Persian center and left wing were routed before the Macedonian left wing collapsed even though some Persians are reported to have attacked through a gap in the infantry line and threatened both Macedonian wings from the rear. The battle therefore is to be characterized as a Macedonian breakthrough and was not decided by the right wing. A Macedonian wing was including reserve cavalry only 7 500 fighters strong as opposed to presumably 14 000 fighters on the Persian side even it has to be considered that part of it (250 meters on either end without shifting) were covered by the Macedonian infantry. The remaining mass was dispersed only because they were attacked by the “Companions” in the flank and rear while being frontally engaged.

The Persian empire continuously had had to fight separatist tendencies namely in Aegypt, where serious cultural misunderstandings allowed for no lasting coexistence. Yet the situation had been little better elsewhere. The satraps west of the Tauros did their private foreign policy and had had little regard for the ideas in the capital. In Syria a whole coalition of Phoenician cities under the lead of Sidon had been crushed after a rebellion; Cyprus had been more than once invaded by Greek forces and almost always was on the brink of defection. Greece itself during the course of the -fourth century had been in the state of permanent civil war. When the Macedonian tyranny by chance got the possibility to alter these circumstances it succeeded in the battlefield, but completely failed to exploit its success to any positive political goal.

Indeed the lines in the Bible: “Now it came to pass that after Alexander the son of Philipp of Macedonia, who first reigned in Greece, coming out of the land of the Chetim, had overthrown Darius, the king of the Persians and the Medes. He fought many battles, took the strongholds of all, and slew the kings of the earth. ( ) He died and his servants made themselves kings everyone in his place ( ) These and their sons brought multiplying evil upon the earth”⁷²⁸ is a most appropriate analysis of the actual outcome of the Macedonian deeds. The Macedonian potentates inherited the above mentioned fracture lines of conflict and perpetuated them into a system of governed chaos, whereas any sober contemporary would have hoped for a state of affairs that quelled these conflicts once and for all.

Alexander III. may have been the most efficient military leader of men in all times, yet all his action amounted to no lasting effect. When he departed for central Asia his dominions in Europe crumbled and Thrace was lost with irreconcilable consequences for Macedonia. When he returned to Babylon again his dominions in India had started to break away. Philipp II. had preserved Sparta to balance it against Argos, Arcadia, Achaia, Elis and Messene. His son could have realized that Egyptian and Greek loyalty to him depended on his role as defender against the great king. If any that conflict was to be perpetuated. To become great king himself, on the other hand, simply was waste of political capital. Other people seemed to have had more perspective. Parmenion and his faction, of course: They would have stopped Macedonian aggression at the Euphrates and restricted themselves to govern “the West”.

There must have been some economic reasoning moreover. To the Macedonians the possession of Eegypt must have appeared as ultimate goal. Besides its status as high developed country with the most perfect system of collection/distribution it also allows access to the southern sea and a possibility for competition in the trade along that routes. Milet was besieged because it quartered a population settled by the great king. Halikarnassos was besieged because its lord was a political antagonist to the Macedonians. The siege of Tyre, on the other hand, was hardly necessary. The city would not have fought on for the great king and had recalled its contingent from his fleet just as everybody else did. The escalation was Alexander’s and his motivation was greed for spices. He intended to reorganize global trade, east and west so far being linked via Carthage and Tyre.

And the siege of Gaza seems to have had no other intention. Even if its lord proved obstinate to the Macedonian rule his fortress could have been blocked, as it happened in numerous other instances along Alexander’s route. The decision to besiege the place, which is related as no small undertaking, becomes reasonable only in connection with a plan to monopolize all exchange along the borders of the Mediterranean and was no move against the great king, but against all peoples in the whole world.

Tyre’s destruction caused economic disaster, famine became a common plight in the eastern Mediterranean during the following decades.⁷²⁹ The great plan of monopolization, however, was not realized until the last Macedonian had ceased to rule and some justice lays in the fact that the historians themselves tired to distinguish between the ever multiplying “epigonoi” and their politically fruitless wars: “πόλεμος πάντων πατέρ, πάντων δέ βασιλέυς, (…) τούς δὲ άνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δούλος ἐποίησε, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους”⁷³⁰ being lived as social reality proved to be chaotic.

Meanwhile Rome, the coalition of cities in Italy, arming against its Celtic and Carthagian opponents became a rival to this system of governed chaos and the first encounter is connected to the name of Pyrrhos. Hannibal being asked who besides himself was the greatest general replied “Pyrrhos” (second to the canonical Alexander). From the sources this choice is no apparent one. No great victories are associated with this name. Indeed the very opposite is true: The Pyrrhic victory is a proverb for a disguised defeat. To understand it anyway a few circumstances have to be mentioned.

Alexander III. started his war against Persia with 66 300 men under arms. King Pyrrhos, one the other hand, from the start had a much smaller political and economic basis than any of his opponents.⁷³¹ He got his army in a conference of the “epigonoi” where they jointly disarmed for reasons of economy and gave their surplus to him and he then immediately was bound to act as he was unable to feed that elephant corps for long. In Italy, one the other hand, he could not act on his own behalf but had to forge an alliance of all the remaining states between Carthage and Rome in order to get together a force that would be a match for them. For indeed the Roman alliance produced very large armies. Cineas, the king’s ambassador, compared them to the famous “hydra”.⁷³²

Unfortunately what is related regarding his battles gives no clue whatsoever and is entirely worthless. Besides Hannibal’s word I found only few lines that are of help: “Pyrrhos not only took in use roman arms, but the Italians also and placed their “semaias” alternately with his own “speiras”.⁷³³ His first battle was a defensive engagement against a superior roman force which attacked while the king was waiting for reinforcements. The king was able to stop its advance, forced it back over the river and in the subsequent chaos captured the Roman camp. “He was very proud to have achieved this with his troops and the Tarentinians alone.”⁷³⁴

Concerning the second battle at Ausculum we are informed that Pyrrhos acted in accord with the poet⁷³⁵ to put his weakest soldiers in the center.⁷³⁶ The “White Shields” of Tarent together with Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians built that center in alternate “speirai” whereas king Pyrrhos’ own infantry presumably remained in column on either wing. In the battle the Romans therefore were defeated much in the same manner as at Cannae: while engaged in the front with a part of the enemy’s force they got outflanked by a reserve and attacked in both wings. If this was the case it is the answer to why Hannibal favored Pyrrhos above all others. He fought with strong wings and weak center which fits the numerically inferior and presupposes his tactical superiority.⁷³⁷ It is the same tactic as employed by Hannibal himself, Hindenburg and Manstein the Younger.

The battle’s outcome is altogether uncertain. It suffices to note that the king afterwards left the field of operations for a longer period of time for Sicily which he couldn’t had done if the outcome had been an unmitigated disaster. For the encounter at Maleventum there too exists no useful narration. Anyway the king retreated from the scene without losing his camp. Again he had had to fight a great superiority.

“Pyrrhos, king of the Epirotes, was the first to inaugurate the custom of concentrating an entire army within the precincts of the same entrenchments.”⁷³⁸ Fortification in the field was the latest trend in the -third century. Once the mercenaries had got accustomed to regular work with sieges it was only natural to employ it in other circumstances as well. One of the “diadochoi”, Lysimachos, successfully withstood a larger force in the field by entrenching, forcing the opponent to besiege the camp and during this siege to escape to another strong position.

Once the infantry got accustomed to this possibility its role on the battlefield further changed. Being so far in a balance with the other branches of war it now became supreme. What had started as only temporarily possible gathering now had instituted into a permanent presence of its own right. Indeed digging a trench right trough the landscape is a demanding task but easily done with an appropriate number of hands. And once done it is a serious obstacle to any cavalry even if it is not guarded at all and becomes bridged at single points.

The process took time. In the course of the -third century regular camp fortification became standard yet digging in of individual units is related as a regular procedure not until the -first century. During the -second century fortification besides the camp protection was used to secure one’s flanks in battle, the way from the camp to the water source and the battle line itself. With this new independence in the field artillery no longer needed a guard of long spears and infantry no longer needed trusting in their protection. This consequence was then realized in the -second century when the distinction of the “heavy” and “light” armed in the close-order infantry finally was abolished.

14. Conclusion

Armies in the Mediterranean changed in many ways in the -fourth century. Professionalism was introduced by the mercenaries. Active sieges became possible by the new means of technical warfare. Militarized trains sustained infantry in the field with only one half the number of vehicles citizen armies would have employed. The armies considerable grew in size which led to deeper and larger formations while weaponry and armor adapted to the logistical consequences of this growth and to the change of the social conditions.

Citizen armies down to the -fifth century seldom stayed in the field. Entrenching armies of the -first century with ten “legions” and more dominated every landscape. In between figured our army in corps-size, all year surrounded by hostile land, in considerable parts consisting of exiles and out-laws and thereby being unwilling to entrench. Heaps of long spears defined a “strategia”, the camping space where alone a “hegemon” commanded and could be applied to and baggage and attendants were safe. The pike being carried by the more well to do symbolized and was a support, perhaps mainly psychological, to people who else had little enough of it. The main military achievement, however, was the heavy “peltast” who fearlessly met alike “akontist” and knight in the field, combining close- and loose-order according to necessity.

The army reforms of Iphicrates, Camillus, Jason and Philipp were equally committed to these principles and Greek and Roman armies developed during the century in a most similar manner. One thing therefore simply did not happen: Macedonian and Roman armies did not arm according to different systems, one relying entirely on long spears, the other entirely on javelins.

Polybios copied the account from the battle of Kynoskephalai well enough, yet 18. 28 to 18. 32 are his free invention. Livy for his part copied Polybios⁷³⁹ and translated: “παράγγελμα καταβαλ͠ουσι τὰς σάρισας ἐπάγειν”⁷⁴⁰ into “hastis positis gladiis rem gerere jubet.”⁷⁴¹– He ordered to throw the “sarisai” and to charge with the sword.⁷⁴²

Afterwards he read Polybios’ fantasy and then, awed by its argumentation and ever since a believer, interpolated “quarum longitudino impedimento erat”⁷⁴³ and did likely in the other books concerning the Macedonian wars (as only partly noted in chapter 3). He was pragmatic, however, and did not care to alter his older books where in 9. 19. 7. he again had copied the truth from one of the annalists. Polybios and Livy thus founded the legend of the “different systems”: The Macedonian monarchy was past as were the long spears while the Roman army was alive and used javelins. The process in time was reinterpreted by some descendants as “alternative way of waging war”.

With this in view Diodor honestly admitted that writing about Iphicrates’ reforms was too tedious for him. Nepos got it wrong too, he at least managed to say that the “peltast” replaced the citizen “hoplite”. In conclusion Arrian maintained a nostalgic intellectual opposition to Roman rule and might have felt quite a rebel when he dared to call “maniples” “speirai” in the Greek copy of his account to the Caesar. He and others in this mood nurtured the legend by narrowing the concept of words like “sarisa” and “pelta”. The only actual military formation that ever experimented with Polybios’ idea might have been emperor Caracalla’s special division, described in Cassius Dio.⁷⁴⁴

This ancient legend will not be shaken by a single work. What could be said to establish a more rational point of view I believe to have said.

Vienna, Austria, 2024

15. Addendum: Polybios Fantasy 18. 28 – 32.

Polybios begins with stating his belief that comparison of “the arms and the tactical systems” of the Macedonians and the Romans were a “useful and worthy task” to answer questions as to why the Romans won their wars against the Macedonian monarchy and promises to do so by “reference to actual facts.” This promise after having read 18 books of the “Universal History” arouses severe suspicions: Does Polybios confess to have constantly fooled his reader so far whenever he referred to military matters or is he rather now going to cloak dubious propositions?

Anyway his comparison is irrelevant. King Philipp V. in his war against the republic of Rome had isolated himself beyond any help and was overpowered numerically. The states of the East naturally had the strongest interest to prevent an intervention from the West, yet Philipp’s predatory behavior drove them into the opposite camp. The Republic sent an army (including elephants from Africa) which alone matched the entire Macedonian war effort, further a fleet which quickly dominated the sea and gathered numerous allies who attacked Macedonia from all directions. If King Philipp would have won the engagement at Kynoskephalai there still would have been little chance for him to win the war as he had 30 000 men, while his opponents represented 300 000 men and more.

The “true cause” therefore is: Stronger forces win wars. There are not “many who are at a loss to account” for this and those who are certainly won’t find any assistance in Polybios’ reasoning. For he chooses first to invent a hypothetical arrangement of useless warriors and afterwards to compare them unfavorable to others. As for “arms” he claims that Macedonian “phalangites” carried pikes 21 feet long and further that this length “earlier” had been even 24 feet.

“Many considerations may easily convince us that” this length for a spear is pure fiction. The longest pikes, as Theophrast has it, were 18 feet. And these were not used by one man in the field but rather by a team behind a wall or aboard a ship. With increasing length the shaft bends and the head becomes difficult to rule. One man cannot hold a pike of 6,3 meters length (~ eight kgs) horizontally over a longer period of time if the hold allowed only for one meter as counterweight even if this end is imagined as a heavy bronze button.

Yet even this one meter of counterweight is a serious trouble to Polybios formation. His ranks allow for one meter only, so practically each man of the second to the sixth row would have had to tolerate the protruding last meter of his foreman’s pike between his body and arms! If the pikes were to be raised at the back end for a downward thrust this could have happened only in a most concerted move of the first six ranks. No loosening was possible as only this tight arrangement allowed for the five pikes to protrude in front of the first rank!

“With this point in mind it will not be difficult to imagine” jointly use of as many weapons as possible as the purpose of this arrangement. But Polybios’ idea allows for no wall of bristling spearheads as he himself fancies and actually contradicts this purpose as the Roman legionary would initially have met but two inert pikes bent like a sausage towards him while the next pair still were three feet away. Time enough to grab them, bring them down and break them. Even the believers therefore more or less corrected Polybios, Arrian for example requests spears of different lengths and many others generally shorter pikes.

Yet even if the bristling wall were to have been accomplished in one or another way the whole formation certainly would have had to utilize small shields. These Polybios omits in his reasoning besides citing Homer (2. 13. 131: As a favor to him “σάκος” there is translated as “buckler” which certainly is not the meaning). Anyway a “phalanx” vulnerable to missiles is a contradiction in itself and would have been shot down without actual fighting. It “therefore may readily be understood” as inferior not only to a Roman army or to a citizen hoplite force from the -5^th century, but even to a horde of stone-throwing apes.

As for “tactics” Polybios argues around the three grades of density. There were the deep, close and very close order with theoretically six feet, three feet and one “cubit” per file. Polybios does not mention the “synaspismos” in his fantasy because this would have reminded his reader where the long spears truly had been in use. Instead he declares the “pyknosis” as the Macedonian and the “bathos” as the Roman manner of deployment for battle. And feeling himself asked how such an extraordinary tactical difference could so far have escaped public notice he does not hesitate to claim that Roman sword fighting would have needed double the space per man than Macedonian spear fighting. Thus Polybios actually claims that the Roman force included no close order infantry at all. Finally his rear ranks who supposedly used their pikes to shield the front men from missiles would have done so more efficiently by the use of proper shields and are doctrinal fiction.

His argumentation concerning the terrain too is not convincing. Armies were restricted to the alluvial plains, the open terrain because of their size, not their armament. They could not feed themselves anywhere else and no Roman army ever “controlled the country” by hiding in mountainous woods while the Macedonians were waiting for them in a plain. Finally Polybios’ idea of scattering a massed enemy front line by attacking it in even more scattered detachments is not sound and contradicts the very idea of the close-order infantry.

My problem in dealing with obvious nonsense is that I tend to underestimate it. Polybios had many fans in antiquity as well as modernity. Indeed he has many fans today. It is difficult to explain what they marvel at. Polybios in the previous chapter presented a “phalanx” throwing their spears and three pages later declares enormous pikes to be fact. This simple contradiction leads to a simple conclusion and “no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying”: Polybios here intentionally invented nonsense and his whole undertaking is a highly rhetoric exercise. Why else would “referring to accomplished facts” need to convince and to appeal to imagination?

In reality the Macedonian as well as the Roman “phalanx” at Kynoskephalai alike fought with artillery and long spears, with heavy and light javelins. They both marched up in “bathos” formation, closed up into “pyknosis” formation for fighting and could further close up by indenting the “three men” per file of sixteen. These three had pikes of eight, nine and ten feet length respectively and produced the “synaspismos” where the heavy javelins of the first two ranks were supported by their three pikes to a joint action “if my description is true and exact” of five “sarisai” per file.

None of this was peculiar to either of the forces as military rivals do not arm according to “systems” but continuously copy each other while Polybios for his part “thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, ( ) as many will afterwards be at a loss to account” for it. This last sentence by the believers, foremost busy Livy, seldom is read at all and, if read, certainly not understood.

Why would Polybios invent such a system of useless tactics for the Macedonians? Because he did likely concerning other traditional enemies of Rome. The old world’s best weapon smiths, the Celts, are denigrated by him as having provided their warriors with poor swords that bent at the first blow (2.30/33) and the Carthagians are so faithless that they start killing each other in the battlefield (15. 13). He did likely, however, even in the description of Scipio’s deeds: In 11. 23 we are told that the Roman army had learned to move in “cohorts” and could now march up with the “legions” either in the center or at the wings, to outflank an enemy or else to meet his outflanking movement. In 15. 14. Polybios tells us something else. Here the “legions” are broken up and the combined “hastati”, “principes” and “triarii” form a front and reserve and operate independently.

This is another obvious contradiction and only one of these interpretations can be correct at the same time. The first of course is correct and the second a mere rhetorical exaggeration. Polybios was writing and published in Greek language, yet did not write for a Greek audience at all. His readers were the stubborn sons of the Roman “aristocracy”, who were totally indifferent to everything besides money and their exclusive social contest. These people learned Greek language to boast their superior education and to show off in rhetorical undertakings but cared little for contents. Could any of these be of significance in view of the majesty of Rome, after all? To these people Scipio was the guy who thoroughly got the “legions” into shape and they simply did not care for the terms used to make that clear. By reproducing their moronic stereotypes as “actual facts” Polybios reveals to have been a most regrettable victim of the “Stockholm syndrome”.

List of Literature:

Adams Colin, “Land Transport in Roman Egypt” Oxford Univ. Press 2007

Adcock F. E, “Greek and Macedonian Art of War” Berkeley & LA 1957, seen in: https://archive.org

Aelian, “Tactics” Pen & Sword Military 2012

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Footnotes

1 Arr. Tact. 1. 2

2 Justin 7. 4

3 Diod. 15. 61

4 Aesch. 2. 26 – 29

5 Beck, p. 130: The Koinon now had an „Archon“ instead of the „Tagos“. Diodor 15. 67. 3 says the cities were „liberated“ and Boiotian (democratic) interests recognized.

6 Definitly Pammenes, he was the one with money.

7 Diod. 15. 77

8 Schäfer 2, 16

9 Diod. 15. 80

10 Heskel, p. 35

11 IG II² 116, Beck. p. 194

12 Diodor 16. 2, Polyaen 4. 10. 1

13 Diod. 16. 2, Pausan. 8. 7. 4, Justin 9. 8

14 Neither would have Pausanias asked Berisades for help nor would have Philipp seen a necessity to bribe him.

15 Theop. Fr. 34, Diod. 16. 23, Philipp in return renounced his claim to Amphipolis.

16 D. 23. 8

17 Justin 7. 6, Theopomp. Fr. 33

18 Theop. Fr. 165, 271, Schol. zu D. 2. 17

19 Diod. 16. 4

20 Beck, p. 157

21 Diod. 16. 4 and 8, Justin 7. 6. 7, Front. Strat. 2. 3. 2

22 Pierre O. Juhel p. 579 – 612 objects to the use of the word district, so “strategia” (Diod. 17. 57. 2) may be read instead.

23 D. 23. 111

24 Polyaen 4. 2. 11

25 As Alexander II. had done

26 Diodor 16. 14

27 Diodor 16. 69: Diodor’s last lines here belong to -357. He clearly was in compiling troubles.

28 Diod. 16. 14. Justin 7. 6 imply this to have happened in -358, which is unlikely as the army would have been needed in Dassarethia after the victory. Late -357 or even later is unlikely as the new started war against Athens would no longer have allowed for interventions in Thessaly.

29 Polyaen 4. 2. 18

30 Thessalian knights being expert therein it was considered difficult to impress them in the matter.

31 D. 8. 357

32 Diod. 16. 8

33 D. 2. 6, Schol. 23. 116, D. 7. 27, Libanius 4. 9 R

34 Amphipolis call for help was ignored: Theop. Fr. 47, D. 3. 4-6, Diod. 16. 8

35 D. 23. 173

36 IG II² 127

37 Anthemus was ceded to the league and Potidaia promised: D. 23. 108, D. 2. 14, Liban. Einleitung zu Ol. This was enough for Olynth to give up Grabos and let him shift to Athens.

38 D. 23. 10

39 D. 23. 107

40 D. 23. 154

41 Diod. 16. 8, D. 20. 63, D. 1. 5, Schol. 9, Liban. 4, 21, Aristid. 38: Pydna fell easy, being populated by Macedonians and without garrison or cleruchs. In the light of Philipp’s general policy with Athens reports of a slaughter of the inhabitants should be considered Athenian propaganda. It must be admitted, however, that Pydna then was rebuilt more afar from the sea.

42 The „Sarnusians“ in Polyaen 4. 2. 12. see Stephen of Byzanz, Sarnusia in Illyria.

43 D. 4. 35: Athens sent 20 triremes in support, albeit they arrived too late.

44 D. 23. 107

45 Theop. Fr 45

46 Stephen of Byzanz, Philippoi: „Krenides asked Philipp for help.“

47 He had to defend Thrace against Triballians, Macedonians, Getai and himself against his rival kings. He was in check from every direction.

48 Strabo 5. 3. 27, Stephen of Byzanz „Alkomenai“

49 Arr. Ind. 18. 6. mentions a Macedonian from Alkomenai.

50 Strabo 7. 7. 9

51 King, p. 9

52 Diod. 18. 12

53 SEG. 43. 434 is in Doric Greek from the -4^th century and found in Macedonia.

54 Nawotka p. 395

55 SEG 47, 999

56 Curtius 6. 8. 25

57 Callisthenes in Arr. Anab. 4. 11. 6

58 Dial. Mort. 14

59 This tribe from present Prilep had allied with Philipp to dethrone the traditional Pelagonian royal house (IG II² 191). The later Roman revival of the name „Pelagonia“ seems to have been a conscious act to delegitimize Macedonian power in the region.

60 This name is given by an Antigonid later.

61 This I place in the Bregalnica valley as Thuk. 2. 98 explains: Sitalces crossed Mount Kercine and had the land of the Paionians on the right, the land of the Sinti to the left. That is he stood in the land of the Dentheletai then. The Kercine mountains were opposite to the Orbelos and therefore mean both the Osogowo mountains (Ruen, 2251 m) and the Malesevo mountains (Lisek, 1754 m). In between at present Logodazh (628 m) the Thracian army invaded Paionia on a way Sitalces had prepared earlier. From Herakleia Sintike the way to Macedonia is south to Edonia, not up the Strumitza valley (which way at that includes no „crossing“ of a mountain).

62 This naturally is opposed by those who seek to prove the identity of „Macedonia“ with the present Greek province.

63 Schäfer III, 103

64 IG II² 130, Athens in vain sent 20 triremes in support

65 D. 23. 183, the speech belongs to -352

66 Tomaschek p. 72

67 IG II² 130

68 Strabo 7, Fragments 35, 36

69 Stephen of Byzanz offers „Paroreia“ as Macedonian settlement near the Thracian border.

70 Polyaen 4. 2. 16

71 IG X, Hatz. Mac. Inst. 6: Thracians got rights to do so by Philipp II.

72 Diod. 16. 22

73 Polyaen 4. 2. 15, here the king lost one eye.

74 D. 4. 35

75 D. 7. 16, D. 6. 12

76 Diod. 16, 69. 8

77 This shows that king Philipp’s position at the upper Strymon was beyond the strategic horizon of the Athenians (as well as of some later commentators). The king „vanished“ from their range into unknown lands. His appearence in the Propontis in the next year was a painful surprise to them.

78 D. 23. 109, D. 3. 7, Libanios, Hypoth zu D. 3. 7 , explains that Philipp’s treaty excluded any separate agreements of peace.

79 Justin 8. 3 explains that the brothers asked for arbitration only because Philipp stood armed at their borders.

80 D. 3 is from -348. D. 3. 4. reads: three years ago that Philipp besieged Heraion, four years ago that the Athenians feared for that to happen.

81 Justin 8. 5. 7 -13, D. 4. 48. Yet the Adriatic coast was not included. Isoc. 5. 21 (in -346): „ (Philipp dominates) most of the Illyrians, save those who dwell along the Adriatic.“ King Philipp never intended to establish a Macedonian fleet there and consequently avoided the coastline. The cities were later named Antigoneia and Antipatreia. A third settlement along the later „via Egnatia“ is likely.

82 Plut. Phok. 12-14, Aesch. 3. 86- 88, D. 5. 5, D. 21. 132, 161

83 Beloch II, p. 502

84 Fgr. Hist. 2 115 Fr. 173, 175

85 So there were two naval operations concerning Maroneia. In -355 Philipp had no ships and sneaked in, in -347 his army and navy made Maroneia an ally, albeit Philipp was not present.

86 Athen. 12. 43

87 Diod. 16. 58

88 D. 19. 156, 334

89 Aesch. 2. 82, 90, 3. 82, D. 9.15

90 Aesch. 2. 156

91 D. 12. 5

92 D. 4. 34

93 D. 7. 2

94 Arist. Economics 2, 1350 b

95 Polyb. 30. 31. 2: 167 “talents” as custom duties in -160. The shipped goods were then worth 4 166 “talents”.

96 Carrara, p. 457

97 Livy. 45. 18. 3: Locationes praediorumque rusticorum

98 This was exported not only for fleet building but also as fire-wood (SEG. 43. 488)

99 Liv. 45. 29. 11

100 Diod. 16. 8. 6-7

101 Diod. 3. 12-17

102 Polyb. 34. 9

103 Livy 45. 18. 3: “metalli quoque Macedonici quod ingens vectigal erat”

104 Hultsch p. 240 ff

105 Plut. Pelop. 28. 3

106 Thuc. 2. 97

107 D. 19. 89

108 I’d like to suggest 767 “talents” per year for this force: 320 “talents” for “sithos” and 447 for “misthos”. See chapter 4 and 8

109 The claimant in the appellation was a woman.

110 Arr. Ind. 18. 3

111 D. 9. 26: „to govern them not only by cities, but also by tribes.”

112 D. 9. 34

113 IG II² 226

114 Diod. 16. 71

115 Schönert-Geiß, p. 451: Philipp conquered Teres III. in -347, yet Maroneia still produced coins for him until -341.

116 D. 8. 14: reinforcements from Macedonia and even Thessaly are sent to eastern Thrace.

117 D. 8. 35

118 Theop. Fr. 244, Satyros Fgr. Hist. 3. 161 F5= Athen. 13. 557d

119 D. 11. 1

120 Arr. Anab. 7. 9. 3

121 Who too had had to deal with the autonomy of the Rhodope mountains.

122 Plut. Alex. 9. 1: I count this city as a foundation of Alexander III.

123 D. 8. 44

124 2 cities in Thessaly, 4 in Illyria/Lyncestis, 5 in Deuriopis, 6 in Macedonian Paionia, 3 in Edonia give 20 cities there.

125 Justin 9. 2. 1: Their port duties then most likely fell to the Macedonian king.

126 Diod. 16. 77, Philochorus Fr. 135

127 Theop. Fr. 46, Strabo 9. 4. 27

128 Curtius 8. 1. 25

129 Polyb. 9. 28. 6, Paus. 3. 24. 6

130 Plut. Alex. 10. 1

131 Fgr. Hist. 115 F 27

132 Justin 9. 8. 17

133 Perhaps these two are identical and there was no pretender then presumably 60 years old.

134, Curtius 8. 5. 6, Aelian 14. 49

135 Plut. Mor. 14 b: Eurydike is pleased to have learnt the letters as a grown up.

136 Athen. Deipn. 14, 614 e

137 Plut. Moralia 178 B

138 Fgr. Hist. 2, 115 Fr. 244: Theopomp accuses Philipp II. downright to have habitually squandered his money.

139 The “hoplite” himself had to sustain his attendant, not everybody would have had one. But see also Thuk. Hist. 4. 3. 22: here the state organizes the “psiloi”.

140 Xen. Const. Lac. 11. 2: “͑αμάξα”, see also David Picker-Kille, “Carro cura carere” p. 2 ff.

141 Yet see Polyaen 2. 17 “…and some horses which, though too old for service, were still used to pull the baggage.”

142 Xen. Anab. 7. 5. 4: “Mules and horses are precious and to be maintained.”

143 Ibid. 2. 1. 6: “whereas oxen and asses are to be slaughtered.”

144 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 22, the smallest administrative unit there has six fighters.

145 Again Xen. Const. Lac. 11. 2

146 Delbrück, G. d. K. Vol. 4. p. 86

147 For comparison: “quia plaustra et currus frumentum, ordeum carnesque ferentes ad edendum, supra duo milia amiserant”: Albertus Aquensis in S. Runciman, “Hist.of Crusades”, p. 125

148 v. Smola, p. 232

149 See Patzdera: “Getreide für Griechenland” , see also Plut. Antony 69.

150 See Whittaker “Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity”

151 Isoc. 4. 167: “compelled many through want of daily bread to serve as mercenaries.”

152 Diod. 14. 37. 1: “τινές μὲν είς τὰς πατρίδας ἀπηλλάγησαν, ὁι δὲ πλε͂ιστοι στρατιοτικόν ἐιθισμένοι ζῆν βίον, ( ) στρατηγόν αύτων ἔιλαντο…”

153 Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 14

154 See Stangl, “Antike Populationen in Zahlen” and Ober, “Das antike Griechenland”

155 Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 15: “For he makes as good use of day as of night and when he is in haste, he takes breakfast and dinner in one and goes on with his labors.”

156 Polyaen. 3. 9. 35

157 Xen. Const. Lac. 12. 5

158 Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 6

159 Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 5

160 Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 11

161 Inscription on coins from Malta, Simmel, “Philosophie des Geldes”, p. 149

162 Polyaen 4. 11

163 Polyb. Hist. 11. 13

164 Polyaen 4. 10. 2

165 Diod. 15. 44. 2

166 90 cm diameter: “The shield is carried for the sake of the whole line” says Demaratos of Sparta. See Anderson p.15, p.112

167 “τ͠ου τε σκέπειν ἱκαν͠ως τὰ σώματα κὰι τ͠ου δύνασθαι τ͠ους χρωμένους τ͠αις πέλταις δὶα τὴν κουφότητα παντελ͠ως ἐυκινήτους ὑπάρχειν.”

168 Preller. L. “Zu Aristoteles Politeia der Thessaler/ Anonym. Schol. Eurip. 307” p. 138: “πέλτε ἀσπίς ἐστίν ἴτυν οὺκ ἒχουσα, ἐπιχάλκους ἐσκυτωμένας – the “pelta” is an “aspis” without rim and encovered in bronze.”

169 Rüstov & Köchly “Griechisches Kriegswesen” p. 238

170 Ibid. p. 16

171 Diod. 14. 16. 5, Liv. 4. 59. 11

172 Rüstov & Köchly “Griechisches Kriegswesen”, p. 14

173 Which too became regulated: “Iphicratids” was the name of the standard issue boot, Diod. 15. 44. 2

174 Strabo, Geographica, 10. 1. 12 (an interpolator unknown, but most eminent through his statement”)

175 For Homeric times see Latacz p. 209 or Strabo 10. 1. 13, for the seventh to six century the vase from Chigi and others.

176 Rotating an “akontion” into a target 30 meters away had to be practiced every day from childhood to be effective. Wealthy citizens simply lacked the discipline.

177 Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 15: “κα͊ι δόρατα ἀφίεντες – the “dory” is thrown”. See also 3. 5. 20 and 4. 6. 11.

178 Arist. Const. Athen. 42. 3: “hoplites” use the javelin.

179 Xenophon in the Cyropaidia has his infantry exclusively fighting with swords. The possibilities and limits of spear-throwing in formation, however, are yet to be determined. See Plutarch Sulla 18. 6: “ἅι τὲ βελοσφενδόναι κὰι ὁι γρόσφοι χρωμένων ἀφειδῶς τῶν κατόπιν Ρωμάιων – the projectiles and the javelins which the Romans from the rear ranks plied unsparingly”. See also Goldsworthy p. 198 and: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cuSXx94YlOo

180 Dio. v. Hal. “Antiquitates Romanae”, 14. 9. 2

181 Anaximenes Fr. Gr. Hist. 2. 72. F4

182 Nepos Iph. 1

183 See Pritchett, Vol. III, p. 117

184 Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 12

185 Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 8 – 9

186 Diod. 16. 24. 2

187 The more psychologic benefit of this weapon use is affirmed by the fact that Osmanic close-order infantry did not fall back to it.

188 No positive explanation of Iphikrates’ reform is possible if they are taken literally. Compare Ueda Sarson, J. G. P. Best, Hans Delbrück and countless others. Nepos said: “pelta pro parma fecerunt”. The warrior he thought of might have been an “akontist” and his weapon then would have been lengthened to the heavy javelin (see Grote, Vol. 9, p. 161)

189 Arr. Tact. 3. 1 – 5

190 Asclep. 1. 2

191 Aelian 2. 17

192 Plut. Aem. 19. 1

193 e. g. Polyb. 3. 93. “The burning Faggots”

194 Polyb. 4. 64: “The peltasts crossed the river in close-order, shields interlocked. The Aetolian cavalry charged, but made no impression on it, standing as it did in close-order.” see also 5. 23, where the “peltasts” are explicitly defined as “heavy-armed”.

195 Recognized by H. W. Parke

196 Arr. Tact. 3. 4: “κα͊ι τὰ ἀκόντια τ͠ων δοράτων κα͊ι σαρισ͠ων λειπόμενα- βαρύτερον δέ τ͠ου ψιλ͠ου.”…shorter than the long-spear, yet heavier than the javelin.

197 Recognized by Ch. D. Hamilton, “From Archidamus to Alexander”, p. 6, also by Grote, Vol. 9, p. 162

198 Polyb. 5. 23: the “peltasts” first form a reserve for the light-armed, then a cover ,“βαρέα ὅπλα”, for the rest of the phalanx.

199 Xen. Hell. 4. 6. 11: Akontists retreat on to a hill and “on the summit were the hoplites with most of the peltasts, and there they stood firm.”

200 Diod. 15. 44. 3

201 Dio. v. Hal. 20. 11. 2

202 Plut. Aem. 20. 2

203 Polyaen. 2. 29

204 31. 39. 10, 32. 17. 12, 37. 42. 4, 36. 18. 7

205 Polyb. 18. 28 ff

206 See the Addendum at the end of this work. For now two hundred years the commentators claim to acknowledge that such a force were indivisible and its mere parts defenseless, yet no one was actually able to reconcile this with the sources: Bauer p. 438, Droysen (Heerwesen) p. 119, Jähns p. 135, Kromaier-Veith p. 114/136, Rüstov-Köchly p. 251.

207 Grimmelshausen, “Der seltzame Springinsfeld”, Chap. 13: “..viel scharfe Occasionen gesehen aber selten wahrgenommen, dass ein Piquenier jemanden umgebracht hätte.”

208 Polybios 18. 24. 8

209 Preller L. “Zu Aristoteles Politeia der Thessaler”, p. 138, see also Liampi, p. 16

210 Diod. 17. 11. 3

211 Ibid. 17. 11. 4

212 Ibid. 17. 12. 1

213 See also Asclepiodotus 5. 1, who emphasizes, that the long spear was invincible in very close order.

214 Sulla 18. 4. The engagement Plutarch describes took place in the -first century, at a time when the Roman army had abandoned the long spears. His wording, however, is most accurate.

215 For the Roman army see below chapter 5 and for the Macedonians Arr. Anab. 1. 6. 8., for Athens IG II² 1422/9: “two boxes of catapult bolts” in -371.

216 Plut. Mor. 219 A: Archidamos promptly laments that war “from now on” is no fun anymore.

217 Polyb. 11. 12: The battle of Mantinea

218 Diod. 16. 3. 2

219 Arr. Anab. 1. 1. 9

220 Curtius 5. 2. 20

221 Arr. Anab. 1. 21 ff

222 Ibid. 5. 17. 6

223 Ibid. 3. 26. 6

224 Plut. Eum. 14. 5

225 Curtius 9. 7. 19 f

226 Diodor 17. 100

227 9. 19. 7

228 Theophrast. Historia Plantarum 3. 12. 1 – 2

229 Used as: “ξυστὰ μακρὰ ναύμαχα κολλήεντα” in marine fighting.

230 “sarisa genus teli Macedonici”, Dionisotti p. 280. “σαρίσα ἀκόντιον μακεδόνικον”, Anselm of Laon. “pilum proprie hasta Romanorum, spiculum quoque dictum, ut gaisum Gallorum, sarisa Macedonum, framea Germanorum”, Servius Grammatarius in Ausonius, p. 402

231 As most unlucky example for the opposite opinion I cite Markle, p. 483-497 and p. 323 – 339

232 Grattius Cynegeticon 117 – 120

233 Javelins (lonchos, palteon, akontion, jaculum, verutum, hasta velitaris, grosphos) were three to five feet, spears (dory, hasta, sarisa, kontos, pilum) five feet seven inches to seven feet in length. Everything exceeding this was a “makron dory, hasta, kontos or sarisa”; a long spear.

234 Anaximenes F. Gr. Hist. 72 F4: “συνεθίσας ἱππεύειν”

235 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 38

236 Diod. 15. 61. 4

237 Ibid. 16. 2. 4

238 To this time belongs the fragment of Theopomp (BNJ 115 F 348) which describes them as “epilektoi”.

239 Diod. 15. 13. 2

240 Arr. Anab. 1. 5. 12

241 Thuk. Hist. 4. 124

242 Diod. 16. 3. 6 There were no exiled Macedonians. These were the mercenaries, presumably three quarters of the total.

243 Arr. Anab. 2. 4. 3: “πεζετάιροι βαρύτερον ὁπλισμένοι ἤσαν”, the “pezhetairoi” were the heavier warriors.

244 Also Polyaen 4. 2. 18: Phillipp II used mercenaries.

245 Recognized by Milns p. 46

246 Justin 8. 5

247 Justin 8. 6

248 Elimiotis, Orestis/Lynkestis and Thymphaia are attested. Deuriopis around Styberra, Alkomenai, Stenae and Stobi is likely, Geugela (= “Leugea”) at the upper Axios around Bylazora, Doberos, Astibos and Astraion a possibility. In the east Edonia around Amphipolis and Philippi, Anthemus, (new) Bottia, and Apollonia in Chalkidike are attested. The Amphaxitis and Mygdonia around Therma and Apollonia seem likely. Finally Pieria around Pydna and Dium give 12 districts and leave Almopia, Eordaia and the old Bottia as “Emathe” for the guard. For Perrhibaea in the south compare Strabo 9. 5. 19 and Theopomp BNJ 115 F-81

249 Arr. Anab. 7. 9. 2: “He (Philipp) made you colonists of cities from being slaves and subjects.”

250 Diodor stating Philipp “invented the phalanx” means this social revolution. The “phalanx” is depicted on an Sumerian carving dating to the -third millennium.

251 Frontin. 4. 1. 6

252 Arr. Tact. 5. 5

253 Ibid. 6. 1

254 Tactica 8. 4

255 Aristoteles Pol. 6. 5

256 Xen. Hell. 4. 2. 18

257 Ibid. 3. 2. 16, 6. 4. 12 und Thuk. 5. 68

258 Arr. Anab. 4. 22. 10

259 e. g. “Mitarbeiterführung”, Uwe Schirmer/Sabine Woydt, p. 116

260 e. g. Secunda, Army of Alexander the Great, p. 25

261 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 25

262 Xen. Const. Lac. 11. 4

263 Arr. Anab. 1. 6. 1: He states the phalanx to be 120 deep, presumably in single file.

264 The uneven number of files in the “lochos” is uncomfortable and suggests their being marched up in pairs as “syntagma” of 256 men together with their field-piece and their officers.

265 Asclep. 7. 2 – 3, 6 – 7

266 Delbrück, G. d. K. Vol. 3 p. 347

267 Polyb. 4. 8

268 Athen. 6. 77. p 260 D-61A = Fgr. Hist. II 115 F 225 B

269 Diod. 17. 17. 4

270 Recognized by Berve, p. 106

271 Arr. Anab. 2. 9. 3: “δύο ἴλας τ͠ων ἑταίρων”( ) ἔπι τὸ δεξιόν ἀφαν͠ως παρελθε͠ιν. 2. 9. 4: ἐκείνοις δὲ ἰππίας τριακόσιους ἐπιτάξαι ἐξήρκεσεν.” W. W. Tarn p. 158f: “the horses in the angle could only be mercenaries. Berve’s number vanishes if one just reads Arrian. I can now get on with what matters…” is an astonishing refusal of apperception.

272 Plut. Alex. 16. 2: gives 13 Macedonian “ilai” at the Granikos. The “Ila Basilikos”, eight “Companion ilai” and four “ilai” of “Sarisophoroi”.

273 “Amphipolis code”, IG 10 Hatzopoulos

274 Polyb. 6. 35

275 Arr. Tact. 40. 4

276 Alexander wields his lance there with one hand

277 Plut. Alex. 32. 7

278 Plutarch Alex. 16: 13 (Macedonian) “ilai” at the Granikos.

279 The figures of 200 (Tarn, p. 161) or even 250 per “ila” have no foundation in reality: Arr. Anab. 1. 18. 1 and 4. 17. 3 give numbers of men because this would not match a unit’s size.

280 Fgr. Hist. 115 F 224: “Ὁι ετ͠αιροι ἀυτ͠ου ἐκ πολλ͠ων τόπων ἦσαν συνερρυηκότες. Ὁι μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀυτ͠ης χώρας, ὁι δὲ ἐκ Θετταλίας, ὁι δὲ ἐκ τ͠ης ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος.”

281 AT Sam. II. 20. 23

282 Frontin. 4. 7. 27

283 Arr. Anab. 1. 6. 6

284 See Polyaen 4. 2. 16

285 A very high number. Langaros presumably also recruited from his neighbours.

286 Dimitar p. 19: “Philipp II. brachte alle thrakischen Stämme südlich des Balkans unter seine Herrschaft.”

287 Strabon 14. 1. 23, see also: IosPe² 196: Anaxagoras son of Demagoros shot 521 meters with his bow.

288 Arr. Anab. 1. 26. 1

289 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 6. 36

290 See also Polyb. 10. 29 .4

291 Vegez. Epit. 2. 25. 5

292 Arr. Anab. 4. 24. 10

293 I. Bekker, Anectota Graeca I. p. 297: ”ὁ ἄρχων τῆς πεντεκοστῆς τ͠ου τέλους κὰι τῶν πεντεκοστῶν”

294 Polyaen 4. 2. 10

295 Krohmaier-Veith, p. 331

296 See Hultsch

297 Polyb. 6. 39: The surplus “choinix” were a security policy of the Roman army.

298 Foxhall, p. 56

299 Xen. Anab. 7. 1. 37

300 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 31

301 Roth, p. 43

302 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 26: “Cyrus advocates gradual break-up with the wine drinking habit”

303 Engels D. W., first claims that Macedonians could carry more than other men (80 lbs.= 36 kg) and afterwards reasons why they should have used carriages. p. 21

304 Adams, p. 14

305 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 31: “If we again come into land, where there is grain, we must then have hand-mills ready.”

306 BJ 3. 5. 5

307 Further reading in: Olivier Buchsenschutz, Stephanie Lepareux- Couturier, Gilles Fronteau, “Les meules du Neolithique à l’èpoque mèdièvale.

308 See also Plut. Mor. 177A, 790b.

309 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 33: “ ἅρμασι κὰι ἁμάξαις” …small and large carriages.

310 ὑποζύγια: Arr. Anab: 1. 5. 9-10, 3. 17. 5., 3. 19. 3, 6. 22. 4, 6. 25. 5 Curtius, “jumenta”: 3. 13. 16, 5. 6. 9, 8. 4. 19, 9. 10. 12-22

311 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 1. 54: on a plain ground only (!)

312 Hayen, p. 448 ff. gives carrying capacities up to 1 100 kg.

313 Furger-Gunti, p. 220 reports a rebuilt “essedum” to weigh 100 kg and carry up to 250 kg.

314 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 33

315 Ibid. 6. 2. 34: “mechanics” indispensable for service of vehicles…

316 Ibid. 6. 2. 32

317 Ibid 6. 2. 25

318 Rüstov und Köchly, “Kriegswesen” p. 263

319 Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 30

320 NT, Apokalypsis 6. 6

321 Engels, p. 14

322 Xen. Cyrop. 3. 2. 11: “τεκτονές”

323 Ibid: “λιθομόι”

324 Polyb. Hist. 10. 29: “λειτουργο͂ι”

325 Curtius 7. 1. 34: Amyntas, son of Andromedes, brought ten horses from Macedonia to central Asia.

326 Arr. Anab. 7. 11. 3: …κὰι πεζέταιροι Πέρσαι κὰι ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι. – Persian “pezhetairoi” with their “asthetairoi”. Other cited passages ( 2. 23. 2, 4. 23. 1, 5. 22. 6, 6. 6. 1, 6. 21. 3) do not contain the word. Even if the writing is unsure in all of these lines “pezhetairoi” are meant.

327 Arr. Anab. 1. 13. 1

328 Ibid. 3. 19. 3

329 See Diod. 17. 94. 4

330 Flav. Jos. BJ 3. 4. 2

331 Former prisoners of war from Greek coastal cities transferred to king Philipp’s new settlements.

332 Xen. Cyrop. 3. 1. 42

333 Welwei, “Unfreie im Kriegsdienst”

334 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 31

335 AT 2 Macc. 8. 21: “the hypotaxis he gave to the pentakosiarchs and to Eleazar.”

336 Diod. 19. 29. 2

337 Xen. Cav. Com. 4. 1: “that he may rest the horse’s backs and relieve the men by walking.”

338 Polybios 6. 39

339 Engels, p. 145 gives 10 lb.

340 Junkelmann, Vol. 2, p.111

341 Even without a shield; Plut. Philop. 6: The rider’s breast plate is heavier than the infantry’s, see also Thuk. Hist. 2. 100

342 Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 13: “For the baggage animals and the captives, numerous as they were, slowed the march down and the large number of men being charged with them fell out of the fighting line; besides, with so many people to feed it was necessary to procure and carry twice as many provisions…”

343 Plut. Alex. 68. 4

344 Diod. 17. 94. 4

345 Ibid. 17. 109. 2

346 Polyaen. 3. 9. 51

347 Ibid. 4. 2. 6 where the king by persuasion succeeds to put off his mercenaries, being clamorous for their pay…

348 Ibid. 4. 7

349 Tänzer p. 49

350 Aristot. Oec. 2, 1350 b

351 Dem. 4. 28

352 Aristot. Oec. 2 1351 B , Polyb. 6. 39. 13

353 Diod. 17. 95

354 Arr. Anab. 6. 27. 16

355 Diod. 17. 74

356 Arist. Oec. 2 1350B

357 Diod. 16. 3: “He (Philipp) equipped the the men suitably with weapons of war.”

358 Arr. Anab. 7. 9. 2: “He gave the chlamys instead of hides”

359 Diod. 19. 20: “and by giving horses and pack animals as presents, he gained the goodwill of the men.”

360 Plut. Alex. 6. 1: 13 “talents” for Bukephalos is to be corrected into 13 “minai”. Also 61. 1: Bucephalos was not 30 years of age when he died, his master was! Bucephalos then was about 16 years old.

361 Kroll “An archive of the Athenian cavalry”, p. 83 – 140.

362 Pouilloux, pp. 371 – 380

363 Military regulations Philipp V. got carved onto a rock, fragmentary. IG 10 Hatz. 11-15

364 Byzant. Anonymus 16. 4: “Armor is not to be worn directly on the dress. A “himation” of one “dactylos” strength is to be worn in between so the body does not get hurt by the armor.”

365 Aristophanes, “Peace” 1225, 1240, 1250: “θώρηκος δεκαμνῳ”, ten minai armor, one mina helmet and 60 drachma trumpet either are exaggerated or else give prices for high-level works.

366 “Opferwesen der Karthager”, p. 84

367 Boeckh, Vol I, p. 93 (his prices belong to the -fifth century and are to be augmented accordingly)

368 ibid. p. 93

369 ibid. p. 86

370 Patzdera, p. 18, IG II² 360 line 30: 5 “drachmas” per “medimnos”. But also see D. 42. 20. 31: 18 “drachmas” per medimnos.

371 Boeckh, Vol I, p. 105

372 AT “Kings”, 1. 10. 29 or Aristophanes, “Clouds” 31, refer to battle- and racing chariots…

373 “Edict on Maximum Prices” ed. Antony Kropff

374 Hasen, p. 221

375 Aristot. Oec. 2 1351 B: “He requested to forgo 6 days of rations and pay ( ), as the days were “hollow days” in the calendar.”

376 The proverbial “τετρωβόλος βίος “

377 I(nscripito)G(raecorum) II² 329, 8-10

378 Higher figures indicate more horses/attendants to sustain. Hay, straw and the veterinarian certainly had a price.

379 Compare Menander Perikeiromene 380 G: “four-obol raw recruits” and “four drachma chiliarchos”.

380 Diod. 17. 64. 6, Curtius 9. 1. 6

381 Arr. Anab. 7. 9. 6: where “Alexander” asserts it.

382 Justin in Trogus 9. 1

383 Polyaen 4. 2. 3

384 See also: Athenaeus 557 b

385 Justin 12. 4

386 Polyb. Hist. 6. 37

387 Plut. Rom. 13, Dio. v. Hal. 2. 2. 4, and Varro “De Lingua Latina” V. §89

388 Varro de L. L. 5. 88: “manipulos exercitus minimas partes, quae unum sequuntur signum.” Also Fröhlich p. 21

389 Livius 1. 52: “..miscuit manipulos ex Latinis Romanisque, ut ex binis singulos faceret, binosque ex singulis” belongs here and not to Romulus’ time.

390 Ibid. 9. 30. 3

391 Ibid. 7. 5. 9

392 Livy. 8. 8

393 As assumed by Hans Delbrück, G. d. K., Vol 1, p. 335 ff

394 Cincius in Gellius 16. 4: “in legione sunt centuriae sextaginta, manipuli triginta.”

395 Delbrück, G. d. K. Vol. I, p. 335

396 The name probably derives from the fact, that they were three per file.

397 The specialized light troops to operate with the cavalry in the country were the “extraordinarii”, the “leves” stayed with the legion.

398 Livy 8. 8

399 Varro de L. L. 5. 88: “centuria, qui sub uno centurione sunt, quorum “centenarius” justus numerus.”

400 Surplus “light” centuries are known since the time of the kings, the “Clustuminians”, see Delbrück, (G. d. K.) Vol 1. p. 296

401 Polyb. 6. 20

402 Polyb. Hist. 6. 24. 5

403 Ibid. 6. 24. 8

404 e. g. 2. 3. 2 The Illyrians, or 15. 9. 9 “γροσφομάχων σπέιραις”

405 11. 23. 1

406 11. 33. 1

407 Ibid. 15. 4

408 Cato probably was somewhat proud of his scheme of half – “chiliarchies” that included the artillery in the number of the unit (“structa”) and knew that this had not been the case with King Philipps army.

409 Diodor 29. 6

410 Curt. 5. 3. 2

411 See also Diodor 17. 65: “reform in the mode of advancement”

412 Diodor 19. 28. 1: “more than 3 000 men.”

413 Arr. Anab. 4. 22. 1

414 Ibid. 4. 23

415 Ibid. 4. 24

416 Ibid. 3. 16. 11

417 The names are not related to the Macedonian aristocracy. Arrian Anab. 4. 30. 6 giving the title “chiliarches” to “strategoi” of the “hyaspists” should be a mistake, see also 7. 25. 6 where the “taxiarchs” enter the hall, whereas “chiliarchs” and “pentekosiarchs” wait in the courtyard.

418 Asclep. 2. 9

419 Xen. Anab. 6. 5. 10-11

420 Tzetzos Schol. Lyc. Alex. 216: “σπείρα αλλαχ͠ου τάξιν στρατιωτίκην”, p. 487

421 Plut. Philop. 9. 2

422 Strabo “Geography” 12. 3. 18

423 e. g. Arr. Contra Alan. 1. 1

424 AJ 17. 9. 3

425 AT Macc. 2. 8. 23, 12. 20

426 NT Mh. 27. 27, Joh. 18. 03/18. 12, Marcus 15. 16, Acts 10. 1, 21. 31 and 27. 1

427 IG 10 Hatzopoulos, 12

428 Curtius 5. 2. 6: “Also in the military discipline handed down by his predecessors Alexander made great changes of the greatest advantage”

429 Plut. Philop. 9. 2

430 Josephus AJ 17. 10. 7: of course talks of a Roman century when he nevertheless names it a “lochos”.

431 Arr. Anab. 3. 16. 15 even mentions the doubling of the “lochoi” for -331, albeit erroneously for the cavalry!

432 “σπείρα σύνταγμα δἱακοσίων ἀνδρῶν”, the “speira” has 200 men, reports a Byzantine dictionary (Zonaras Lex. p. 1664)

433 Diodor 17. 65: “to strenghten the forces by the number”

434 IG 10 Hatzopoulos 17: Philip V. calls Bilos son of Nikagoros a “lochagos”

435 Diod. 17. 94. 4: „επιφοράς ταγματικάς“

436 A number Arrian mentions for “Hypaspists” in 4. 23. 2

437 See Livy 37. 40: Antiochos’ phalanx consists of “merai” 1 600 strong.

438 Posidonios Histories 34; pres. in Athen. 4.153 b

439 Diodor 23. 2

440 Arr. Per. 8-11, Pos. 19 and 20

441 p. 158

442 Eining/Unterfeld in Germany is thought to have sheltered five cohorts. It covers 11 hectares.

443 Beside the above quoted lines from book 6 “speira” means “maniple” in 2. 30. 6, 3. 110. 6, 3. 113. 3, 3. 115. 12

444 Varro de L. L. 5. 16

445 Cicero ad. Att. 6. 1. 14: “cohortes quadringenarias”, also Livy 7. 7 and 10. 48

446 e. g. AJ 14. 15. 10

447 AJ 17. 9. 3

448 “Bevölkerung” p. 212

449 “Kings and Colonists” p. 9 – 11.

450 Arr. 1. 24. 2, Diodor 17. 49, Curt. 4. 6. 30

451 Arrian 1. 9. 1, those would be without lands. See further the table below.

452 Later Macedonian armies were never again that size; with Alexander they all wanted to participate in conquering “the world”.

453 Droysen, “Alexander des Großen Armee”, p. 226 – 252

454 Justin 9. 5: 32 000 infantry/4 500 riders, 182 ships
Arrian Anab. 1. 11: not much above 30 000 infantry/ more than 5 000 riders, 160 triremes and trading vessels.
Diodor 17. 17. 1: 12 000 infantry/1 500 riders in Europe, 30 000 infantry/4 500 riders in Asia, 60 ships “with the king”.
Callisthenes in Polyb. 12. 9: 40 000 infantry/4 500 riders.
Ptolemaios (Fr. 4): 30 000 infantry/5 000 riders.
Anaximenes (Fr. 15): 43 000 infantry/5 500 riders.
Aristoboulos (Fr. 1): 30000 infantry/4 000 riders.
Frontin 4. 2. 4: 40 000 men.
Plutarch Alex. 15: between 30 000 infantry/4 000 riders and 40 000 infantry/5 000 riders.

455 Polyaen 5. 44, Diodor 16. 91 adds that a “meros” of this force was Macedonian.

456 for Detail see: Maxim Kholod “The Macedonian Expeditionary Corps in Asia Minor”

457 Diodor 17. 9

458 Philodem’s “Academic’s index” col. 11; 33 – 37, 12; 38 – 41: “Korrhagos with 1 000 men in the Peloponnese.”

459 Demosthenes 9. 58: 1 000 mercenaries

460 Demosthenes de Halon. 32

461 From -338 to -336 (Plut. Arat. c. 23)

462 Demosthenes 19. 81

463 Jehne, p. 144 – 145

464 Hammond/Walbank Vol. 3 p. 25: “We infer then that the Macedonian fleet consisted of 22 “triremes” and 38 “tria-/pentekonters”.

465 5 000 in the above mentioned garrisons, 5 000 with the field army see below.

466 Justin 9. 5: The number tenfold is obvious nonsense.

467 Their combined cavalry in any case surmounted 1 500.

468 and Aitolia 5, Akarnania 2, Ambracia 1, Phokis 3, Lokris 3, Doris, Ötaia, Malis, Ainania, Agria and Dolopia 5, combined nesiots 8

469 As IG II² 236b already was amended by Marcus Niebuhr Tod (Tod II 177, StV III 403 lb, Syll³ 260b, HGIÜ II 256) all of this is highly hypothetical. He who does not like to follow here takes the 1 800 Thessalians from Diod. 17. 17. 3 and has to accept that they would have been accompanied by their light-armed.

470 Compare Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 21: four hoplites for one rider, 4 “drachmai” per day for the rider.

471 Recruiting rowers was much an international affair. The community sent a disciplined core only and fully manned their ships in other ports. 4 “obols” per man give the 600 “drachmai”.

472 Besides Attica, Salamis, Lemnos and Skyros also Samos was part of their territory. Arrian mentions that Alexander “kept” 20 triremes. This does not say there were only that number with the fleet. For one “ila” of knights see Plut. Phoc. 16. 5.

473 No less than 2 000 Pheraian riders left Thessaly with Lykophron II and fought for the Persians

474 Arr. Anab. 1. 18. 4

475 Only one with the invasion army is attested. The number is conjectured from the relative strength of the Paionians and Agrianians (and the fact that the Odrysians alone sent men for the war).

476 Diodor 17. 17. 5, compare to 18. 12. 2: In -323 Antipater has 13 000 infantry with 600 Macedonian knights.

477 consequently 4 000 with the fleet. See Callisthenes’ number of the initial strength.

478 Hist. 12. 19

479 Which would explain the insecurities even contemporaries had with the “initial” strength of Alexander’s army.

480 Arr. Anab. 1. 17. 7: The Argives remain as garrison in Sardes.

481 Anab. 1. 23. 6

482 Bosworth, “The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis War”, p. 27- 43

483 Anab. 1. 9. 1

484 Curt. 3. 7. 8. for Issos implies that there were Macedonian troops in Asia Minor not yet united with the field army.

485 Curt. 3. 9. 10

486 Diodor 17. 62. 5 claims that Memnon revolted against his king. This he probably did because no Thracian prince’s name is known.

487 Alexander s. o. Aeropos, the Lyncestian, was sent at the head of the Thessalians into the lands of Memnon the Rhodian to plunder it. He was not “strategos” in Thrace and Memnon in Thrace was a Macedonian without relationship to Artabazos or Mentor. If he perhaps was a son of Hegesander compare IG VII-IX, FD III 5: 58, 29-30; Hegesander a Macedonian in -331.

488 I presume Curtius 9. 3. 21 belongs to -332. In -325 Phrataphernes brought 500 Triballian “akontists” with 300 riders from Parthia to India (Arr. Anab. 5. 20. 7) and C. confused this much in the same way as at the Persian gates, where the “hippotoxotai” appear because the operation he describes (Crateros holding the enemy while the king makes a detour) is the same as at the Indus (C. 5. 4. 14).

489 Arr. Anab. 2. 20. 7

490 Arr. Anab. 3. 1. 5 Asklepiodor s. o. Eunicos then stayed in Syria and is mentioned again in 4. 7. 2 bringing troops to Bactria.

491 Arr. Anab. 2. 13. 5

492 Curt. 4. 5. 22

493 Curt. 3. 1. 19

494 Curt. 4. 8. 12: Partly with mercenary “hoplites” from the main land where Alexander then removed some city garrisons, as the danger for their governments had ceased to exist.

495 Justin 11. 11

496 Curtius 4. 8. 4, Arrian 3. 5. 1: 2 000 infantry as garrisons in Pelusion and Memphis from the field army. 4 000 infantry as regional amy and 1 000 were sent to Elephantine. Further 30 “triremes”and the above mentioned riders. Shipping them to Aegypt only to make them march back to Syria would have been a poor deploying decision and it then became difficult to understand where from Ptolemaios later obtained his Thracian cavalry unit. “Menidas s. o. Hegesander” perhaps is identical with Memnon. Antipater, however, could not have sent 4 000 Greek mercenaries as the garrisons in Europe were not to be touched while he himself had no such troops; and probably no money to employ them.

497 Arr. Anab. 2. 5. 8

498 Curtius 4. 1. 35

499 See note 478, Polyb. Hist. 12. 19

500 I suggest that Polybios deliberately composed two different passages from Callisthenes to ridicule his narration.

501 Which would leave him with 350 cavalry and 5 000 infantry in Phrygia.

502 Arr. Anab. 3. 12. 3

503 Arr. Anab. 4. 25. 6, Curt. 5. 3. 6

504 One “ila” each from Athens (Plut. Phoc. 16. 5) Elis, Achaia, Arcadia, Argolis, Boiotia, Akarnania, Aetolia, Malis and Phokis/Lokris combined.

505 Balacros as “somatophylax” is much more likely as a “strategos” in Cilicia than the “ila” commander Socrates, Curt. 4. 5. 9

506 Andromachos commanded “foreign mercenaries” from Asia Minor and Syria. The Greeks and Thracians landed in Cilicia and were given horses from the imperial studs there.

507 Arr. Anab. 3. 9. 6: “τ͠ων πεζ͠ων τὲν φάλλαγγα ἕκαστον τὲν ὁί ἐπιτετραμμένην” …the pedestrians stood each to its phalanx combined. See also 5. 12. 1

508 Diodor 17. 57

509 Arr. Anab. 3. 11

510 Curtius 4. 13. 26 ff

511 Tarn 1948, Adcock 1957, Brunt 1965, Milns 1966, Fuller 1968, Lock 1974, Anson 1981, Hamilton 1982, Atkinson 1987, Bosworth 1988, Heckel 1992, Ashley 2004, Lonsdale 2007, Gabriel 2010, Lane Fox 2010… this list is demonstrative.

512 Compare Arr. Anab. 4. 23/24: “Philipp and Balakros” not “Philipp son of Balakros”

513 Curtius 5. 1. 40

514 Curtius 6. 1. 16

515 See also Diodor 17. 65. 3

516 Curtius 5. 1. 43

517 Curtius 5. 2. 16

518 e. g. Arr. Anab. 1. 14. 1

519 Ibid. 3. 18. 5: the words give no proof for the tactical body “tetrarchy”

520 Curt. 5. 6. 11

521 Arr. Anab. 3. 19. 6.

522 Curt. 6. 6. 35

523 Curt. 10. 1. 43 belongs to -330.

524 Plutarch 47. 3, Justin 12. 25 mentioning this then is no proof, of course, yet readily fits in.

525 The “provinces” then were the western part: Asia Minor, Syria, probably Irak and with positive proof only Iran and Aegpt. Suidas (p. 539): “Βασίλειοι παίδες ἑξακισίλιοι ὁι τίνες κὰτα προστάξιν Ἀλεξάνδρου τ͠ου Μακεδόνος τὰ πολέμια ἐξήσκουν ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ – 6 000 paides were recruited by Alexander Macedon in Aegypt” (pub. by N. G. L. Hammond, 1996). In the East recruitment would have been initiated, of course, yet hardly can have had produced results until -324. In -322 no forces there can be called up against the revolting mercenaries.

526 Arrian 7. 6. 1: from the new-founded cities as well as from the “spear-won land”.

527 Diodor 17. 108. 2: “χρόνον ἱκανόν”

528 Plutarch Alex. 47. 1. These were the “Hypaspistes”, 7 Macedonian and one “taxis”of “xenoi”, 2 “chiliarchies” archers, one of “Agriani”, two of Thracians; the “Basilike Ile”, 11 “ilai” “Companions”, 4 “ilai” “Sarisophoroi” and 3 “ilai” mercenary riders under Erigiyos.

529 Seven “chiliarchies” of “xenoi”, one “ila” of “Companions”, 500 Greek mercenary riders under Andromachos, the Paionian “ila”, three Odrysian “ilai”, four Triballian “ilai”, 130 Thessalian volunteers, probably one “chiliarchy” of Thracian light-armed and the 3 500 Triballian foot.

530 Curtius 10. 1. 2 estimates the regional army as 5 000 with 1 000 cavalry.

531 Arr. Anab. 3. 27. 8: Hephaistion and Cleitos commanded each two “ilai” of the “agema”, the four “hipparchs” three “ilai” each.

532 Arr. Anab. 4. 4. 7

533 See also Ps. Callisthenes A’, 1, 26, 1

534 Curtius 5. 2. 6: the knights had to accept no longer to be replaced “κὰτα ἐθνή”(out of their tribes).

535 In -325 “three chiliarchies” = 2 400 fighters, Arr. Anab. 4. 24. 10

536 Arr. Ind. 19. 2

537 Arr. Anab. 4. 22. 1

538 These in Arr. Anab. 4. 4. 6. are mentioned a last time at the crossing of the river Polytimetos in Sogdiana, still four “ilai” strong.

539 Ibid. 6. 27. 6

540 Ibid. 4. 4. 6: “πρ͠ωτον μίαν ἱππαρχίαν τ͠ων ξένων”, the first “hipparchy” of foreigners.

541 Curt. 6. 6. 35, Arr. Anab. 3. 25. 2-5

542 Arr. Anab. 5. 20: “Phrataphernes brings the Thracians from Parthia.”

543 Curt. 6. 5. 10

544 Curt. 6. 6. 35: One “ila” of these stayed, the other joined the army; as I would like to understand.

545 Ibid. 3. 24. 1 They probably used the “ἀνκύλη” with their missiles.

546 Cyrop. 4. 2. 1: their contingent was 1 000 riders.

547 As one governor received 40 of them they possibly were also concerned with transmitting letters in the eastern provinces.

548 Curt. 7. 3. 4

549 Ibid. 5. 16. 5

550 Curt. 7. 10. 11-12, Arr. Anab. 4. 7: 4 000 each of Syrian and Lycian, 8 000 Greek and 4 000 other infantry with 500 each of Syrian and Lycian, 600 Greek and 1 000 other cavalry.

551 Curt. 7. 5. 27, Arr. Anab. 3. 29. 5

552 Arr. Anab. 4. 22. 4, Curtius 7. 9. 21: 1 500 infantry and 300 cavalry of mercenaries were killed at the Polytimetos.

553 Arr. Anab. 6. 22: One perhaps stayed in India, another in Oreitia.

554 Arr. Anab. 5. 20. 7, 6. 15. 12

555 Diod. 17. 95. 4, Curt. 8. 5

556 Justin 12. 7. 5

557 Diod. 19. 14. gives 1 000 infantry/610 riders for Arachosia, 1 200 infantry/700 riders for the Paropamisadae and 1500 infantry/1 000 riders combined for Areia, Drangdiane and Bactria a couple of years later.

558 P. Petr. 3. 21, P. Petr. 3. 54 and BGU 10. 1978 name cavalry officers with the title in the Ptolemaic army.

559 Arr. Anab. 7. 14. 10

560 Arr. Ind. 19, Curtius 8. 5. 4

561 Plut. Alex. 66. 2

562 Delbrück, G. d. K Vol. 1, p. 244

563 Curt. 9. 3. 21, Diodor 17. 95. 4: 7 000 Greek mercenary infantry came from Harpalos and Alexander had with him perhaps 6 000 from Bactria besides the “archaioi” mercenaries. I estimate three garrisons of 1 000 each. A reasonable guess for the regional army were 4 000 Syrians or Lycians and 4 000 Greek mercenary infantry from this surplus, 1 500 Triballians/ Thracians and one “ila” of Greek mercenary riders from the field army and 300 Triballian riders with 500 Triballian foot from Phrataphernes.

564 Engels, p. 117

565 Peithon around Pattala presumably kept 2 000 Greek mercenaries with the last 1 000 Thracians and perhaps two “ilai” of “Sarisophoroi”.

566 Diod. 18. 12: “more than 10 000” as the remaining Macedonian archers too were sent home.

567 Curt. 10. 2. 8

568 Arr. Anab. 7. 23

569 See Diodor 19. 14. where Peukestas has the same amount of men from Persia.

570 Diodor 17. 110. 2

571 e. g. Hogarth fell for this, p. 271

572 Arr. Anab. 7. 29. 4

573 Justin 12. 12. 3

574 Ibid. 7. 6. 3

575 Diod. 17. 59

576 Hist. 12. 19

577 Compare Antimenes in Arist. Oec. II

578 A ratio of one dead for four wounded is weak. It counts not those who hurt themselves but only those who had to be dismissed because of it.

579 Plut. Alex. 22. 2

580 18. 16. 4

581 Perieget 8. 52. 5

582 Including the Greeks from Asia Minor and Cyprus. Demosthenes (51. 237) mentions 2 000 Greek mercenary riders for -338 and Arr. Anab. 3. 7. 1 mentions still 2 000 Greek mercenary riders in Persian service in -331. For the total see Griffith, p. 21

583 Indeed Diodor 18. 9. gives their number as 8 000 (plus perhaps those 6 000 with Harpalos on the isle of Crete on their way to Cyrene).

584 “Alexander’s Newly founded Cities”

585 Diod. 17. 83. 2: 7 000 natives and 3 000 from the half-combatants..

586 Theopomp Fr. 115, F 110

587 Plut. Mor. 438 e

588 Arr. Anab. 4. 4.

589 Curtius 7. 6. 25 – 27

590 Tarn p. 233: “Alexandria in Egypt was the first of Alexander’s foundations”

591 “katoikiai” is a name used by Epigonoi for their own foundings. No real difference, no need to mix it up with Alexander III.

592 Diodor 17. 83. 2: “ἀλλας πόλεις” (to Tarn this is “absurd”)

593 Phoenician traders: Arr. Anab. 6. 22. 4, courtesans: Curt. 5. 7. 2, Plut. Alex. 38. 1-2, women and children: Justin 12. 4, Diod. 17. 94. 4, Arr. Anab. 6. 25. 5, sailors: Arr. Anab. 6. 1. 6, 6. 2. 4., Greeks liberated from Persian captivity: Curt. 5. 18. 19, Diod. 18. 19, Justin 11. 14., 3 000 actors and athletes: Arr. 7. 14. 10

594 Tscherikover 1923, Tarn 1948, Fraser 1996, Cohen 2013

595 e. g. Kroll, Ath. Cav. Archives

596 Arr. Anab. 7. 9. 6, Curt. 10. 2. 24

597 Plut. Alex. 15. 1

598 These expenses were not immediately to be paid for. The soldiers at the payday received pocket money only. Only when a man became a veteran he was to be paid out.

599 Diod. 17. 6. 4: 100 couches, Aesch. 2. 162: banquet for 200 guests

600 Athen. 12. 532 D: Chares feast for “the Athenians” cost 60 “talents”. Ptolemy II. is supposed to have spent more than 2 000 Egyptian (see Hultsch) “talents” on a feast. Yet this still seems to be boasted tenfold.

601 Arr. Anab. 1. 2. 1 in Europe, Parmenio in Asia stormed the city of Grynium and sold the population (see Kholod, p. 432)

602 Plut. Alex. 15. 2, Eum. 2. 2

603 Justin 13. 1

604 Diod. 19. 56. 5

605 Plut. Vit. Dec. 7

606 In ten year shares in Macedonian mining? Hypereides 4. 35: “Epicrates of Pallene got 300 talents out of his mines”

607 Plut. Vit. Dec. 11

608 In Ephesos, Magnesia and Tralles further tax liabilities were abated, Arr. Anab. 1. 17. 10, 1. 18. 1-2

609 Arr. Anab. 1. 17. 3

610 Arr. Anab. 1. 17. 1-2

611 Arr. Anab. 1. 17. 7-8

612 Curt. 3. 1. 20: 5 600 Thracians and Triballians were recruited in -332 and the army payed. I rather doubt more Greek mercenaries.

613 Arr. Anab. 2. 1. 7

614 Arr. Anab. 1. 27. 4, 2. 5. 5: such sums could be procured by property taxes only.

615 Arr. Anab. 2. 11. 10, Justin 11. 9

616 Curt. 3. 12. 16, Arr. Anab. 2. 15. 1, Plut. Alex. 24

617 Arr. Anab. 2. 13. 10

618 Curt. 4. 7. 5

619 Diod. 17. 52. 6

620 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 29, 2. 3. 14, 2. 3. 17

621 William Duane, Philadelphia, 1814, p. 4

622 Rüstov & Köchly, “Kriegswesens”, p. 104

623 “ὄρθιας σπείρας” in Plut. Titus Flam. 4. 4

624 Vegetius 1. 9. 2

625 e. g. Aelian Tactica 31. 1. See also Steinwender, “Römische Taktik”, p. 426
The effort spent so far to prove a unique Roman fighting style is impressive: “Maniples” that fight individually, or widen their formation in front of the enemy, or take turns during fighting, or throw their “pila” by ranks for continuous fire are all ingenious ideas. Still they are mere folly. Infantry for battle had to march up to a line, the phalanx. The denser this could be realized, the better it was. Nothing more was ever done or aspired to in the -first millennium.

626 Hist. 12. 18

627 Plut. Alex. 33. 3 “πρὶν δὲ συμμε͠μιξαι τοὺς πρώτους ἐξέκλιναν ὁὶ βάρβαροι – before the foremost ranks were engaged, the barbarians gave way.”

628 Arr. Anab. 1. 6. 1

629 Plat. Laws 833 d-e, 794 c, 813 d- 814 b, 829 a- 831 a; Politeia: 416 d, 422 b, 521 d, 543 b

630 Plat. Prot. 350 A

631 Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 8 – 15; which indicates of course that there was a discussion.

632 Xen. Cav. Com. 6. 5: “A cavalry commander must be able to throw a javelin.”

633 If Plut. Alex. 58. 4 is to be believed, king Alexander himself could not swim. In Curtius 9. 4. 12. he at least intended to plunge into the water.

634 Arr. Anab. 7. 6. 1

635 Hatzopoulos, IG 10, EKM 1 Beroia. 1 (SEG 27. 261)

636 Odo of Deuil, “De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem”; ed. and trans. V. G. Berry p. 24-25

637 IG 10, Hatzopoulos, 63

638 Curtius 8. 2. 16: “king Alexander has 30 horses with him”; 10. 2. 23: “the royal household has a worth of 60 talents.”

639 Arr. Anab. 4. 13. 1

640 Curtius 3. 3. 27

641 Polyb. Hist. 6. 40

642 Carl v. Martens: “Lehre von der Militärverpflegung” p. 42: “Ein bedeutendes Heer von über 70 000 Mann, gleichwie eingeteilt, kann nicht in einer Kolonne Märsche machen, weil die Last für das Land, besonders der Vorspann, zu drückend würde.”

643 Ibid. p. 47: “Es wird daher vorausgesetzt, dass keine Kolonne über 60 000 Mann stark sei.”

644 Polyaen 3. 10 , Curtius 6. 6. 14

645 For comparison Diod. 19. 37. 2: “…they occupied quarters divided in many parts, the detachments six days march apart from each other.”

646 Ibid. 19. 13. 6: “He divided the army into three parts for the dearth of food.”

647 Plut. Alex. 15. 1

648 e. g. Arr. Anab. 3. 23. 2

649 Martens, p. 84: “Ein Strich, eine Meile breit auf beiden Seiten des Wegs ( ) liefert an die Hilfsmagazine.”

650 Martens, p. 90: “Speicher und Gutsvorräte, Bäcker und Müllervorräte und sogar die des Einzelnen sind anzugeben und werden weggenommen.”

651 Curtius. 7. 4. 24

652 Martens, p. 91: “Wenn die Vorräte sonst versteckt bleiben ist es ratsam, Bezahlung in Aussicht zu stellen.”

653 Arr. Anab. 6. 20. 5: four months for the whole army…

654 Ibid. 6. 22. 4

655 Xen. Cyrop. 4. 5. 42

656 Sallust B. J. 45

657 Plut. Cleo. 12. 3

658 Diod. 20. 29. 6

659 Quinctilian Inst. Oratoria 8. 6. 42: „…you might compare it to an army with as many camp-followers as soldiers…“

660 Livius Epitome LXVII: 80 000 fighters with 40 000 non- combatants..

661 Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 8

662 Ibid. 4. 2. 29

663 Xen. Cyr. 1. 6. 43

664 Ibid. 1. 6. 9

665 Xen. Cav. Com. 4. 6

666 Ibid. 4. 7

667 Plut. Arat. 5. 4, Aeneas Tact. 6. 1

668 Diod. 14. 104. gives 40 “stades”, in 17. 33. 1. 30 “stades” as well within the screen. In single missions they of course could be sent even farther ahead; Arr. Anab. 6. 32. 2

669 Diod. 11. 21. 41

670 Aeneas Tact. 6. 4 “The scouts should signal in relay and be swift to report what cannot be signaled.”

671 e. g. Arr. Anab. 2. 8. 1 “Proteas waits for the scouting reports before he moves.”

672 Arr. Anab. 6. 19. 3

673 Ibid. 2. 7. 2

674 Vegez. 4. 37

675 e. g. Curtius 3. 4. 13

676 e. g. Arr. Anab. 4. 30. 5 – 6

677 e. g. ibid 1. 12. 7

678 Curtius 3. 13. 2

679 Arr. Anab. 3. 7. 16

680 Ibid. 4. 28. 8 Ptolemy, the “somatophylax”, on forage expedition reconnoitres farther off and reports to the king: He found an army with more fires than in the king’s camp. The king, however, did not believe him.

681 Curtius 4. 12. 4-5

682 Xen. Cav. Com. 4. 16

683 Arr. Anab. 3. 8. 1 – 4

684 King Alexander gave Hephaistion permission to read his letters as “he too was Alexander” Arr. Anab. 2. 7. 14

685 Plut. Mor. 790 A

686 Diod. 19. 57. 5: “He established trough the part of Asia he was master of a system of fire signals and despatch carriers, to have quick service in his business.”

687 Polyb. 10. 43

688 Plut. Alex. 5. 1

689 Xen. Cyr. 6. 3. 6

690 Sun Tzu 13. 6

691 Xen. Cav. 4. 8

692 Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 4

693 Sun Tsu 13. 14

694 Ibid. 13. 17.

695 Polyorketica 5. 31

696 Lys. 19. 7

697 Claud. Ael. “Varia historia” 9. 2

698 Xen. Cav. Com. 9. 8

699 Sun Tzu, 3. 3

700 Caes. B. Civ. 3. 50 – 53

701 Vegez Epitomes 4. 7

702 Clausewitz, Vol. 6, p. 115 f

703 Arr. Anab. 3. 6. 19

704 Diod. 14. 41 ff

705 Arr. Anab. 4. 2. 1: “κὰτα λόχους κλίμακας ποιε͂ισθαι..”

706 Pol. Hist. 5. 97

707 Vitruv. Arch. 10. 13

708 Arr. Anab. 1. 20. 12

709 Polyb. 9. 41, Diod. 20. 91

710 Curtius 8. 10. 30: The mound is completed in nine days.

711 Polyb. 5. 99

712 For details see Rüstov & Köchly, “Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller”

713 Livy 32. 17. mentions that the wheels ran on or in rails.

714 Polyb. 5. 100

715 For the number see Plut. Ant. 38. 2: a giant ram of 24 meters length albeit is mentioned there

716 Apollodor’s “Polyorketica” 137. 4: “that each will be effective, protective and safe, and that as far as possible all shall be made of easily provided materials, light in weight, well engineered and quick to produce with unskilled labor.”

717 Arr. Anab. 2. 24. 12

718 Diod. 20. 9. 1

719 Arr. Anab. 2. 18. 1 ff

720 See note 557

721 Arr. Anab. 2. 2. 1, Curtius 5. 30. 4

722 Diod. 17. 48

723 This number too is assumed by Polybios (12. 18)

724 These would include 40 000 horses (=1 000 tons of water, 280 tons of hay, 120 tons of barley and 40 tons of straw per day)

725 Caes. B. Afr. 1. 19

726 Curtius 4. 9. 3 estimates the Persian force at Gaugamela as one and a half compared to that of Issos

727 The personal engagement of the kings in this battle therefore did not happen. Alexander was with Menidas when Parmenio called for aid.

728 AT Maccabee I 1. 1.-1. 10

729 SEG 9. 2: Macedonia and many other states imported grain. D. 34. 37: The price for one “medimnos” of grain increased to 16 “drachmas”.

730 Heraklit B 53

731 Mommsen “Römische Geschichte” p. 140 compares “Epiros” to “Makedonia” like “Hessia” to “Prussia” (19^th cent.)

732 Plut. Pyrr. 19. 5

733 Polyb. 18. 28. 10: to mix troops of different value in the smallest units increases resilience.

734 Plut. Pyrr. 17. 5

735 Homer Illiad IV/299

736 Frontin. 2. 3. 21

737 Frontin. 2. 3. 7

738 Ibid. 4. 14

739 Bähr, § 243

740 Polyb. 18. 24. 9.

741 Liv. 33. 8. 13.

742 Compare Livy 7. 16. 5: “piloque posito stricto gladio in hostem impetum facit”.

743 To translate: “He ordered the spears to be laid away as they were a hindrance because of their length and to charge with the sword”, reveals a one-dimensional reception of the source (and makes Philipp V. looking like an idiot).

744 Cassius Dio, Hist. 78. 7. 1 – 2